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Summary 
The role played by the Spanish Communist Party (Partido Comunista de 
Espana, PCE) during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 remains controversial to 
this day. Yet despite the wealth of work which exists on the PCE during the war, 
none has examined party activity in any detail. Furthermore, while events in the 
city of Madrid during the war provided the framework for both the rise and 
demise of the PCE, many studies have tended to focus instead on Barcelona 
and Cataluna. In contrast to the lack of secondary material on Madrid and the 
PCE, a wealth of Spanish archival material exists on communist activity within 
the city and province. 
The origins of communist dominance during the Spanish Civil War lie with the 
particular national and international conjuncture which enabled the PCE to fulfil 
a particular role when other organisations could not. Thus chapter one 
examines the origins of the PCE within the context of Spain's Second Republic 
and chapter two discusses the party's behaviour prior to and after the coup and 
the outbreak of civil war. Chapter three explores the party's role in the defence 
of Madrid and the effect of this on both the prosecution of the war, and the 
growth of the party. Chapter four examines the PCE's role in mobilising different 
groups in order to meet the needs of the war, while chapter five examines the 
fragility of the PCE's support base, further undermined as material privation 
worsened. Finally, in chapter six the party's demise is charted within the context 
of the Republic's poor military and material situation, and an unfavourable 
V 
international political arena. Much more than a Soviet puppet, the PCE 
absorbed and channelled all the hopes and aspirations of the Spanish Republic, 
binding itself in the process to a cause which was increasingly doomed. 
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Introduction 
The role played by the Spanish Communist Party (Partido Comunista de 
Espana, PCE) during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39, remains controversial 
to this day. Over the past 60 years a heated debate has ensued between those 
who seek to explain the political ascendancy of the PCE during the war as a 
direct result of Soviet intentions to establish a satellite regime in Spain, and 
those who have sought to explain communist dominance within the framework 
of the pre-existing political and social order in Spain. The debate was further 
obfuscated by both Francoist and official communist histories produced in the 
1960s. The former served to justify the military coup of 1936 on the pretext that 
the communists were about to seize power, while the latter also overstated the 
strength and influence of the pre-war communist movement in Spain. 
Of those studies which argue for the attempted sovietisation of Spain, the most 
well-known and thorough-going is that of Burnett Bolloten, who dedicated a 
large part of his life to this work. First published as The Grand Camouflage in 
1958, revised in 1979 as The Spanish Revolution, and expanded in 1991 as 
The Spanish Civil War, ' Bolloten's central thesis is that the Communist 
International (Comintem), through its obedient agents in the PCE and their 
unwitting Spanish accomplices, the bourgeois republicans and the right wing of 
the Spanish Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol, PSOE) 
' Burnett Bolloten, The Grand Camouflage. The Spanish Civil War and Revolution. 1936-39, 
(Pall Mail Press, London, 1968); The Spanish Revolution. The left and the struggle for power 
during the Civil War, (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1979); The Spanish Civil 
War. Revolution and Counterrevolution, (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf. 1991). 
5 
dismantled the revolution unleashed by anarchist and left-wing socialist groups 
in the wake of the military rebellion in 1936.2 The communists achieved this by 
rebuilding the bourgeois state apparatus, incorporating the workers' militias into 
the regular army and bringing collectivised industry and agriculture under 
centralised control, while intimidating, persecuting and even purging their leftist 
opponents through the establishment of a regime of terror akin to that of 
Stalinist Russia. The objective was firstly to facilitate the Russian quest for an 
alliance with the western democracies and ultimately to establish a Soviet- 
dominated regime in Spain. 3 In the course of his work Bolloten amassed an 
enormous volume of extremely valuable material which is housed today at 
Stanford University. His thorough examination of the subject means that on 
many issues his work is an accurate and invaluable source. He is correct in his 
claim that the communists collaborated with moderate socialists and 
republicans to reassert the authority of the central state, and that this occurred 
at the expense of more thorough-going social reform and political reform. It is 
also true that the PCE advocated the creation of a Popular Army to replace the 
militias, and was involved in the persecution of political opponents, most notably 
the dissident Marxist party, the Partido Obrero de Unificacibn Marxista (POUM). 
Nevertheless, Bolloten's main argument is deeply flawed as his interpretative 
framework was constructed purely in the context of post-I 945 Europe. In his 
assessment of the Spanish Republic, Bolloten ignored the pre-1936 divisions of 
the Spanish left, and assigns these groups an entirely passive role in the events 
2 Throughout this thesis I have used 'republican' to denote members of specifically republican 
parties and groups, and 'Republican' to denote all those who supported the Republic during the 
civil war of 1936-39. This also applies to derivative terms: republican-socialist government, 
1931-33, Republican zone, Republican institutions, etc. 3 See Paul Preston's critical review of Bolloten's work which appeared in The English Historical 
Review, October 1993, pp. 990-92 
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of 1936-39. Moreover, his argument overlooks the underlying reason why the 
Republic, so badly disadvantaged militarily against the Nationalists, would need 
to centralise its resources and subordinate everything to the war effort. He also 
fails to explore the reasons behind the PCE's overwhelming popular appeal in 
the Republican zone, particularly during the first two years of the conflict, and 
finally, in the absence of concrete evidence, his case rests on assumptions 
concerning Stalin's intentions, which are still unknown. 
Bolloten's erroneous assessment remains worthy of discussion, however, 
despite its obvious flaws, because it invites more thorough studies of the 
Spanish Civil War in order that a greater understanding of the communists' role 
during the conflict can be reached. For my own part, I was undoubtedly drawn 
to the Spanish Civil War because of a personal fascination with the Soviet role 
in the conflict. With the opening up of the Soviet archives in the post-Soviet era, 
it seemed that, at last, answers would be found to many of the questions asked 
about Soviet intervention. New material has indeed addressed some of the 
issues concerning the nature of and extent of the Soviet Union's activity in the 
Spanish Republic. Excellent work has been produced on diverse areas such as 
the extent of Soviet military assistance (by Gerald Howson), the impact of 
Soviet intervention including the role of Soviet personnel in Spain (by Daniel 
Kowaisky), and the nature of Comintem's relations with the Spanish 
communists, (by Tim Rees and by Antonio Elorza and Marta Bizcarrondo) to 
4 name but a few. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the question of Stalin's intentions 
4 Gerald Howson, Arms for Spain, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998); Daniel 
Kowalsky, La Unidn Sovietica v la auerra civil EsoaMola. 1936-39: Una revision critica, (Critica, 
Barcelona, 2003); Tim Rees, The 'Good Bolsheviks': The Spanish Communist Party and the 
Third Period' in In Search of Revolution: International Communist Parties in the Third Period, 
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remains unanswered, but has also become less relevant as new work has 
challenged preconceptions about the extent of Moscow's control both at home 
and abroad in the mid-1930s. 5 In this context, much of the recent work using 
previously unseen archival sources has raised questions about the extent of 
Comintern influence and control over the PCE, serving to challenge the idea 
that the PCE was a carefully controlled organisation blindly following Moscow's 
instructions. 
From a different perspective, pioneering work by Paul Preston on the origins of 
the Spanish Civil War, by Santos Julia on the socio-economic changes 
occurring in Madrid, and by Helen Graham on the pre-war divisions of the 
PSOE, the largest pre-war workers' party in Spain, have provided a partial 
framework within which the PCE's lack of implantation before 1936 and its 
meteoric rise after 1936 can be explored. Furthermore, given that the PCE 
became a mass party during the civil war, for the first (and last) time in its 
history, this development raises questions not only about how the Party could 
become so successful, but also about its political and social identity. Hitherto, 
however, no work has addressed the subject of the wartime Communist Party in 
any detail. The vast majority of work has tended to focus, understandably, on 
the international dimensions of communism in Spain, without paying attention to 
the activities of grassroots militants or local and provincial organisations. It is 
(ed. ) Worley, Matthew, (I. B. Tauris & Co., London and New York, 2004), pp. -174-202; Tim Rees, 'The Highpoint of Comintem Influence? The Communist Party and the Civil War in Spain' in 
International Communism and the Communist International: 1919-43, (eds. ) Tim Rees and 
Andrew Thorpe (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1999), pp. 143-67; Antonio Elorza 
and Marta Bizcarrondo, Queridos Carnaradas: La Intemacional Comunista v Espana. 1919-39, 
jPlaneta, Barcelona, 1999) 
See for example Jeremy Agnew and Kevin McDermott, The Comintern: A History of 
International Communism from Lenin to Stalin, (Macmillan, Hampshire and London, 1996) as 
well as the works cited above. 
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these two contrasting approaches, of the international and national political 
conjuncture, which serve as a framework for my thesis. 
Starting from the premise that the role of the PCE deserves more attention, it 
soon became apparent during the course of my research that although the city 
of Madrid, as the Spanish capital, was integral to both the evolution of the PCE 
as a political entity and to any study of the Spanish Civil War, many studies 
have tended to focus on Barcelona and Cataluna, and to extrapolate for the 
whole of Spain the experiences of this particular region. The lack of secondary 
material on Madrid, particularly on the provincial PCE, in both the Spanish and 
English languages, in contrast to the wealth of Spanish archival sources on the 
city, makes Madrid a viable area for study of the PCE during the Spanish Civil 
War. Madrid is also ideal for the study of the evolution of a political party such 
as the PCE because it was never captured in combat by the Nationalists and 
remained a Republican stronghold until the very end of the war. The city of 
Madrid was centre stage at both the beginning and end of the conflict: during 
the epic defence of the city against Nationalist troops in the winter of 1936, and 
again in the spring of 1939, where it was the scene of the anti-communist 
military coup led by Colonel Casado. This context, therefore, offers an 
opportunity to study the trajectory of the Party, its activities and aspirations 
during the whole conflict. However, this study is not solely concerned with the 
activities of communists within the city of Madrid, but also examines the 
evolution of the Party at a national level in relation to its achievements within the 
city. In this respect Madrid becomes an explanatory framework for both the rise 
and demise of the Party. 
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In many ways it was the PCE's ability to fulfil a specific role at a specific time 
when other political entities could not which helps to explain the Party's political 
ascendancy during the war. In order to understand the origins of communist 
dominance it is essential to begin with the origins of the PCE, and the reasons 
for the Party's lack of substantial political implantation before 1936. In Madrid, 
an important centre of communist activism, militants had a significant impact on 
both of these developments. The particular national political conjuncture which 
fostered the Party's growth after the international communist movement's 
adoption of the Popular Front policy in 1935, as well as the social and political 
milieu in Madrid, was also immensely significant in terms of the Party's growth 
in members and influence, on both a national and provincial level. These 
themes, are taken up in chapter one, while chapter two examines the Party's 
behaviour in the immediate pre-war period following the successful election of a 
Popular Front government in February 1936. For the first time, the PCE 
assumed a national political presence and began to work largely within the 
framework of parliamentary democracy, although there were inherent 
contradictions within communist ideology which Popular Frontism had failed to 
properly address, and which were largely unresolved by the outbreak of war in 
the summer of 1936. As both the capital city and the seat of the Communist 
movement's national leadership, as well as the home of a growing provincial 
communist party organisation, Madrid provides an ideal location within which to 
examine communist responses the political instability in the spring and summer 
of 1936, as well as to the coup and the outbreak of civil war. Such responses, 
as will be demonstrated, were often improvised, suggesting both that Soviet 
10 
influence was more tenuous than is often assumed, and that at national and 
provincial levels communists responded to the particular set of circumstances in 
which they found themselves. However, the internal dynamic of democratic 
centralism which characterised the PCE by 1936 meant that national and 
provincial leaderships were able to respond rapidly to the demands of war, 
organising militants in the city and the province, and establishing an efficient 
fighting force in the Fifth Regiment. The Party's internal dynamic of democratic 
centralism was also usefully externalised for the purposes of Popular Front unity 
and the military policy Mando Onico (a single unified military command). 
Chapter three explores the Party's role in the defence of Madrid, its mobilisation 
of civilians, the impact of Soviet military aid, and the influence of communist 
concepts of unity and the imagery of the city's defence, on both the prosecution 
of the war, and the growth of the Party. The communists' role in the 
recuperation of the authority of the central government, and by association, 
bourgeois democracy, through its administration of public order in the city is 
also discussed. Much of the PCE's support came in the form of the mass non- 
party political organisations sponsored by the Party. These were useful to the 
Party for engaging with people outside the typical syndical or political arenas, 
but also a means to achieving a kind of hegemony for the communist movement 
in Spain. In fact it was the deployment of these local networks of social power 
that enabled the PCE to access these hitherto untapped resources during the 
battle of Madrid and thereafter. Chapter four examines the PCE's role in 
mobilising different groups within the Republican zone in order to meet the 
needs of the war, and to lay the foundations of the post-war Republican society. 
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Through its antifascist organisations such as the women's group, the 
Agrupacibn de Mujeres Antifascistas (AMA), and the solidarity organisation of 
the Comintern, Socorro Rojo International (SRI), volunteers performed useful 
functions in the rearguard, and served to boost morale at the front. However, 
the impact of these bodies was limited, raising questions about the extent of 
communist influence: the work of the AMA to get women into the workplace, for 
example, was not taken as seriously as was needed to have been effective. 
Where the communists were influential, such as in the institutionalisation of the 
milicianos de cultura, which provided literacy classes to the soldiers of the 
Republic's new Popular Army, they built upon the educational initiatives 
undertaken by the republican-socialist coalition of 1931-33. The more 
generalised support gained for the PCE through these organisations was to 
provide a social and political power base for the PCE, but such support was 
transitory and began to decline as the population lost faith in the possibility of 
victory. 
Chapter five takes up this theme, in addition to exploring the limitations of 
communist influence which began with the restitution of Republican authority 
form April 1937 onwards. This was especially pertinent in the province of Madrid, 
where the PCE's strength lay in these more informal power networks and within 
the military, but was less influential within official political circles. Within the 
recently created forces of law and order too, the PCE in Madrid also found itself 
in a position of relative weakness. Furthermore, the pace of change during the 
war had left the Party without sufficient numbers of politically competent cadres 
to maintain the Party's link with the masses and to exert the influence it desired 
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within government and administrative institutions, throughout Madrid and its 
province. The communists sent their best men to the army, and counted on 
huge numbers of affiliates to the Unified Youth organisation, the JSU, among 
the young men who made up its ranks. Additionally, the PCE counted on a 
number of military professionals, who, attracted to the communist emphasis on 
military discipline, had joined the organisation after the outbreak of war. Yet 
despite these factors, the Party's hegemony within the army was never assured. 
Indeed, the Party's reliance on military professionals in the face of the Casado 
coup was to prove to be a terrible mistake. The close association of the PCE 
with a policy of steadfast resistance, first articulated during the defence of 
Madrid, meant that the Party was increasingly associated with the prolongation 
of the war. As material conditions within the Republican zone deteriorated, 
support grew for the illusory notion of a mediated or negotiated settlement with 
the Nationalists. However, the communists continued as the principal 
supporters of the socialist Prime Minister Negrin in his advocacy of a policy of 
maximum resistance. This was predicated on obtaining a peace with 
guarantees for the civilian population from Franco, given the brutality of 
Nationalist repression in the areas already conquered. In the rearguard, above 
all in the Centre-South zone, war-weariness, starvation and disease began to 
take its toll, while at the front, a lack of weaponry due to the international arms 
embargo imposed by the Non-Intervention agreement, and the capitulation of 
France and Great Britain to Hitler at Munich, seriously undermined morale, the 
Republic's capacity to resist, and faith in the policy of resistance itself. It was in 
such a context that demise of the PCE occurred. In Madrid the communist 
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movement became increasingly isolated, divisions within the JSU became acute, 
and the Party organisation suffered as men were drafted into the Republican 
army and neophyte. militants drifted away. In such a situation increasingly 
women took on organisational and leadership roles. These themes, as well as 
the overthrow of both the PCE and Negrin's government by Casado's military 
coup in Madrid in March 1939, will be explored in chapter six. 
Additionally, running throughout this study are a number of general themes, 
which are thrown into relief by a study of the PCE in Madrid. The relationship of 
the PCE to the Comintern was fundamental, both in terms of the Party's 
evolution as an organisation, and in that the adoption of the Popular Front policy 
by the international communist movement created the framework within which 
the Party should work during the war. This created a number of problems for the 
internal dynamic of the Party, centred on the unresolved issue of whether it was 
to be mass or elite, reformist or revolutionary, in character. The issue of Popular 
Frontism also revealed the heterogeneity of ideas subsumed within both the 
Comintern and the PCE as individuals within these organisations embraced or 
struggled with the new policy. These issues engender discussion of what it 
meant to be a communist both before and during the Spanish Civil War. Madrid, 
as one of the largest centres of communist militancy, both before and during the 
civil war, as well as, at times, a breeding ground for internal Party dissidence, 
provides an ideal framework within which to explore these ideas. Also related to 
the Party's espousal of Popular Frontism was the communists' discourse and 
policy of unity which informed the behaviour of the Party during wartime, the 
nature of its relationships with other political and syndical organisations, and 
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ultimately the way in which the Republic prosecuted the war. The activities and 
behaviour of communist militants in the city and province of Madrid and their 
contact with other groups illustrate the way in which the unity policy was 
implemented on the ground, and also highlight the limitations of communist 
influence. This is highly significant in terms of evaluating the extent of 
communist dominance overall during the civil war. In contrast to earlier studies 
such as those by Bolloten, which have focussed on Barcelona and have 
produced rather skewed impressions of communism's implantation in the 
Republican zone, this study, through focussing on Madrid, demonstrates that 
communist hegemony was never as thoroughgoing as might be assumed. 
Finally, a key element in the PCE's ascendancy was the symbolic and actual 
significance of the defence of Madrid. The Party used the imagery of Madrid's 
defence to good effect, earning it support from many quarters and reaffirming 
belief in victory. Significantly, the Party's ascendancy was encouraged because 
its political outlook coincided with that of republicans and moderate socialists. 
Ultimately all these groups withdrew their support when they realised the PCE 
could not deliver the victory it seemed to promise in the winter of 1936. 
This study has evolved over the course of a number of years, the original 
concept arising from a number of discussions I had as an undergraduate, with 
my current supervisor, Dr. Mary Vincent. I would like therefore to express 
particular thanks to Mary for encouraging me both to pursue my ideas, and to 
resume my studies after a hiatus of several years. I would also like to express 
thanks for her guidance and support over the course of this study, and her 
15 
invaluable comments and constructive criticism of my thesis as it has evolved. I 
am grateful to those who have shared their knowledge and insight of Spanish 
history with me, in particular, Helen Graham, Tim Rees, and Julius Ruiz. 
Discussions with Hazel Nicholson have also informed my ideas on the 
internationalism of left-wing solidarity. I am also grateful to several Russian 
specialists - David Shepherd in the department of Russian and Slavonic studies 
and Miriam Dobson of the history department, both at the University of Sheffield. 
I would also like to express my gratitude to the archivists of the Civil War 
archive in Salamanca and especially to Victoria Ramos at the PCE archive in 
Madrid. Special thanks are reserved for my partner John Palmer, without whose 
support I doubt this study would ever have been possible, and to my family and 
friends, particularly Lisa and Alex Howlett and Jane Cunliffe among others, who 
have provided me with accommodation over the past few years. Finally I would 
like to thank the University of Sheffield's History department for financial 
assistance provided for the purposes of archival research in Spain. 
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Chapter One. The PCE during the Second Spanish 
Republic. 
The origins of the PCE 
The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the creation of the communist Third 
International provoked debate in left-wing organisations across Europe. In 
Spain this resulted in the provisional affiliation of the anarcho-syndicalist 
Confederaci6n Nacional de Trabajo (CNT) to the Comintern in 1919, and a 
series of discussions within the Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE), and 
its youth movement, the Federaciön de Juventudes Socialistas Espafiolas, 
(FJSE or FJS). The founding of the first communist party in Spain was led by 
the Socialist Youth, when in April 1920, heeding Lenin's call to create 
communist parties all over Europe, the national leadership of the FJS sent a 
circular letter to its sections calling on members to abandon the Socialist Youth 
and to proclaim the birth of the Partido Comunista Espanol (PC). Among those 
that left the PSOE to join the PC were the majority of affiliates of the socialist 
Agrupacibn de Somorrostro, including the as yet unknown Dolores Ibamari, a 
future leader of the PCE. This youth initiative was soon followed by 
secessionists from the adult party (known as terceristas, because of their desire 
to affiliate to the Third International), who formed the PCOE (Partido Comunista 
Obrero Espanol), in April 1921. Since the statutes of the Comintern only 
allowed one national section per country, the international organisation forced a 
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unification of the two groups, and in November 1921 the PCE (Partido 
Comunista de Espana) was born. ' 
The Communist Party was still in its infancy when it was proscribed by Miguel 
Primo de Rivera, under his dictatorship of 1923-30. For a decade, Party life was 
punctuated by waves of arrests including the imprisonment of its leaders? The 
PCE differed little from most of the other newly formed communist parties, 
which were typically weak organisations with small and fluctuating memberships, 
which hampered their ability to forge stable networks of cadres and activists. 3 
Upon his arrival in Barcelona in December 1930, the Swiss Comintern envoy 
Jules Humbert-Droz exclaimed: 
There is nothing, nothing, nothing! A handful of half-anarchist types who 
don't know what to do. Neither party, nor newspaper, nor syndicates. 
What there is, is divided, subdivided, impotent ... 
4 
The Party's lack of members, organisation and discipline contrasted starkly with 
the PSOE which had enjoyed the privilege afforded by collaboration with the 
dictatorship .5 In fact some PCE members rejoined the PSOE, further 
' Jose Peirats, Anarchists in the Spanish Revolution. (Freedom Press, London, 1998), pp. 37- 
38; Dolores lbdrruri, El ünico camino, (Editorial Bruguera, Barcelona, 1979), p. 97; Mayte 
Gomez, 'Early Communist Cultural Politics in Spain: The Case of the Union Cultural Proletaria, 
1922, ' Bulletin of Hispanic Studies. 79,1, (2002), pp. 3-5 2 Victor Alba, The Communist Party in Spain. Transi. Vincent G. Smith (Transaction Books, 
New Brunswick, 1983) p. 86 3 Jeremy Agnew and Kevin McDermott, The Comintem: A History of International Communism 
from Lenin to Stalin, (Macmillan, Hampshire and London, 1996), p. 20 and Victor Alba, The 
Communist Party. p. 113. Alba attributes to the party a significant turnover of members. 
Antonio Elorza and Marta Bizcarrondo, Queridos Camaradas: La Intemacional Comunista y 
Esaafa. 1919-39, (Planeta, Barcelona, 1999), p. 141 s See Paul Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War. Reform. Reaction and Revolution in 
the Second Republic, (Methuen, London, 1978), chapter one, and Paul Heywood, Marxism and 
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contributing to a decline in numbers. However, repression and clandestinity 
offer only a partial explanation for the lack of implantation of the Party in its first 
few years. Another key element in the PCE's early failure was its internal 
divisions and factional struggles, which were, at least in part, the result of deep- 
seated ideological differences. Such differences originated in the political 
impulse which had prompted the creation of the PC and the PCOE. The PC 
founded by the members of the Socialist Youth, was essentially anti-reformist, 
in that it argued that the piecemeal social reform advocated by the PSOE would 
kill the revolutionary spirit of the masses. Moreover, many of its founders came 
from the Madrid section of the FJS, young intellectuals such as Juan Andrade, 
Jose Antonio Balbontin and Gabriel Leon Trilla. This 'intellectual' faction would 
continue to develop more radical responses to the issues of the day, operating 
at the margins of the PCE in organisations such as the Grupo Comunista 
Espafiol and the Union Cultural Proletaria, in the early 1920s. 
In contrast, the founders of the PCOE were older, and essentially reformist in 
outlook, products of the gradualist Pablista tradition of the PSOE. These very 
different outlooks were able to coexist within a single party throughout the 
1920s, in part because of the ambiguity of the Comintem's position by 1921. At 
its Third Congress, the Comintern acknowledged the failure of European 
communist parties to bring about revolution and instead put forward a policy of 
United Front, calling on communist parties to seek alliances with other workers' 
organisations including socialist parties, in order to create conditions for 
revolution. However, it was not clear how this should be done, leaving 
the Failure of Organised Socialism Spain 1876-1936. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1990), chapter four for a detailed analysis of this relationship. 
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communists in Spain to interpret the policy in two different ways. On the one 
hand, it could be seen as a temporary tactic to be used in order to overwhelm 
reformists through the radicalisation of the working class struggle, while waiting 
for a stronger spur of revolutionary impetus to take place. On the other hand, 
communists could also embrace it as part of a wider political strategy which 
meant admitting that parliamentarianism was a necessary step in the 
revolutionary process. The change in Comintern policy gave impetus to both 
wings of the Party, causing internal divisions throughout the 1920s and into the 
1930s and beyond. It also highlights a problem which was never entirely 
resolved by the PCE: whether it was itself a revolutionary or a reformist party. 
These inherent contradictions would come to the fore especially during the civil 
war period .6 
The Party was also divided over organisational issues, which originated with 
attempts by the Comintem to exercise greater control over its member parties, 
and which in Spain over time also fuelled further political differences within the 
PCE. The Leninist principles of party unity, discipline and democratic centralism 
were present in the Russian Bolshevik party from the outset. Indeed, it was 
Lenin's advocacy of the necessity of the 'vanguard party' of dedicated 
professional revolutionaries to lead the proletarian revolution which split the 
Russian Social Democratic Party in 1905 into the Bolshevik and Menshevik 
factions! However, the national sections which formed in the wake of the 
Russian Revolution and affiliated to the Third International initially did not 
necessarily share these 'Bolshevik' characteristics. Furthermore, during Lenin's 
6 Mayte G6mez, 'Early Communist Cultural Politics in Spain, ' pp. 6-10 7 Robert Service, Lenin: A Political Life: Vol. I The Strengths of Contradiction, (Indiana 
University Press, Bloomington, 1985), pp. 40-44, pp. 88-93 
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lifetime the International which guided them embodied a degree of pluralism 
and open debate. But a number of developments during this period also 
foreshadowed the type of organisation it would become. The International was 
entwined with the Soviet Party from its inception, initially because of the 
prestige of the Bolsheviks as the only Marxist group to have actually carried out 
a successful revolution. The weakness of foreign communist parties and the 
great difficulties of travel to and from Moscow made it inevitable that the day-to- 
day running of the Comintem would be dominated by Soviet personnel. 
Bolshevik prestige as the revolutionary vanguard party also influenced the 
establishment of conditions for admission to the Comintern, introduced at its 
Second World Congress in 1920, to exclude reformist tendencies, while the 
perceived inaction and failure of the loose federal structure of the Second 
International permitted the development of a highly centralised Third 
International. The Congress also sanctioned the primacy of the Russian Party in 
the day-to-day administration of the Comintern, and empowered the 
International's Executive Committee (ECCI) to expel whole parties as well as 
groups or individuals. The resolutions of the Third and Fourth Congresses 
reproduced the Bolshevik organisational model in the Comintern. The creation 
of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) Presidium, 
Secretariat, Organisational Bureau and International Control Committee 
paralleled the Russian Party structure and strengthened the tendency to 
concentrate power in smaller bodies which as a rule were headed by Bolshevik 
cadres. '5 This 'Bolshevisation', that is 'Russification', of the Comintern was 
8 Agnew & McDermott, The Comintern, p. 14, p. 17, pp. 23-25. 
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extended to its member sections and was reflected in attempts by the 
Comintern to'Boishevise' the Spanish party. 
The appointment of Jose Bullejos as general secretary of the PCE by Moscow 
in 1925 was part of this process of Bolshevisation. He was charged with the 
reorganisation of the Spanish party, which included bringing the more 
autonomous federations of Cataluna, Asturias and Vizcaya under central 
authority. However, there was discontent among many party members, who 
refused to accept the leadership that had been imposed upon them by Moscow. 
In particular the two most significant dissident groups - the Federaciön 
Comunista Catalano-Balear (FCC-B), (formed from around 30 syndicalist 
communists who had joined the PCE in 1924), and the Agrupacibn Comunista 
de Madrid (ACM), - regarded the leadership as petty bureaucrats responsible 
for the ineffectiveness of the party. There was also widespread opposition in the 
Party to the policy of mass expulsion of those who disagreed with the policies 
implemented by the leadership. This was the first time arbitrary expulsions had 
been used to resolve political disputes, but hereafter it became a permanent 
characteristic of communist party culture. 9 
By 1930 the PCE was completely disorganised and could only count on a few 
hundred Affiliates. The syndicalist-revolutionary origin of the FCC-B had always 
distinguished it from the rest of the PCE, but now the opposition of the FCC-B to 
the bureaucratic methods of the leadership had deepened to acquire a more 
9 Elorza and Bizcarrondo, Queridos Camaradas, p. 53; Tim Rees, 'The "Good Bolsheviks": The 
Spanish Communist Party and the Third Period' in In Search of Revolution: International 
Communist Parties in the Third Period, (ed. ) Matthew Worley (I. B. Tauris & Co., London & New 
York, 2004), p. 179; Andrew Charles Durgan, B. O. C. 1930-36: EI bloaue obrem v camDesino, 
(Laertes, Barcelona, 1996), p. 37, pp. 83-84; Alba, The Communist Party, p. 99 
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political character, and the organisation was expelled from the PCE. Meanwhile, 
disagreements between the ACM and the PCE leadership came to a head in 
the summer of 1930 when three members of the local committee were expelled 
after a financial dispute with the leadership. The one hundred or so militants of 
the ACM expressed their immediate support for the local committee and the 
Executive Committee responded by expelling almost all of them. For the next 
seventeen months the ACM maintained itself as an independent organisation 
outside of the PCE and rapidly aligned itself with the FCC-B. Both organisations 
made repeated calls for the reestablishment of internal party democracy. 
Attempts at mediation by Humbert-Droz failed and in 1931 the FCC-B joined 
with the Partit Comunista Catalä (PCC). The product of this union would be the 
dissident Marxist group the Bloc Obrer i Camperol (BOC), forerunner of the 
POUM. The five or six years after the appointment of Bullejos were therefore 
characterised by crises and internal disputes which absorbed the main part of 
the activity of the PCE. In 1931 the entire national Party numbered only around 
800 militants. However, the political orientation of the Party also demonstrated 
its increasing lack of contact with the reality of the country, a situation 
aggravated by erroneous instructions from the Comintern, and which also 
contributed to its lack of implantation in Spain. 10 
In 1930 the Primo dictatorship collapsed, undermined by the end of the 
economic boom that had supported the regime. " Agrarian and industrial elites 
10 Durgan, B. O. C. 1930-36, p. 37; Cruz, EI Partido Comunista de Esoaf a en la II Rea(jblica, 
(Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1987), p. 59 
Shlomo Ben-Ami, The Origins of the Second Republic in Spain, (Oxford University Press, 
1978), p. 167, pp. 238-49 
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optimistically believed that there could be a return to the traditional order of the 
restoration monarchy. However, their hopes were dashed when a republican- 
socialist coalition emerged victorious from the municipal elections held across 
Spain on 12 April 1931. The polls signalled a clear rejection of the monarchy, 
and a Republic was declared to popular acclaim, in the capital and throughout 
the country. 12 The PCE responded by railing against this jubilation: 'Down with 
the Monarchy, yes, but also the Bourgeois Republic! ' read the headline of the 
Communist daily Mundo Obrero, 13 while a small group of militants held the red 
flag aloft as their truck drove past the Royal Palace on Plaza de Oriente in 
Madrid, much to the disgust of the jeering multitude. 14 This episode revealed 
that the PCE was fundamentally out of step with the desires of ordinary people 
largely because its policy was formulated on the basis of abstract Marxist 
theories rather than the social and economic reality of Spain. In many respects, 
such behaviour reflected the perennial dichotomy of the PCE. It aspired to be a 
national party but was part of an international communist movement, which by 
the early 1930s was dictating, in the main, the policy it should follow and the 
type of internal party culture it should maintain. The influence of the Comintern 
would become even greater over the next few years, a symptom of its growing 
organisational and ideological rigidity. Thus, paradoxically, the PCE was 
ideologically more flexible at a time when its enforced clandestinity and factional 
disputes ensured the Party's limited reach, but when the Republic brought 
greater freedom of association and also a period of economic austerity 
12Cruz, EI Partido Comunista, p. 126 and Santos Julia Diaz, De La Fiesta Popular a la Lucha de 
las Clases: Madrid. 1931-34, (Siglo Veintiuno, Madrid, 1984), p. 9 Both argue that this support 
was truly popular, rather than narrowly political, in the sense that a wide cross-section of Madrid 
society supported it 
" Mundo Obrero, 18 April 1931. 
14 Cruz, EI Partido Comunista, p. 126 
24 
(witnessing more frequent manifestations of labour mobilisation and social 
unrest), no dramatic breakthrough occurred. During the republican period 
therefore, any discussion of the PCE must locate the party within the wider 
context of an international communist movement. 
Communism under the Second Spanish Republic 
At the advent of the Republic in Spain, the dispute between the ACM and the 
PCE remained unresolved. As a result the ACM presented its own list, separate 
from the PCE, in the June 1931 Parliamentary elections. But despite a high 
attendance at electoral meetings, the Madrid dissident list only obtained around 
700 votes, while the PCE obtained 2,500, in the capital, increasing the ACM's 
isolation. Furthermore, despite their common ground with the FCC-B, the 
majority in the ACM were not disposed to breaking completely with the PCE. In 
particular Julifin Gorkin and Luis Portela had reservations about joining the 
BOC because of its strong inclination towards Catalan nationalism. In the end 
the ACM maintained its position until 1932, when finally the majority of its 
members returned to the ranks of the PCE. A small number including Gorkin 
and Portela broke with the PCE completely creating the Madrid section of the 
Federaci6n Comunista erica in October 1932. 
Meanwhile relations between Bullejos and his Comintern mentors entered a 
difficult phase. The advent of the Republic was interpreted by the Comintern 
leaders as evidence that a revolutionary juncture was near, and the Comintern 
leadership was critical of the PCE's responses to events, but it was not entirely 
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clear as to what it should have done instead. 15 Over the next eighteen months, 
the Comintern was increasingly critical of the PCE's inability to create a clear 
organisational structure, and consequently to organise the masses. In an 
attempt to redeem the party with the Comintern during the first year of the 
Republic, Bullejos, and those around him, had organised violent May Day 
demonstrations in Sevilla. But the Comintern leaders, particularly Manuilskii, 
head of the Roman Secretariat, were more inclined to take such incidents as 
evidence that the masses possessed a revolutionary propensity which the 
leadership did not know how to direct. 
The party's response to the abortive Sanjurjo coup in August 1932 - when it 
called for the defence of the Republic - provided the Comintern with the pretext 
for the removal of Bullejos and his closest collaborators, Manuel Adame, 
Gabriel Leon Trilla, and Etelvino Vega. They were expelled on 29 October 1932 
in a closed session in Moscow. Thus, ironically the expulsion of Bullejos from 
the Party in 1932 was further symptomatic of the 'bolshevisation' of the PCE. 
Although the Comintem argued that the leadership should have used the slogan 
'long live the Soviets! ' this long-running dispute should be understood in 
primarily organisational rather than ideological terms: the Comintem removed 
the leadership because of its inability to organise the Party effectively, not 
because there was any significant divergence in policy. This episode is 
particularly interesting in that it offers a telling insight into the operational 
activities of the Comintern, and how it dealt with errant members. The Bullejos 
group survived for so long, despite its ineptitude, because of the practical 
15 Cruz, EI Partido Comunista, p. 127 
26 
difficulty the Comintern had in establishing the nature of the PCE organisation 
from afar. " 
This lack of control by Moscow was rectified by the Comintern delegate-tutor in 
Spain, the Argentine Vittorio Codovilla, who had been sent to Spain to resolve 
the Bullejos issue, and who now set about reorganising the PCE. He appointed 
a new leadership, based in Madrid, and entirely sympathetic to the International. 
The Sevillan former anarchist and baker, Jose Diaz, was appointed general 
secretary, the painter Jesüs Hernandez assumed the role of agitation and 
propaganda secretary, and Dolores lbärruri took responsibility for the women's 
section. From the expulsion of Bullejos until the outbreak of war in 1936, the 
Comintern, through Codovilla was able to maintain strict control over the PCE 
leadership, and to direct its policy. However, the Bullejos chapter was a 
foretaste of the difficulties the Party would experience in wartime in terms of its 
communications with Moscow. Communications between the two bodies even 
were more erratic under of the conditions of war, as events sometimes moved 
at such a pace that it was impossible for the PCE to await instructions from the 
Comintern before the party took action. In such a way during the civil war the 
PCE experienced a greater degree of autonomy in decision-making from the 
Comintern. " 
Under this new leadership and in line with the democratic centralism which 
characterised both the Russian Communist Party and the Comintern, the PCE's 
16 See Elorza and Bizcarrondo, Queridos Camaradas, pp. 141-169 for details of this period. 17 On the relationship between the Comintern and the PCE during the Civil War see Tim Rees 
The Highpoint of Comintern Influence? The Communist Party and the Civil War in Spain' in 
International Communism and the Communist International, 1919-43, (eds. ) Tim Rees and 
Andrew Thorpe (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1999), pp. 149-150 
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party structures were tightened. At the top resided a small secretariat, which 
met on a fortnightly basis, effectively subsuming the directive functions of the 
Political Bureau and the even larger Executive Committee. There was also an 
inner group, composed of the secretaries for political, organisational and 
syndical activity. This met twice weekly, with Codovilla exercising decisive 
control over it. 18 The National Congress was in theory the main party body, 
supposed to meet to examine and approve or reject the report of the Central 
Committee of the PCE on the activity of the party between congresses. In the 
intervals between congresses, the executive body of the party was the Central 
Committee, elected at each congress. This theoretically directed all party policy, 
but in practice only did so when convoked. In the interval between sessions the 
Political Bureau (Politburo) was responsible for the elaboration of policy. In 
Spain there was only one National Congress and seven meetings of the Central 
Committee in the entire republican period. Thus the true leadership of the party, 
besides that, of course of the ECCI was the Politburo, elected by the Central 
Committee from its members, and the secretariat, formed by leaders 
responsible for the different departments of the organisation. Both were bodies 
with less than ten members which effectively assumed control of running the 
Party. 19 This national leadership was based in Madrid, but as it was largely 
separate from the provincial party organisation in the capital, this had little 
significance except in the symbolic sense of reinforcing centralism. Directives 
and pronouncements were handed down from this unit to the party base, thus 
dispensing with debate or discussion of any kind. This culture set the PCE apart 
from other workers' organisations and left-wing political groups in Spain, and 
Rees, 'Good Bolsheviks, ' p. 191 19 Cruz, EI Partido Comunista, pp. 40-42 
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would hold the communist movement together during wartime, when both the 
CNT and PSOE would be riven by factionalism. 20 However, this elite would also 
find itself under intense pressure during the conflict due to a sheer lack of 
competent cadres to direct and implement policy in the expanded party. 
At the base of the party, too, reorganisation was attempted, with emphasis on 
strengthening the district committees (radios) and creating party cells in 
factories. Each radio had to have a committee and celebrate conferences with 
delegates from the cells of the locality. The pinnacle of communist organisation 
was the cell, intended to group together members of the party who worked 
together in a given place. Each cell was led by a committee responsible for the 
organisation of agitation and propaganda, the unions and finance. The political 
secretary was responsible for the whole cell and its links with the radio 
committee. 1 
In Madrid both the PCE and the youth organisation the UJC (Union de 
Juventudes Comunistas) were composed of four central radios - North, South, 
East and West, as well as two other radios in the working class areas of the 
South of the city that went by their own names - Legazpi and Vallecas. During 
the Civil War when the party expanded enormously Madrid was divided into 
Sectors, again those of North, South, East and West, and within these areas 
many more radios sprang up, for example, in the outlying and predominantly 
working-class districts of Carabanchel and Cuatro Caminos. Each radio sent 
20 Santos Julia, Oriaenes del Frente Pooular en Esaaßa (1934-36), (Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 
Madrid, 1979) p. 75 2' Cruz, EI Partido Comunista, p. 51 22 Leonor Estevez Varela, La vida es lucha, (A-Z Ediciones y Publicaciones, Madrid, 1993), p. 
42 
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delegates to the Madrid Provincial Committee of the Party, which was by virtue 
of its relative numerical strength, one of the most active of the local communist 
organisations. In spite of the geographical proximity of the local cells and radios 
to the National leadership of the Party, there appears to have been little in the 
way of fraternisation between the lowest and highest levels of the Party, 
reinforcing the democratic centralist structure of the Party, whereby directives 
and instructions were cascaded down to the lower levels of the Party via the 
Provincial Committee and the radios. 23 
The PCE and the UJC as a whole were characterised by the youth of their 
members and Madrid was no exception. In fact the age profile of the 
communists in Madrid reflected the changing demographic and socio-economic 
structure of the city, fuelled by the construction boom of the 1920s. In 1930 
almost thirty-nine percent of all men and (a little more) of all women in the 
capital were aged between 15 and 34 years old. The relative youth of the 
population was the result of a massive influx of outsiders in the previous thirty 
years, but above all in the 1920s, when Madrid and its surrounding areas 
received almost 240,000 immigrants from other parts of Spain. This population 
had to look for work primarily in the unskilled service sector, the men particularly 
in the construction industry, and the women in domestic service or industry. Of 
a population of 952,842 in 1930 in Madrid, around 80,000 were employed in 
construction. 4 
23 See for example, Estevez, La vida es lucha, pp. 37-132 24 Santos Julift, De La Fiesta Popular, pp. 59-64 
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These young members of the urban working class were the very constituents 
that the PCE preferred to recruit: Isidoro Dieguez and Luis Giorla of the Madrid 
PCE Provincial Committee both worked in the construction industry in the city, 
although Giorla found himself more often out of work than employed. 25 The 
PCE's preference for the urban working class originated in the Party's self- 
perception as the vanguard of the proletariat. This self-image was in turn, 
influenced by the Comintern directives, themselves the embodiment of Lenin's 
emphasis on the role of the 'vanguard party. '26 The Party sought to recruit the 
most politically conscious members of this class, in order to lead it. PCE 
documents throughout the 1930s reveal a certain disposition towards achieving 
a party of genuine workers, as if there were a suspicion of those who were not, 
although officially the party always had their doors open to other sectors. 27 This 
continued to be true in wartime. An internal bulletin of the Madrid PCE 
Provincial Committee in October 1936 concerned with the recruitment for the 
defence of Madrid outlined the need 
... to recruit the most conscientious and resolute workers from 
construction, metallurgy, railways, from workers who have the most 
developed class consciousness and who can therefore offer the best 
guarantees for security when mobilised. 28 
25 Estevez, La vida es lucha, p. 98 26 Robert Service, Lenin: A Political Life: Vol II Worlds in Collision, (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 
1995), pp. 82-86 
27 Cruz, EI Partido Comunista, p. 63 The delegation at the Fourth Party Congress in 1932 can 
offer some insight into the actual social composition of the party: 77.5% were workers, 11.7% 
were employees and 8.2% were intellectuals. The category 'workers' included agricultural as 
well as industrial workers, and among the latter numbered employees of large and small firms, 
artisans and independent workers, as well as women. 28 Archivo Histörico del Partido Comunista de EspaAa (henceforth AHPCE), microfilm xv, 
apartado 189, 'Nuestras Tareas: Boletfn Interior del Comite Provincial de Madrid, 6 October 
1936'. 
31 
Comintern directives were driven by Lenin's insistence on the universal 
applicability of the Bolshevik model 29 Because of this, the Comintern allowed 
pre-determined theoretical formulations to impede its analysis of the Spanish 
Republic. It was assumed that Spain was going through the bourgeois- 
democratic preliminary stage to the socialist, proletarian revolution. 30 In fact, 
Marxist communists had made the same mistake as their socialist counterparts, 
who had assumed that the new republican leaders of the Second Republic 
represented the progressive bourgeoisie, who would lead the first stage of the 
revolution, while the landed oligarchy, most powerful during the restoration 
monarchy of 1875-1931, was a mere remnant of feudalism. But they were 
mistaken on both counts: firstly the republican elements in government were 
mainly individuals rather than representative of a group or group of interests, 
furthermore, not all were progressive or liberal. Secondly, Spain was no longer 
a feudal society, but an agrarian capitalist one. In the nineteenth century the 
bourgeoisie had been virtually bought off by the disentailment of church lands 
and the release of common lands onto the open market. This process saw 
much urban mercantile capital invested on the land and the consolidation of 
large latifundia estates. The 'progressive bourgeoisie' were in fact already tied 
to the old oligarchy, and henceforth the latifundios were part of the capitalist 
system, not feudal vestiges. 31 
29 Agnew & McDermott, The Comintern, p. 8 30 Heywood, Marxism, p. 134 31 See Preston, Coming, p. 25 and Heywood, Marxism, pp. 114-15 for a discussion of this 
misapprehension by Spanish Marxists; for the Comintem position see Elorza and Bizcarrondo, 
Queridos Camaradas, pp. 141-51 
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Such heavy emphasis on a theoretical blueprint for society meant that the 
communist movement in Spain targeted the wrong audience. Or rather, it 
targeted the same audience as the socialists and the anarcho-syndicalists (the 
latter was especially true of Cataluna, where the CNT had a strong urban 
foothold). Yet across Europe - and Spain was no different in this respect - the 
socialist parties were the main representatives of organised workers, and thus 
the communist parties were encouraged by the Comintern to compete with the 
socialists to capture this militancy for their own organisations. To this end 
Comintern practice between 1921-28, the United Front, or frente ünico, had 
centred on attacking and discrediting the essentially reformist socialist 
leaderships, whilst at the same time forging links with rank-and-file members 
from other political and syndical organisations with the aim of pursuing joint 
objectives. 32 This often presupposed not only communist propaganda activities 
but also the creation of clandestine 'cells' in reformist political and trade union 
organisations. 33 In Spain, unsurprisingly these tactics served to foster both 
socialist and anarchist mistrust of the communist movement, which was only 
partially overcome with the subsequent unity initiatives, although freute Onico 
did enjoy a certain degree of success in Asturias where communists supported 
the anarcho-syndicalists Sindicato Ünico Minero (SU), against the socialist-led 
Sindicato de los Obreros Mineros de Asturias (SOMA). 34 However, the 
development of the United Front into the more sectarian policies of the 'Third 
Period' (including the concept of 'class against class') from around 1928, 
intended as a means of promoting the independent identity of the Communist 
32 Agnew & McDermott, The Comintern, p. 27 33 Ibid.. p. 32 "Adrian Shubert, 'The Epic Failure: The Asturian Revolution of October 1934' in Revolution 
and War in Spain 1931-39, (ed. ) Paul Preston (Methuen, London, 1984), p. 117 
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Party, saw the formation of a separate national union federation, the CGTU 
(Confederacibn General del Trabajo Unitario, General Unitarian Confederation 
of Labour) in the summer of 1933.35 The resultant splitting of the SU in August 
1931 undermined previous achievements and led to the collapse of anarcho- 
syndicalist and communist support among the miners during 1932 and 1933.36 
These were key elements in explaining the limited implantation of the PCE. As a 
political entity it had to compete with anarcho-syndicalism and socialism for 
political space. Those that seek to explain communist gains particularly in Spain 
and particularly during the Spanish Civil War as primarily the work of external 
Soviet machinations would do well consider the national political context. 37 
During the republican period the PCE in Madrid initially struggled to make 
inroads among its target audience. Although the beginning of a socially 
differentiated working class existed in 1930, Madrid was effectively a proto- 
industrial city with a strong artisan culture, and its skilled tradesmen were 
largely organised and represented by the socialist UGT. 38 By way of illustration, 
in the capital, all manner of people from a wide variety of social sectors had 
voted for the republican-socialist coalition. Even the employers' organisation of 
cafes and bars had claimed for themselves the title of 'working class' in contrast 
to the 'opulent capitalists' or 'great landowners'. These were the real enemies, 
while employers and proletarians were members of the same class, defined by 
their labour. Although the PCE maintained the language of class, which it 
35 Elorza and Bizcarrondo, Queridos Camaradas, p. 178 36 Shubert, 'The Epic Failure, ' p. 122 $7 Cruz, El Partido Comunista, p. 14 Certainly for the pre-war Republican period Cruz asserts 
that the trajectory of the PCE must always be understood in constant reference to the existence 
of anarcho-syndicalist, anarchists and socialists in Spain, and this is equally relevant during the 
war. 
38 Santos Julia, De la Fiesta Pooular, p. 22 
34 
continued to do until 1935, aspiring to represent the working class, it struggled 
to make headway in such an environment. 39 
The PCE, with its limited financial resources and lack of infrastructure, found it 
hard to compete with the UGT for members. The UGT, supported by the 
socialists in government, had its own premises in the Casas del Pueblo, well- 
developed cultural and educational networks and established methods for the 
settlement of labour disputes. However, the UGT in Madrid tended only to 
represent skilled workers, leaving opportunities for other groups to recruit from 
the unskilled and increasingly unemployed sectors, left in poverty after the 
collapse of the construction boom. The CNT, with its preference for direct action 
gained most from these constituents, partly among construction workers, but 
the PCE also began to make small inroads. 40 
Between March 1932 and March 1933 membership figures indicate a rise in 
members both in Madrid and nationally: the party grew from 11,756 to 19,489, 
giving way to a period of stagnation in 1934, and reaching a peak of just less 
than 20,000 between March and May 1934, which represented only a 2.65% 
increase on April 1933. Although the PCE could be unwelcoming to those it 
regarded as non-genuine working class (that is, non-industrial or unskilled 
labour), the party's growth actually came in areas and occupations where 
working class organisations were at their weakest: for example among the 
unorganised trades in Andalucian cities such as Sevilla or Cordoba, rather than 
the industrial heartlands of Asturias and Catalufia. Many were engaged in 
39 Rafael Cruz, 'Del Partido Reden Llegado al Partido de Todos: El PCE, 1920-1939, ' Paper 
gven at the I Congress on the History of the PCE. 1920-77, Oviedo 6,7 &8 May 2004. 
Santos Julia, De la Fiesta Popular, pp. 9-10, p. 36, p. 56, p. 67, p. 173, pp. 188-90 
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insecure occupations or were unemployed, the latter being targeted by the 
party's recruitment drive during 1933. In this respect the PCE was similar to the 
German KPD, who as the second largest in the Comintern was also the party of 
the unemployed 'par excellence, ' and the British CPGB, which had firm links 
with the unemployed. 41 However, the PCE's recruitment figures should be 
treated with a little caution. The political and social marginality of the 
unemployed could make them a volatile constituency. Tim Rees has identified a 
core of committed militants surrounded by shifting numbers of essentially 
temporary members who dropped in and out of the Party, which could skew 
membership figures. Cruz has also identified fluctuation as a constant problem 
of the PCE and other communist parties, which the Spanish leadership blamed 
on the lack of political education and the absence of control in the cells. 
Members might cancel their membership on realising that they had dues arrears. 
Furthermore, these cancellations were not always registered by the local 
organisations causing further ambiguity in membership figures. Local 
organisations often lacked an enthusiastic, disciplined militancy, but such 
patterns help us to understand that the PCE in this period must have had more 
sympathisers than the figures show. 42 Such a trend is borne out by lbirruri's 
personal experiences in Madrid of numerous non-partisan working people 
offering to assist her in small but valuable ways. 43 
41 Dick Geary, 'Unemployment and Working-Class Solidarity: The German Experience 1929-33', 
in The German UnemDloyed. Experiences and Consequences of Mass Unemployment from the 
Weimar Republic to the Third Reich, (eds. ) Richard J. Evans and Dick Geary (Croom Helm, 
London & Sydney, 1987), pp. 261-62, p. 267; Paul Corthom, 'Labour, the Left, and the Stalinist 
surges of the late 1930s, ' The Historical Journal, 48,1 (2005), p. 190 
Rees, 'Good Bolsheviks' p. 194; Cruz, El Partido Comunista, pp. 61-62 43 lbfirrun, El ünico camino, pp. 143-44, pp. 210-212 
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Party figures for Madrid reflect this fluctuating membership: although the Party 
in the capital grew from 700 in 1932, reached a peak of 1,400, and then 
decreased to around 1000 militants in mid-1933, no fewer than 4,000 members 
had actually passed through the Party in the two previous years. But in contrast 
to the national Party, where new recruits often came from outside the urban 
working-class, in Madrid Party membership tended to reflect the PCE's 
preference for industrial workers, although there was a prominent intellectual 
element in the Party in the capital. A party membership report from 1932 
reported that 
Less than I per cent are not workers in the main areas of party strength. 
Madrid has a higher figure of intellectuals but the non-workers are still 
less than 5 per cent 4` 
The greater intellectualism of the communist movement in Madrid was in turn 
reflected in the Party's youth movement which university students such as 
Manuel Tagüena Lacorte and Fernando Claudin had joined in 1932. 
Furthermore, although the communist movement did attract some members of 
the PSOEIUGT or the CNT, prior to 1936 when the party began to expand 
massively, for the majority of new members, like Tagüena Lacorte and Claudin, 
communism was their first choice. Among young people communism appeared 
to have had a greater appeal than the other more established organisations, 
accounting for the relatively greater growth of the UJC compared to the adult 
party. The UJC increased from 4,050 in March 1932, to 8,846 in November 
44 Rees, 'Good Bolsheviks, ' p. 195 
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1932, reaching 11,275 in June 1933. With some fluctuation over the next 14 
months, in September 1932 it also claimed 11,275 members 46 
The communist movement's preference for industrial workers was also reflected 
in the types of activities its militants were involved in. Leonor Estevez, a young 
female member of the UJC began her militancy working for the Legazpi radio, in 
1932, in the modest area where she lived. As she gained experience and 
became a competent and trusted militant she was moved, in 1933, to Radio Sur 
where she worked as part of their committee as head of the Women's 
Secretariat. Radio Surat that time was the most important of the communists' 
district committees as this area had the greatest industrial implantation with 
many large factories and workshops. In this district the communists counted on 
many female employees at the city's tobacco factory as well as numerous 
construction workers. According to Estevez, at the end of 1933 and into early 
1934, the Radio Sur had achieved some success with the creation of organised 
cells in all the factories and firms within the district, and had created many more 
district cells. ' 
However, although the PCE and the UJC did make some gains in the early 
republican period, the organisations were still plagued by sectarianism, and 
were restricted in both policy and organisational terms by the Comintern. The 
PCE, like many groups on the Left, failed to respond adequately to the reality of 
Spain as a predominantly rural country. Patterns of land ownership and 
agricultural exploitation differed vastly depending on the geographical area. In 
4 Ibid.. pp. 193-94, Cruz, EI Partido Comunista, p. 56 46 Estevez, La vida es lucha, pp. 49-50 
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the north and on the tableland of Castilla-La Vieja (the Meseta), the agrarian 
norm was the peasant smallholder or tenant farmer, who tended to be 
conservative in politics and frequently religious, while in the centre-south 
(Castilla-La Nueva downwards) the dominant form of landholding was the 
latifundio, vast estates run mainly by bailiffs in the absence of their aristocratic 
owners and farmed by virtual armies of landless day labourers. In contrast with 
the peasant smallholders or tenant farmers, these landless workers were often 
fiercely anti-clerical. As protest tended to occur at the isolated level of the 
village, organised trade unions and workers organisations had made only 
limited inroads before the arrival of the Republic. Given this, and coupled with 
the prevalent anticlericalism of the labourers, anarchist ideas and direct action 
as a means to settle local grievances were popular. With promises of land 
reform under the republican-socialist coalition elected in 1931, many in the 
south flocked to the socialist land workers union (FNTT), founded in 1930,47 
limiting the political space open to the PCE. 
Paradoxically, through presenting itself as a serious revolutionary alternative to 
both socialism and anarchism, the PCE was able to make some membership 
gains in 1932 and 1933. The experience of the PSOE in government and its 
failure to implement radical social and economic reform had discredited the 
socialist movement to a certain extent in the eyes of its adherents. In the case 
of the anarchists, disorganised attempts at revolution resulting in failed 
47 Helen Graham, The Spanish Republic at War 1936-1939. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) p. 42 48 For a discussion see especially Preston, Coming, chapter three, and Graham, The Spanish 
Republic, chapter one. 
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insurrection attempts in 1932 and 1933,49 had a similar effect on some of its 
traditional constituents. 
On the whole, however, the Party made only limited gains. Some workers were 
attracted by the Soviet vision, but few understood the ideological basis of this in 
reference to Spain. In communist strategy the bourgeois-democratic revolution 
(which the PCE should lead) would begin with the installation of a workers' and 
peasants' government, the class character of which was fairly ambiguous. Once 
this was installed the socialist revolution - the dictatorship of the proletariat - 
could begin. Even among militants, the difference between these two stages 
was insufficiently clear. Furthermore, the means by which the workers' and 
peasants' government would be brought about, through the election of 
delegates at places of work through specially created channels known as 
soviets, (which would naturally be under communist direction) caused much 
confusion and misunderstanding, not least because to most militants, these 
were a strange and foreign phenomenon. Soviets could only come about after 
factory committees were created and the committees presupposed the 
formation of factory'cells'. Yet many in the Party did not fully grasp the 
necessity or role of such 'cells' in bringing about the revolution. In general 
communist factory cells had insufficient implantation in the large factories and 
little influence. 50 In reality, the PCE's factory cells comprised about one third of 
militants, while the other two thirds were district cells, relating to places of 
49 Such as the uprising in January 1933, which provoked the massacre of peasants by Civil and 
Assault Guards at the small town of Casas Viejas: Jerome R. Mintz, The Anarchists of Casas 
Vieias, (Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 1994), pp. 177-226 
Cruz, El Partido Comunista, pp. 280-82; Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement. From 
Comintern to Cominform, trans. Brian Pearce and Francis MacDonagh, (Penguin Books, 
Middlesex, 1975), pp. 212-13 
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residence rather than work. The communist union, the CGTU was also relatively 
weak vis-&-vis the UGT and CNT. Concrete membership statistics are 
problematic, and although contemporary communist sources put affiliates to the 
CGTU at around 144,000 in March 1934, such claims are certainly 
exaggerated. 51 
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The policy of freute ünico from below also alienated some workers from the 
party and caused much confusion in the Party. The communist press contains 
numerous references to 'errors' committed in the application of the policy, 
usually because frente ünico had been achieved 'from above' rather than 'from 
below'. Local organisations were often confused by the leadership's praise for 
pacts concluded in localities such as the frente Onico agreed in Zamora 
between the UGT, PSOE, FJS, PCE and UJC on 30 January 1934.52 The Party 
even went so far as to expel Jose Antonio Balbontin from the Central 
Committee in spring 1934, for his disapproval of the term 'social fascism', and 
his advocacy of unity with socialists and anarchists from above and below to 
fight fascism 53 His expulsion did cause disquiet among some in the Party 
leadership such as lbirruri, who wondered at the prudence of the continual 
confrontation with other forces on the left advocated by the Comintern, hinting 
at dissent in what was otherwise a strictly controlled organisation. 
As a small relatively well-controlled organisation during the Second Republic 
the party was able to highlight and move to correct such deviations from official 
51 Santos Julift. La Izauierda del PSOE. 1935-36, (Siglo Veintiuno Editores, Madrid, 1977) pp. 
175-76 
52 Cruz, EI Partido Comunista, p. 192 53 Jose Antonio Balbontin, La Esoafia de mi experiencia, (Coleccibn Aquelarre, Mexico, 1952). 
p. 280 
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4Fi 
Policy relatively quickly and easily, but this would prove to be less 
straightforward under conditions of war. During the conflict the expansion of the 
Party, with new members drawn largely from the politically inexperienced, 
caused anxiety amongst the party leadership who largely lacked the resources 
to rectify the situation, and affected the extent of party control over those it 
claimed as members. The reintegration of previously expelled militants, such as 
Balbontin, after the outbreak of war, would also cause problems for the 
leadership. Although he was welcomed back to the Party, Codovilla continued 
to regard him as a 'Trotskyist'. ` 
The Party's strict organisational structure and ideology could also be 
unappealing to many outside the movement, and became unpalatable even to 
some inside it. Stricter control by the Comintern and the transference of 
practices developed in the Russian Party meant that by the 1930s a distinctive 
internal party culture had evolved which set communist parties apart from other 
political groups. One aspect of this was the practice of self-criticism. This was 
the means by which a member of the party recognised his or her error, either 
verbally or in written form, before party superiors, rather than the peer group. 
This act invalidated previous political positions and confirmed the pre-eminence 
of the party organisation over the militant. It also performed the essential 
functions of freeing the militant from blame, through his acceptance of Party 
norms, of consolidating the Party hierarchy, and of highlighting errors in the 
body of the organisation in order that these could be uncovered and corrected. 
The authority invested in the Comintern since the early 1920s to remove non- 
" Balbont(n, La EsDaf a de mi exceriencia, pp. 361-63 
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conformist members of national sections had reached fruition with the expulsion 
of the Bullejos group. But it did not stop there. A further consequence of the 
'Bolshevisation' of the Party by the Comintem saw supporters of the expelled 
leadership (or anyone accused of dissent) forced either to rectify their positions 
or face expulsion themselves. Dolores lbarruri, now a rising star in the PCE, 
had been mentored by Bullejos and by association fell under suspicion. 55 
Imprisoned since October 1931, shortly after her move to Madrid to take up an 
editorial role at Mundo Obrero, she made a successful self-criticism from gaol. 
The practice of self-criticism, far from being a requirement only at times of 
internal crisis, was a constant feature of Party life. At the base of the Party, self- 
criticisms were constant, above all for the non-fulfilment of tasks entrusted by 
the committee of the party cell. Sometimes, a self-criticism was not sufficient to 
compensate for the errors committed, and the leadership proposed the 
expulsion of the militant. Reasons for expulsion included indiscipline, fractional 
work, attempts to undermine the leadership, contacts with Trotskyists, 
cowardliness, or attacks on the morale of the Party. The most common of these 
was that of fractional work, by which is meant the assumption of a position by a 
militant on a given subject which was different from that held by the leadership. 
Once a militant was expelled he could expect no further contact with the Party, 
nor was his name mentioned, except to insult. 57 
Cruz, EI Partido Comunista, p. 83, p. 191 56 Dolores Ibarruri, EI Onico camino, pp. 135-144. She had been imprisoned for having given 
refuge at her house in Somorrostro to a Communist implicated in confrontations with socialists 
in Bilbao. 
5' Cruz, EI Partido Comunista. pp. 83-85 He describes self-criticism as'one of the most 
significant ritual phenomena' of the organisation. 
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The communist movement also demanded a certain moral rectitude, an 
irreproachable conduct. A good militant should neither drink, nor gamble, nor 
dance. The militant who acquired vices might turn into an agent provocateur. 58 
Such self-discipline was difficult, especially for the youth members. Manuel 
Taguena Lacorte, complained that as a communist delegate to a student 
conference in 1933, he slept little because by day he and his comrades went to 
the official assemblies and at night they held meetings as members of the 
revolutionary opposition. They were under a lot of pressure and were expected 
to adopt austerity in their pastimes and in their dress which he considered 
completely inappropriate given that most of them had not reached twenty. 59 
Militants were expected to sacrifice themselves for the Party: indeed sacrifice 
was essential to achieve the revolution. They were expected to give money to 
support the 'funds of struggle', and to forsake friends or family if their beliefs 
were at odds with party ideology. There were cases where the Party asked its 
militants to make difficult choices: For example, one engineer was asked to 
work at the Mundo Obrero press, leaving a well-paid position and breaking 
contact with his family. 60 In fact the best reference for a communist consisted in 
having passed some sort of test of sacrifice for the Party. The most powerful of 
these resided in the experience of torture and prison, provided one did not 
break one's silence and denounce one's comrades. 61 The greater social liberty 
afforded to the Party in the early republican period meant that the party was free 
S8 Ibid.. p. 88 59 Manuel Tagoena Lacorte, Testimonio de dos guerras, (Planeta, Barcelona, 1978) pp. 36-37 °° Letter to party leadership, Madrid, 22 Jan 1934, reproduced in Cruz, El Partido Comunista, p. 
85 
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to campaign openly and recruit new members, which undoubtedly boosted its 
membership. However, it was at times, still dangerous to be a communist, as 
Leonor Estdvez testifies in her memoir. In organising demonstrations 
communists often fell foul of the Republic's law and order legislation. In 1935 
she spent several months in Ventas prison as a political prisoner. This culture 
however, was not unique to the Republican period, nor indeed to Spain. It was 
an important feature of communist practice under Franco and of the resistance 
movements of the Second World War, and beyond. 62 
During the civil war Dolores lbärruri would popularise this discourse of 
communist sacrifice 63 Her broadcasts to the people of Republican Spain were 
punctuated by the language of combat and the concomitant sacrifice that it 
would require: the same night she learned of the uprising in Morocco of the 
army of Africa she launched the combat slogan of the Republic'No Pasarän'. 
Later she would declare 'iEl pueblo espatIol pro fiere morir de pie a vivir de 
rodillas! (Better to die on one's feet than live on one's knees). 64 
This austerity of internal Party culture did not attract many Spaniards, though for 
some it was this culture which set the party apart from other working-class 
groups. The concept of 'united front from below' was on the whole very popular 
among Spanish communists. The 'unmasking' of anarchist and socialist leaders 
62 Estevez, La vida es lucha, p. 42; For details of the Republic's law and order legislation see 
Graham, The Spanish Republic, p. 39; Jorge Semprun, Communism in Spain in the Franco era. 
The Autobiography of Federico Sanchez. Trans. Helen R. Lane, (Harvester Press, Brighton, 
1980) pp. 44-49 Semprun, who survived both the Nazi camps and later became a clandestine 
Communist activist In Spain under Franco, has written several books which reflect his 
experiences, as well as his growing disillusionment with communism. 63 In many respects throughout her life lbdrruri epitomised communist sacrifice. See lbdrruri, F-I 
ünico Camino, p. 88 and Cruz, Pasionaria, p. 36,54-57 
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as false prophets, as traitors to the cause and tools of the capitalist oppressors, 
not only made sense, but was also necessary in defining what communists 
themselves stood for. This policy emphasised that only Bolsheviks understood 
the real meaning of revolution and knew how to create one 65 This rigidity also 
enabled the party to offer organisational stability and rapidly improvised 
responses to the chaos of civil war. However, while this internal culture 
formulated by the Comintern, was adhered to by the leadership and the best 
party cadres, in practice even during the Republic the PCE lacked the 
infrastructure to control its militants. The leadership complained of 'anarchic 
work', fluctuation in numbers of militants, lack of discipline, irresponsibility, 'cafe 
culture' and an absence of capacity and political discussion. 66 In particular, the 
lack of understanding of the party's political line among its affiliates was 
bemoaned by the leadership. Consequently, the militants had great difficulty 
trying to make workers, peasants and sympathisers understand the party line 
and the ideology it was based on. To remedy this, the leadership proposed a 
school for militants in 1932, but this project did not achieve fruition until during 
the war. 67 
The PCE did not become a Bolshevik party during the Second Republic (in the 
sense that they were the vanguard of the proletariat). On the one hand, it lacked 
members, and remained little more than a sect for the most part, making it 
difficult for the leadership to be-in touch with or to truly represent the Spanish 
working class, on the other hand a Bolshevik party required the execution of 
tasks at the base as much as political participation, and the party's militants did 
66 Rees, 'Good Bolsheviks', p. 183 Cruz, El Partido Comunista, p. 89 87 Cruz, EI Partido Comunista, p. 75 
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not participate adequately in the life of the organisation 68 Nor did they always 
possess a sufficiently developed political consciousness. 
The origins of unity and the rise of the PCE 
In the elections of November 1933, the Spanish Left had gone to the polls 
divided. On the whole the PCE had adhered to its non-collaborationist stance of 
frente ünico while Largo Caballero and his supporters within the socialist 
movement, in response to the more radical elements of the FJS and the FNTT 
insisted on the PSOE entering the 1933 elections alone. 69 In an electoral 
system which favoured coalitions, the fragmentation of the Left, coupled with 
the abstentionism encouraged by the CNT, meant that no challenge was offered 
to an ascendant Right who emerged victorious from the elections. 70 
There had been, however, some instances of collaboration on the Left, which 
set a precedent for later cooperation. While Comintem directives did not allow 
for alliances or electoral pacts at this stage, frente Onico permitted candidates 
who wholly accepted the communist platform to be accepted within a 
communist candidature. In this way, an antifascist front was formed in Malaga 
by left-republicans, socialists and communists, after the communist candidate 
Doctor Cayetano Bolivar (who was in prison at the time) won the first round of 
the 1933 elections. In the second round the Frente Ünico Antifascista 
88 Ibid, pp. 66-67 89 Heywood, Marxism, pp. 130-32; Preston, Coming, p. 89 70 Preston, Coming, pp. 90-91 
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triumphed. " Retrospective official communist histories have tended to down- 
play their past subservience to the Comintern. In the Spanish case it was 
claimed that after the expulsion of Bullejos in 1932 the party developed policy in 
accordance with the particular needs of Spain instead of formulating theory 
through the prism of the Bolshevik model, culminating in the creation of an 
antifascist front in 1933.72 Thus, Bolivar's election was presented as the first 
Popular Front initiative. In reality, however, it was little more than an example of 
the communist movement's sectarian frente ünico policy. The labelling of Largo 
Caballero as a socialist traitor during these elections serves as a reminder that 
this policy had not yet been abandoned. 3 Nevertheless, Bolivar's election was 
an important lesson for those on the Left because it demonstrated the 
advantages of unity. 
Once in government, the Right began to annul the republican-socialist 
legislative programme. During the November election campaign, Gil Robles, the 
leader of the CEDA, had confirmed the socialists' worst fears when he had 
declared his determination to establish a corporative state in Spain. In view of 
the triumph of the right and Gil Robles' known hostility to the Republic, the 
socialist movement needed to formulate a new strategy. Indalecio Prieto and 
Francisco Largo Caballero, representing moderate and revolutionary positions 
within the movement agreed on the need for 'a defensive action' should 
71 Cruz, EI Partido Comunista, pp. 169-172 In the first round Bolivar obtained 18,519 or 36.44 
per cent of the votes cast The platform of the frente Onico antifascista included appropriation of 
land without indemnification, a total amnesty of political prisoners, the dissolution of the Civil 
and Assault Guards, the dissolution of fascist organisations, and measures against 
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reactionary elements go beyond the bounds of the constitution in their attempts 
to annul the work of the Republic. 74 In contrast, the veteran UGT leader Julian 
Besteiro counselled inaction, a position which was rejected by the other leaders 
and which seriously undermined his position as President of the UGT. 
Consequently he resigned and from February 1934, a twin-pronged policy was 
adopted: on the one hand normal activity through the legal channels of the 
Republic; on the other, semi-clandestine preparations for a revolutionary 
movement against what was seen as the growing fascist menace in Spain. 75 
On the international stage the rise of Nazism in Germany had demanded a 
change in Comintem policy, although initially the Comintem had misread the 
situation. The elaboration of the doctrine of 'social fascism' by the Comintern in 
1929, wherein social democratic parties were viewed as collaborators with the 
enemy forces of capitalism, and the rise of fascism was equated with the 
inevitable demise of capitalism, had precluded working class unity at the 
national level, and the defence of parliamentary democracy. As a consequence 
division on the Left in Germany had facilitated the rise of the Nazi party, 
although it was Hindenburg who actually appointed Hitler Chancellor. 76 By the 
end of 1933 the scale of the crisis was staggering. Of 72 parties represented at 
the Thirteenth Plenum of the ECCI, only 16 were legal, and 7 'semi-legal'. The 
French and Czechoslovak parties with barely 30,000 members had become, 
with the exception of the Bolsheviks and the disparate Chinese party, the 
74 Ibn, p 100 76 Heywood, Marxism, pp. 137-8 76 For a full account of Hitler's rise to power see Henry Ashby Turner, Hitler's Thirty Days to 
Power. January 1933 (Bloomsbury publishing, London, 1997). 
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largest sections of the Comintern, leading the French especially to have a 
significant impact on the reformulation of Comintern policy. 
Although it has often been argued that the gradual change in Comintern policy 
from 1934 was a temporary tactical shift determined by the needs of Soviet 
foreign policy, in fact it came about through the interaction of three separate 
trends, of which one was Soviet diplomacy. n Rank and file French communists 
pioneered a new approach uniting with their socialist counterparts to call a 
general strike in February 1934 in response to a violent demonstration by 
fascists against the Daladier government 78 Similarly in Austria social 
democratic workers organised resistance to the authoritarian Dolfuss regime, 
but this had ended in bloody defeat. 79 Both events made an impression on the 
Bulgarian communist Georgii Dimitrov, who since 1929 had been in charge of 
Comintem's West European Bureau, based in Berlin. He had witnessed first- 
hand Hitler's rise to power and consequently had a less dogmatic approach to 
social democracy S0 Shortly after his appointment by Stalin to the post of 
general secretary of the Comintern, he resolved the problems within the PCF 
agreeing that `the walls between communist and social democratic workers 
must be broken down'. The French communist daily L'Humanite on 31 May 
1934 reproduced an article from Pravda on 23 May which stated that it was 
n Agnew & McDermott, The Comintern, pp. 120-21 7e M. Adereth, The French Communist Party. a Critical History, (1920-84) (Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 1984), p. 70 n Jill Lewis. Fascism and the Working Class in Austria. 1918-1934: The Failure of Labour in the 
First Republic, (Berg, Oxford & New York, 1991), pp. 192-201 
Agnew & McDermott, The Comintern. p. 124 Dimitrov had actually been arrested and tried in 
March 1933 for setting fire to the Reichstag, and upon his release in February 1934 returned 
home to a hero's welcome in Moscow. 
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perfectly admissible to propose united action to the socialist leaders. 81 As a 
consequence in July 1934 the French communist and socialist parties signed 
the antifascist 'pact of unity of action. '82 Initially this Comintem change was 
driven by the threats posed by fascism to its national parties, rather than the 
international threat of fascism. By the end of 1934 however, as Soviet foreign 
policy began to respond to the latter, so would the Comintern. 83 
In Spain the rise of fascism and particularly Hitler's accession to power 
signalled a widespread recognition within the Spanish Marxist Left that an 
effective alliance strategy was vital if Spain was to avoid the fate of Italy and 
Germany. The most significant development from this was the formation of the 
Alianza Obrera (workers' Alliance) in 1933 by Joaquin Maurin, leader of the 
Catalan-based BOC. 
In February 1934, Largo Caballero led the PSOE into a series of regional 
agreements with the Alianza. M But the PSOE's insistence on leading any 
revolutionary movement and the CNT's refusal at a national level to participate 
in a 'political' initiative also deprived the alliance of crucial support. The one 
area where it enjoyed success as a unifying entity was in Asturias, and the key 
to its success here was the participation of the CNT. 
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Within the PCE, the sectarian policies of the Third Period were still popular. 
However, while the Party had been able to capitalise on the failure of the 
socialists in government in the summer of 1933, PCE membership figures 
stabilised in 1934. This was, in good measure, due to the radicalisation of the 
PSOE and a search among working-class constituents for alternative solutions 
such as the Alianzas Obreras. These developments had been brought about by 
the realisation among many workers that things could be even worse for them 
with the socialists outside government. In comparison, an isolated and marginal 
PCE was a less attractive proposition. 
These factors, coupled with the international threat of fascism, prompted the 
PCE leadership to seek to revise their policies. Jose Diaz travelled to Moscow 
to present his report to the Roman Secretariat of the ECCI on 31 July 1934. In it 
he asked for a change in frente ünico similar to that achieved by the PCF. 
Approved by the Comintern, the Central Committee of the PCE met on 11 
September to sanction the new line which would allow the PCE to enter the 
Allamas Obreras. 
It is important to note, however, that while this development represented the 
Party's first, hesitant steps towards greater unity with other working-class 
organisations, the PCE was still operating on the basis of a modified version of 
frente ünico. The communists would adopt a conciliatory stance towards social 
democratic leaders but they did not relinquish the aspiration of a single party of 
the proletariat led by the PCE. Furthermore, unlike in France where the change 
of direction had been largely driven by the grassroots, in Spain the PCE, 
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particularly at the base of the Party, was slower to embrace change. The Party 
joined the Alianza Obrera in Asturias at the eleventh hour on 11 September 
1935, and only secured entry to the revolutionary committee on 4 October. 
Elsewhere however, many local and provincial organisations of the PCE had 
not joined their respective alliances, reflecting a communist tradition in Spain 
that was more leftist and sectarian. The about-turn was particularly difficult for 
the Catalan Communists, who were most strongly opposed to the Alianzas, 
which had been developed by their 'trotskyists' rivals in the BOC. In Madrid, this 
appears to have been less of an issue as the Alianzas there were led by the 
socialists, and relations were a little better between the two groups 85 
The PSOE and PCE leaderships reached an agreement to declare jointly a 
general strike should ministers from the CEDA enter the cabinet, which 
occurred at the beginning of October 1934, with the CEDA taking three 
sensitive portfolios: Agriculture, Labour and Justice. In light of general European 
developments, the Spanish Left interpreted this as fascism arriving by legal 
means. 86 The sources are sketchy on the actual events of October. In Madrid 
strikers brought the city to a standstill for a few days, but the socialists were 
badly organised and were unable to effectively distribute the arms they had 
acquired. Hundreds of members of the UJC waited for socialist arms and 
instructions which never arrived, and many communist and socialist 
°5 Elorza & Bizcarrondo, Queridos Camaradas, pp. 210-219, Santos Julia, Oricenes, pp. 71.72, 
Bernhard Bayertain, 'EI significado de Octubre de 1934 en Asturias. La comuna asturiana y el 
Komintem', in Octubre 1934: Cincuenta afios oara la reflexi6n, (ed. ) German Ojeda (Siglo 
Veintiuno Editores, Madrid, 1985), p. 23, Cruz, EI Partido Comunista. p. 285, Rees, 'Good 
Bolsheviks' pp. 196-98 
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protagonists were quickly arrested. 87 In Sevilla, where the PCE was relatively 
influential, fear and demoralisation characterised the militants. The two hundred 
members who did assemble quickly dispersed after discovering there were no 
arms. Only in Asturias was there an armed rebellion, with the miners holding out 
for two weeks. Here communists assumed leadership of the unitary committees 
in the days following the strike. 88 For the most part local communist committees 
were improvised and disorganised, and many complained of the reluctance of 
the socialists to involve the PCE in any decision-making. In Asturias, isolated 
through a lack of solidarity in the rest of Spain, the uprising was doomed to fail. 
The right-wing government sent in troops from Africa under the authority of 
Generals Franco and Goded, both hostile to the Republic, to put down the 
rebellion. A fierce repression ensued whereby 1,335 people were killed, 2,951 
injured89 and up to 30,000 were imprisoned, many of them tortured. Martial law 
was declared throughout Spain. Working-class organisations were closed down, 
the Communist leadership at national and local levels were arrested, and the 
PCE press was suppressed. Many left-wing militants including the PSOE 
parliamentary leader, Indalecio Prieto went into exile. The socialists were 
heavily implicated in the rising, although the UGTs Madrid-based executive had 
played no part in the Asturian events, nor had they been directly involved in the 
planning decisions taken by the Asturian Alianza. 
87 Tagüef a Lacorte. Testimonio de dos auerras, pp. 52-55, Estevez, La vida es lucha, p. 69 
Cruz, El Partido Comunista, pp. 207-208 e9 Preston, Coming. p. 129, Elorza & Bizcarrondo, Queridos Camaradas, p. 229 
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The lessons of Asturias 
The PSOE executive was called to account for the events and Largo Caballero 
was tried. Fearing the confiscation of PSOE/UGT assets, Largo denied 
involvement, enabling the PCE to assume responsibility for the events even 
though its role had been marginal. 90 For the PCE, Asturias had allowed them 
for the first time to participate in a broad political initiative with official backing. 
Although in itself a small step, it signified a turning point in Comintern policy 
which would facilitate a larger role for the PCE in Spanish politics. However, it 
would be quite misleading to suggest that the party broke with Its past policy 
and strategy at this juncture. In many respects the party continued to maintain 
its pre-Asturias line. Although officially a policy of 'united front from above' was 
superimposed and unity of action with the PSOE was sought In the form of 
formal agreements, the concept of frente Onico persisted, and the PCE used 
Asturias to attack the PSOE and CNT arguing that they had betrayed the 
workers. The PSOE rejected unity calls for the same reason they had done in 
the past: because they called for working-class unity but under communist 
leadership. 91 
The Asturias episode was significant though, in that it presaged the PCE's later 
cross-party, largely non-party political unity initiatives, which would be 
particularly prominent during the civil war. After the October revolution the PCE 
°OPreston, Coming, p. 132 91 Santos Julia, Oriaenes, pp. 76-77, Heywood. Marxism, p. 154 At the end of October 1934 the 
Political Bureau of the PCE Issued Instructions to the PCE provincial committees to work for 
unity of action with the PSOE, amounting to a United front form above; Cruz, El Partido 
Comunista. p. 287 tells us that an Antifascist Bloc was to be led by the working class through 
the Alianza Obreras, whose hegemony the party sought. To this end the Allamas should be 
constituted in a workplaces, localities and provinces. 
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initiated a campaign against the repression. Its principal objectives were: 
struggle against the death penalty, help to those who were victims of reprisals, 
and appeals for the amnesty of prisoners, all of which needed the collaboration 
of workers' forces and their organisations. In the first instance, the PCE created 
commissions of assistance to the Asturian miners and the first liaison committee 
with the PSOE to deal with the question of prisoners, which later organised the 
collection of signatures and joint strikes to try to save those condemned to 
death. It also created the national committee for Help to Victims of the 
Repression of October, composed of three socialists and three communists for 
the distribution of the three million francs collected in the USSR. 92 
Perhaps most significantly, the foundation of the Spanish branch of the 
International Women's Committee against War and Fascism (in Spain known as 
el Comite de Mujeres contra la Guerra y Fascismo), by Dolores Ibärrurl, 
although not directly related to Asturias (it predated events by several months), 
brought the PCE, and Ibärruri especially, to the attention of the feminist circles 
within the republican parties. The formation of this organisation in Spain 
constituted a success for the PCE because until then it had been unable to 
create any broad organisms of wide-reaching political and social composition. 
This organisation was the forerunner of the Agrupacibn de Mujeres 
Antifascistas (AMA), the communist-inspired, but more broadly antifascist 
women's wartime organisation. 3 Prior to the October uprising this organisation 
was very active, particularly in Madrid, where women from the UJC and PCE 
had been the driving force behind the mobilisation of around 2,000 women from 
92 Cruz, E! Partido Comunista, pp. 222-23 93 See chapter three below. 
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factories and workshops against plans by the right-wing government to mobilise 
reservists for the war in Morocco. After October this organisation was 
proscribed, but its work continued under the cover of the Organizaci6n Pro- 
Infancia Obrera, created by lbärruri to take care of children orphaned or 
temporarily without parental care through the death or imprisonment of their 
parents. 94 In Madrid, the premises of the Pro-Infancia organisation on Gran Via 
provided the communists with a legal base from which they could mobilise 
women and organise the Party in clandestinity. 
Other non-party political or overtly communist groups also made their entrance 
in Spanish society around this time. The foundation of the Spanish branch of 
the Friends of the Soviet Union organisation (la Associacidn de Amigos de la 
Uniion Sovietica, AUS) in April 1933 was designed to educate politicians and 
citizens in general as to the numerous cultural and scientific advances achieved 
by the USSR and reflected the improvement in diplomatic relations between the 
USSR and Spain under the Republic. In its first three months it counted on 
7,000 affiliates with 14 regional sections 85 Arguably it was the Soviet Union 
which benefited more from the creation of the AUS than did those Spaniards 
who joined it in the hope of finding out more about the USSR. The organisation 
seems to have been intended as a means of diffusing Soviet propaganda, and 
of accumulating information concerning politics, society and culture in Spain on 
behalf of the Soviet Union. Daniel Kowalsky has taken such effects to more 
sinister conclusions: he claims that this proves that the Soviet presence in 
94 Cruz, Pasionaria, p. 125, Est6vez, La vida es lucha, pp. 92-93 95 Daniel Kowalsky, La Uniion Sovi6tica y la auerra civil Espanola 1936-39: Una revision crftica (Critica, Barcelona, 2003) p. 136 By September 1938 affiliates number 110,000 of which 50,000 
were in Madrid. 
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Spain was far from negligible during the war, that the fruit of the propaganda of 
groups such as the AUS was the birth of a sudden and notable popular 
fascination with the USSR, and that by the time war broke out the Russians 
already had a wide network of informers, collaborators and diffusers of 
propaganda, as well as a list of potential enemies. Yet, this type of 'conspiracy' 
theory is not only undermined by his other arguments which highlight the inept, 
haphazard and at times downright half-hearted attempts to send propaganda to 
Spain during the war, 96 but also ultimately denies the Spanish Republic and its 
citizens a role in the shaping of events. Communism was weak in the pre-war 
period, not because Soviet attempts to infiltrate by stealth had been 
unsuccessful but because it was not embedded in the social fabric of the nation, 
it did not address the needs of ordinary people and it largely failed to find 
political space between anarchist revolutionism and essentially reformist 
socialism. 
Kowalsky's analysis also misinterprets the Spanish interest in the Soviet Union. 
Membership of the AUS reflected a general interest and fascination with the 
USSR, common among many left-wing sympathisers and intellectuals all over 
Europe, rather than any widespread implantation of the PCE or communist 
ideology in Spain. 97 Often it was the symbolism of the Russian Revolution as a 
metaphor for the aspirations of the international proletariat rather than the reality 
98 bJ id. p. 137, pp. 150-1, pp. 153-63 97 On the attitude of some Intellectuals and politicians to the communist movement in the 1920s 
and 1930s, including sections of the CNT and the British Labour movement see Jason Gamer, 
'Separated by an ideological chasm: The Spanish Labour confederation and Bolshevik 
Internationalism (1917-1922), ContemDorary European History. 15,3 (2006); Arthur Marwick, 
Clifford Allen. The Open Conspirator, (Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh and London, 1964), pp. 58- 
59; On the conversion of the left-leaning writer Raman J. Sender to communism after a trip to Russia in 1933 see Elorza & Bizcarrondo, Queridos Camaradas. pp. 205-6. 
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of the narrowly-defined Soviet model which had most influence. Whilst on the 
campaign trail in Asturias for the Popular Front electoral coalition, lbärruri noted 
the enthusiasm of the villagers for stories about the lives of workers in Soviet 
Russia, which she had recently visited. 98 
Crucially, Spanish communism did not have exclusive representation of the 
Soviet Union within Spain, thus enabling individuals to reach their own 
conclusions about the nature of the Bolshevik state. In Spain, as elsewhere 
there existed a literature and journalism on Russia which broke the information 
monopoly of the PCE on Soviet events, and reflected an interest in the USSR 
which pre-dated the creation of the AUS and its supposed propaganda machine. 
The conservative and reactionary press habitually identified the strategies of all 
workers' and left-wing groups in Spain, and not just the PCE, with that which 
was occurring in the Soviet Union. 99 It is such a reading which has erroneously 
represented Spain as under a real threat of communist takeover In the 
Republican period, an argument wielded for many years In Francoist 
propaganda to justify the military uprising and war against the legitimately 
elected democratic govemment. 100 
Undoubtedly, the assistance organised by the agencies of the Comintern, such 
as the money supposedly raised by Soviet trade union organisations and 
channelled to Spain through Socorro Rojo Intemacional (International Red Aid, 
" Ib3rruri, El ünico Camino, pp. 226-27 Of course as with all Communist memoirs there is an 
element of propaganda here, but we can assume that the curiosity of the crowd was real 
enough. 
99 Cruz, El Partido Comunista, pp. 91-92, Cruz, 'Del partido reden Ilegado', Juan Aviles Farre, 
La fe aue vino de Rusia: la revolucion bolcheviquey los esnanoles 1917-31 (Biblioteca Nueva, 
Madrid, 1999), pp. 153-168, p. 280 100 See for example Cruz, El Partido Comunista, p. 290-93 
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SRI), boosted the popularity of the movement and of the PCE within Spain. In a 
report to the Comintern in June 1935, Codovilla spoke of 276,000 francs 
received for the Comit6 de Ayuda and 700,000 for SRI, and claimed he was 
expecting a total of 3 million francs. Furthermore, Socorro Intemaciönal de 
Trabajadores (SIT) was involved in the evacuation to the USSR of exiled 
politicians, irrespective of political affiliation after the Asturias revolution. This 
contrasted favourably with the distinct scarcity of external socialist help. In 
January 1935, Julio Alvarez del Vayo was entrusted with the task of finding 
assistance funds in Paris by the socialist leadership. He returned with only 
10,000 pesetas. The revolutionary experiment of October had not impressed 
European social democracy and this translated into a paucity of material 
assistance. In September, the Belgian Schevenels informed the secretariat of 
the UGT that the solidarity fund for Spain of the International Syndical 
Federation was 230,000 francs, of which they could only send 100,000, 
compared with the 4 million collected for the German socialists and 7.5 million 
for the Austrians. 101 
Comintem and Soviet financial assistance, coupled with subsequent Soviet 
military intervention, would seem to suggest a desire for sovietisation, especially 
when viewed retrospectively in light of the Soviet satellite states established in 
Eastern Europe after 1945. But the Spanish Civil War, and much less the 
Second World War were not yet a tangible threat, and communist action in this 
context should thus be viewed as an attempt to strengthen the international 
proletariat in its antifascism, while working-class and left-wing responses 
101 Elorza & Bizcarrondo, Queridos Camaradas, pp. 229-32 
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reflected a genuine desire for unity and for self-improvement. Naturally such 
developments served to strengthen the PCE and enhance its prestige, but it is 
important not to overstate the significance of this. The Socialist International 
had not yet been seen to abandon the Spanish Republic, as occurred during the 
civil war, with its acceptance of the non-Intervention policy. 
Moreover, the PCE's marked suffering from the post-Asturias state repression, 
precluded its evolution into a powerful political entity. Party work continued in 
clandestinity, with visits to prisons, collections of funds for prisoners, the 
distribution of propaganda and the sale of Party and Youth press. All this work 
was illegal, however, and if caught, militants could expect to spend at least 
three months in gaol. 102 
The brutal repression following the Asturias revolt of October 1934 helped to 
foster a sense of both national and international working-class and left-wing 
unity, which the PCE and the Comintern tapped into, and nurtured, but did not 
create. In many respects the broad fascination with the Soviet project was 
bound up with this movement, for it was concerned with the emancipation of the 
working classes in a variety of senses. Within Spain, left-wing solidarity was 
demonstrated by a united action in favour of an amnesty for the prisoners of 
October, with all workers organisations and some republicans supporting the 
National Committee for help to the Prisoners of October. 103 A growing 
rapprochement between disparate left-wing political leaders was a 
consequence of their experience of prison, which both encouraged discussion 
102 Estevez, La vida es lucha, p. 93 103 Ricard Vßas, Laformaci6n de las Juventudes socialistas unificadas, (1934-36) (Siglo Veintiuno Editores, Madrid, 1978) p. 37 
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and debate and fostered a desire for unity of action which would help achieve 
the amnesty. 
The about-turn in Comintern tactics made official at the Seventh Congress of 
the Communist International (25 July - 21 August 1935) created an opportunity 
for the PCE to engage in unity initiatives with other political and syndical entities. 
Georgii Dimitrov delivered the main report which formally signalled the break 
with the sectarian rigidity of the Third Period and ratified for the whole 
movement the Popular Front policies pioneered by the French Party. The new 
line redefined the character of communist policies by encouraging the parties to 
address the daily lives of the workers, to seek anti-fascist alliances'from above' 
as well as 'from below' and by doing so enter the mainstream of national 
political life. 104 Nonetheless, progress towards unity was slow and the PCE was 
reluctant to completely abandoned the Third Period and accept that other 
working-class parties were its equals. As late as May and June 1936, Dimitrov 
was admonishing the PCE for its failure to abandon sectarianism. The PCE 
remained a marginal political force until late in 1935, and it was actually the 
radicalisation of the Caballerista wing of the PSOE which finally brought the 
PCE into mainstream politics. 105 
The Asturias episode had cemented the growing gulf between the reformist and 
revolutionary wings of the socialist movement whose antecedents can be found 
104 Furthermore, it allowed for a greater degree of local Initiative. Although popular Frontlsm was 
limited by the requirements of Soviet diplomacy, it presaged the evolution of a greater degree of 
autonomy from Moscow In the pluralist democratic'national roads to socialism' between 1944 
and 1947 and the Eurocommunist movements of the 1970s. Fernando Claudln, Eurocommunism and Socialism trans. John Wakeman, (NLB, London, 1978). pp. 30-64 Rees, 'Good Bolsheviks' pp. 197, Heywood, Marxism p. 152 
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in the experience of government in 1931-33, and which had resulted in the 
socialist departure from government in 1933. Francisco Largo Caballero and 
Indalecio Prieto, who represented the two main poles of the socialist movement, 
drew radically opposing conclusions from the Asturian revolt. 106 Largo believed 
that failure in October 1934 had occurred because the PSOE had been 
insufficiently revolutionary and therefore that it should be 'bolshevised'; Prieto, 
having supported the PSOE's revolutionary line with some misgivings, was now 
more than ever convinced of the need to regain political power through coalition 
with the republicans. And while Prieto's assessment was to culminate in the 
Popular Front, Largo's was to lead to the wholesale loss of the FJS to the 
PCE. 107 
However, this internal division in the movement was provoked only in part by a 
clash of political principle and tactics, in reality the disputes had more to do with 
organisational rivalries within the movement and the battle to control the party 
apparatus, than with the espousal of different roads to socialism. 108 This 
becomes increasing evident, especially from 1935 onwards. By way of example 
Helen Graham has pointed out that the extreme vociferousness of the radical, 
pro-left-socialist sector of the youth organisation, the stance of its leadership 
and the hostility displayed towards the reformists in the PSOE and particularly 
towards their leader, Indalecio Prieto, made the socialist youth into an 
instrument perfectly suited to the needs of the left socialists and of their leader, 
106 Ibid., p. 146 107 Heywood, 'The Development of Marxist Theory, ' p. 121 108 Helen Graham, 'The Socialist Youth in the JSU: the experience of organizational unity, 1936- 8' in Spain in Conflict democracy and its enemies, (ed. ) Martin Blinkhom (Sage, London, 1986), 
p. 84 
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Largo Caballero, in what was a strategic battle against the Prietistas for control 
of the party organisation. 
In response to the reformists' support for a reconstitution of the republican- 
socialist alliance of 1931-33 Largo advocated a 'united workers' front' which 
would extend as far as unity of action with the anarchists, and which envisaged 
the unity of the entire working class on which any strategy of taking power was 
predicated. Left socialism wanted to transplant what had occurred in Russia, to 
Spain, but in place of the Communist Party, the history and tradition of the 
Spanish workers movement meant that the function of the single party would be 
assumed by the PSOE. Furthermore, as the proletariat in Spain was organised 
by syndicates, the function of the soviets would be achieved by the UGT and 
the anarchists who would follow them. Before the attainment of the single party, 
working-class unity would be patiently constructed, with syndical unity as the 
first stage. Given the ideological similarities between the UGT and CGTU, 
unification here seemed much more easily achievable than that of the UGT and 
CNT. Agreement was reached by the CGTU and UGT towards the end of 1935 
and was weighted heavily in favour of the latter. In fact unification was actually 
no more than the complete absorption of the CGTU into the UGT. The UGT 
would not tolerate the fusion of the two unions, although the communists had 
asked that where the CGTU was sizeable - in Sevilla, Pontevedra and Toledo - 
that fusion congresses take place. The UGT merely responded that the UGT 
was structured by national federations, and that if the communists had an 
industrial federation equal to or greater in size than the corresponding UGT one, 
then a fusion congress could take place. As a result the CGTU accepted the 
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form of entry imposed by the UGT, the CGTU was dissolved and its members 
entered the UGT. los 
The historical conjuncture, that is, the adoption of the Popular Front strategy by 
the Comintern coupled with the radicalisation of the socialist left around Largo 
Caballero allowed the PCE for the first time to fully engage with the idea of left- 
wing unity. In fact the Communist Youth movement had already begun to move 
away from its sectarian past and attempted to engage with a wide spectrum of 
youth, in order to organise them against fascism. In Madrid this took the form of 
Sunday excursions to the Casa del Campo, where militants were encouraged to 
bring 1 or 2 friends or acquaintances. They played a lot of sport, but also held 
clandestine meetings and plenums under this guise. Of course this was still 
dangerous and many meetings were broken up and young cadres arrested and 
imprisoned: the girls in Ventas prison, and the boys in the Modelo. 1934 and 
1935 also saw an increase in joint Communist and Socialist Youth initiatives. 
They organised popular mobilisations against right-wing acts of provocation, 
such as the rally at El Escorial of members from the JAP (Juventud de Accibn 
Popular), the youth wing of the CEDA. The shared experience of gaol also 
fostered left-wing solidarity, and popular support for Youth unity. ' 10 
However, despite the changes in strategy by the Comintem and by the Spanish 
communist movement, Popular Frontism in Spain began as a purely electoral 
'09 Julia, La Izauierda, p. 174, pp. 180-81 110 Estevez, La vida es lucha, pp. 71-87; Fernando Claudfn, Santiago Carrillo: crdnica de un 
secretario general (Planeta, Barcelona, 1983), pp. 23-25 
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alliance devised by the republican politician Manuel Azafla. 111 Azana, who had 
been jailed for his association with the Asturias rising, undertook a massive 
publicity campaign upon his release from prison, to convince Spaniards, 
particularly Spanish workers of the urgent need to rebuild an electoral 
agreement on the Left. Between May and October 1935 he toured major urban 
centres delivering his 'discursos en campo' (open-air speeches), which were 
met with a tremendous popular response. Alongside Azafla's campaign, left- 
wing groups organised public meetings at which speakers from a variety of 
parties, including the communists, made speeches in favour of unity. At the 
large public events across Spain prominent national political and syndical 
leaders, including Ibärruri and Diaz from the PCE, made speeches. In Madrid, 
where the PCE was particularly active in the organisation of this campaign, 
speakers came from all levels of the party: women such as Maria Teresa Leon 
and the young activist, Leonor Estevez, or men like Isidoro Dieguez from the 
Madrid Provincial Committee. Venues included the Barbieri Theatre in the 
district of Lavapies and the cinema in Carabanchel, both working-class areas of 
the city. The PCE was also involved in the organisation of public meetings in the 
province of Madrid, for example in Morata de Tajulia and Aranjuez. These 
experiences certainly helped to raise the profile of the Party, and contributed to 
an increase in affiliates in the capital and its province. Membership in Madrid 
rose from around 526 in 1934 to 955 in the late summer of 1935. By March 
1936 with a membership of 3,450 the Madrid PCE maintained its position as 
one of the largest Communist Party organisations, second only to the 
organisations in Asturias and Malaga, which both counted on 3,500 militants. 
... Paul Preston, 'The Creation of the Popular Front in Spain', in The Popular Front in Euroae 
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Nationally the Party was also growing: the PCE numbered around 13,000 
nationally by August 1935, and the UJC numbered around 5,297 in May of the 
same year. By December 1935 the PCE counted on 17,342 members nationally, 
while by February 1936, the PCE had 22,497 members and the UJC 14,000.12 
The enormous groundswell of popular support for unity encouraged all groups 
on the Left, including the PCE and the socialist left to support the idea of an 
electoral alliance with the republicans. Although Prieto and Azaha were not 
keen on communist participation, Largo Caballero insisted on it. His demands 
were driven partly by a desire to tie the PCE into political responsibility (albeit 
indirectly) for delivery of the electoral programme, and partly to strengthen his 
own position with the republicans and to prevent Prieto from assuming a 
predominant position within the PSOE. It was agreed that the PSOE/UGT 
would represent on the National Popular Front Committee all those forces to its 
left included in the electoral pact. The signatories to the electoral pact were 
PSOE, UGT, PCE, POUM, lzquierda Republicana, Union Republicana, the 
Catalan Esquerra and Partido Sindicalista, encompassing republicans, 
socialists, dissident and Moscow-oriented communists, Catalan nationalists and 
members of the libertarian movement. In terms of candidate allocation the 
Left's allocation was taken from the PSOE's share with the result that the PSOE 
were under represented and the republicans over-represented. Prieto had 
112 Estdvez, La vida es lucha, pp. 71-87, p. 93; lbfirruri, EI ünico Camino, p. 207-8; Cruz, EI 
Partido Comunista, appendix 6; AHPCE, microfilm xvi, apartado 197, 'Desarrollo numerico del Partido desde diciembre 1935 a diciembre 1937; AHPCE, Carpeta 17, 'Militantes del Partido en 
marzo de 1936'. 
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accepted this because he believed that a purely workers' front would not be 
strong enough against the forces of the Right. 113 
The Popular Front coalition was carried to victory in the February 1936 elections, 
with the promised amnesty for political prisoners and the support of CNT 
playing a key role in its success. However, the government formed after the 
election victory was a purely republican one, deprived of socialist participation 
because of the organisational rivalry within the PSOE. 114 
For the PCE, although it was still a relatively small and insignificant party, the 
elections signified a break with the isolationism of the past, and marked the 
beginning of a transition towards a populist, reformist political agenda. The 
Party obtained 17 seats in parliament, signalling for the first time a truly national 
presence. 115 The Party's new role afforded it new opportunities for growth and 
for participation in national and local politics. In embracing Popular Frontism, 
the Party also began to champion the cause of broad left-wing unity, which 
would affect its relationships with political, syndical and cultural organisations. 
An influx of new members would affect its internal organisational dynamic, 
where democratic centralism was predicated on ideological unity and tight 
13 Graham, The Spanish Republic, pp. 63-65 114 pp. 72-73; See chapter two below for the implications and consequences of the PSOE 
internal power struggle. 115 A full (and reliable) list is provided in the propagandist history of the PCE by the Francoist 
Eduardo Comfn Colomer, Historia del Partido Comunista de Espana, Part One. (Editorial 
Nacional, Madrid, 1965), p. 732 The deputies elected were: Jose Diaz Ramos, Madrid; Juan 
Jose Manso de Abad, Oviedo; Dolores lbärruri Gomez, Oviedo; Cayetano Bolivar Escribano, 
Malaga; Leandro Carro Hemaez, Vizcaya; Pedro Martinez Cartdn, Badajoz; Bautista Garces 
Granell, Cordoba; Jestis Hemandez Tomas, CBrdoba; Daniel Ortega Martinez, Cadiz; Eduardo 
Suarez Morales, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria; Adnano Romero Cachinero, Pontevedra; 
Florencio Sosa Acevedo, Tenerife; Vicente Uribe Galdeano, Jaen; Antonio Mije Garcia, Sevilla; 
Miguel Valdes Valdes, Barcelona (capital); Juan Antonio Urives Moreno, Valencia (province); 
and Antonio Pretel Fernandez, Granada. 
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control by the leadership over its militants. Even in Madrid, where communism's 
traditional base was male, urban and working-class, demographic changes in 
membership were occurring. Nevertheless, the Party was essentially still bound 
by the same restrictions and limitations which had characterised it throughout 
almost the entire Republican period: the adherence to Marxist-Leninist doctrines 
and the Bolshevik model of revolution; the strict control by the Comintem, 
through Codovilla, over the party; the hierarchical chain of command, whereby 
decisions were taken by a small executive and handed down to the rank-and- 
file; a membership base which contained diverse elements: the dedicated and 
the politically uneducated/inactive, working-class constituents as well as other 
groups. This framework would continue to shape the PCE as a political entity in 
parliament and in civil war. 
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Chapter Two. In defence of the Republic. 
The rather dramatic policy change of the international communist movement in 
the summer of 1935, and the PCE's participation in the Popular Front, saw the 
Party evolve from marginal to mainstream in a matter of months. A focus on 
parliamentary politics signalled a change in the modus operandi of communism, 
and in particular Spanish communism, which was accustomed to clandestinity, 
entryism, and even the forms of direct action favoured by Spanish anarchists. 
The rapid nature of this about-turn meant that, inevitably, previous attitudes and 
behaviour persisted. In the period following the elections, Spanish communism 
was a mass of contradictions most of which remained largely unresolved by the 
time of the military uprising on 18 July. 
Reformism vs. revolutionism 
There was an inherent paradox in the ideas emanating from the communist 
camp, particularly in the first few months of 1936. Despite entering parliament, 
the PCE did not immediately renounce its long-held objective of the overthrow 
of capitalist society by means of an armed insurrection and the implantation of a 
workers' and peasants' dictatorship. I This was in part because Comintem policy 
seemed still to be evolving: on 21 February 1936 a speech by the Comintern 
leader Georgii Dimitrov, which was reproduced in the communist daily Mundo 
Obrero, articulated his support for both the Popular Front and the possibility of 
revolution in Spain, after which a Soviet government would be formed based on 
' Cruz, EI Partido Comunista, p. 275 
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the government bloc of the PCE and another party (or its left wing). This was a 
clear allusion to the left-wing of the PSOE gathered around Francisco Largo 
Caballero? 
The implementation of the recent Comintern resolutions were also hampered by 
the attitudes of the head of the Comintem's Roman Land Secretariat, Dimitri 
Manuilskii, who continued to compare Spain to Russia at the advent of its 
October revolution. Several sources concur on the ambivalence towards 
democracy displayed by both Codovilla and Manuilskii: Codovilla took 
government instability as a sign that the revolutionary conjuncture was nearing, 
while Manuilskii advocated extra-parliamentary action to advance the demands 
of the masses, 3 or as Jose Diaz summarised it: the activity of the organisation 
would develop between parliament and the street 4 
Part of this extra-parliamentary activity involved the training of the MAOC 
(Milicias Antifascistas Obreras y Campesinas - Antifascist Workers' and 
Peasants' Militias), whose creation pre-dated communist Popular Frontism. 
These militias were originally conceived within the communist framework of 
armed struggle and insurrection. 5 In line with Comintern directives, the PCE, 
like all national communist parties in the early 1930s, had articulated an anti- 
militarist stance, aimed at the protection of the Soviet Union from its imperialist 
enemies. It also worked clandestinely within the armed forces and towards the 
creation of its own militias. Until the Seventh Congress, Comintern approaches 
2 Mundo Obrero, 21 February 1936 
3 Cruz, El Partido Comunista p. 269, p. 279; Elorza & Bizcarrondo, Queridos Camaradas p. 279 
Cruz, El Partido Comunista p. 258 5 Juan A. Blanco Rodriguez, ¬I Quinto Reaimiento en la Polftica Militar del PCE en Ia Guerra 
Civil, (UNED, Madrid, 1993), p. 27 
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to armed struggle and insurrection against the state were grounded in classic 
Marxist and Leninist theories. For Lenin the militias would create in the masses 
a spirit of combat, of confrontation with the repressive forces of the state. Yet 
the army's support for the revolution at the moment of the insurrection, (or at 
least a part of it in order to neutralise the rest) would be crucial. Work in the 
army involved the creation of communist cells, which, in the moment of uprising, 
could neutralise the reactionary commanders and attract the majority of soldiers 
to execute revolutionary missions jointly with the proletariat. This work was 
carried out by the PCE through Soldado Rojo, a clandestine publication within 
the barracks. 6 To this end, Juan Modesto and Enrique Lister were appointed to 
carry out Party work in the areas of militia and army respectively. Both had 
spent time at the Lenin school in Moscow in 1933 and 1934, learning Marxist 
theory and military strategy! 
Following the adoption of Popular Frontism in the policy of the Seventh 
Congress, insurrection was barely mentioned. Instead, the militias were to be 
formed as self-defence groups in the face of assault from fascist groups .8 This 
transformation of the purpose of the MAOC framed the wider transitional phase 
for Spanish communism at this time. However, given the persistence of earlier 
theory, it is unsurprising that the PCE continued to articulate an aspiration to 
revolution. On 24 February a speech by the PCE leader Jose Diaz was 
published in which he asserted that `the desires of all the workers are to make 
Spain a country like the Soviet Union and for this it is essential that a great 
°II. pp. 2-4 
Juan Modesto, Soy del Quinto Reaimiento, (Coleccibn Ebro, Paris, 1969), p. 8 p. 14; Enrique Lister, Memorlas de un luchador, (G. del Toro, Madrid, 1977), pp. 57-59 ° Blanco Rodriguez, El Quinto Reaimiento, p. 8 
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single revolutionary party of the proletariat exists. The workers are invited to join 
the ranks of the Communist Party. '9 In an open letter to the PSOE, the PCE 
called for the immediate implementation of the pact of the Popular Bloc and the 
struggle for the programme of a workers' and peasants' government. 10 In 
communist strategy the democratic revolution would begin with the installation 
of a workers' and peasants' government (or simply a soviet government), of 
indeterminate class composition. Once installed this government would begin 
the socialist revolution - the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
' 1A resolution was 
passed at the Party plenum held on 28-30 March 1936: 'to carry the workers 
and peasants towards the triumph of revolution, to terminate the democratic- 
bourgeois revolution and to rapidly transform it into a socialist revolution. '12 
The dictatorial methods of the Comintem representative in Spain, Vittorio 
Codovilla, also hindered the adoption of other congress resolutions. Codovilla 
ran the Party virtually single-handedly, leaving to the home-grown leaders the 
tasks of implementing his directives. His stranglehold on the Party was later 
heavily criticised by the French communist leader Andre Marty. 13 Such a 
paternalistic and condescending attitude, he argued, ran contrary to the spirit 
and letter of resolutions of the Seventh Congress of the Communist 
International, which reduced the intervention of Comintem representatives in 
the internal affairs of parties and which permitted national sections of the 
Mundo Obrem. 24 February 1936. ' Mundo Obrero. 5 March 1936 "Cruz, El Partido Comunista, p. 281 12 AHPCE, Microfilm xiv, apartado 187,7 April 1936. 'A todos los comites y organizacidnes del 
Fartido. Circular del Comite Central del PCE'. 
3Ronald Radosh, Mary Habeck & Grigory Sevostianov, Soain Betrayed. The Soviet Union in 
the Soanish Civil War (Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2001), pp. 38-39. 
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movement to elaborate tactics in tune with local conditions. 14 Indeed it had been 
intended that Codovilla would leave Spain once the elections were over and the 
National Congress of the PCE had been held, thus allowing the Party to work 
for itself without a special representative from the Comintern. The course of 
events would prevent this from occurring. 15 
It has been argued with some justification that the PCE's activity and language 
was significantly moderated after Hitler's denunciation of the Locarno Pact and 
occupation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936. For the Comintem, fascism was 
no longer simply a threat to its national sections, but an ever more serious 
threat to the USSR itself and to other European states. The seriousness with 
which the Comintern took the developments was reflected in its directives to its 
Spanish section: in a telegram from Dimitrov and Manuilskii to Diaz and 
Codovilla on 9 April 1936, it was stated that in all activity of the Party, the 
creation of Soviet power was not the order of the day. Rather the object was to 
create a democratic regime and to strengthen the positions of the proletariat 
and its allies in order to prevent the rise of fascism and counterrevolution. 16 
However, although the expectations incumbent on the PCE were made more 
explicit at this point by the Comintern, the PCE in practice had already resigned 
itself to the fact that revolution was no longer an immediate goal. Lofty 
aspirations to revolution were the preserve of rhetoric rather than reality and, 
despite the legacy of some entrenched habits and ideas, there is also plenty of 
evidence to support the view that the signing of the Popular Front electoral pact 
on 15 January was more than a symbolic gesture by the PCE. The struggle 
14 McDermott and Agnew, The Comintem, p. 134 'S Elorza & Bizcarrondo, Queridos Camaradas, p. 266 1° Ibid., pp. 280-833 
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against fascism took precedence over the goal of revolution for the first time, 
and the defence of the Spanish Republic was integral to this new strategy. 11 
This new emphasis was reflected in various Party communications. A Party 
circular concerning the MAOC stated that the fundamental objectives of the 
militias were the 'defence of democratic liberty and to help the government in 
the struggle against reaction and fascism, ' and additionally to lend support to 
the struggle of the workers and peasants: to defend the land in their hands, help 
in the event of shutdowns/stoppages, act in defence against evictions, and as a 
'defence for the unions, workers organisations and parties and those of a 
popular nature. ' It was also stated that the militias must act legally and to this 
end the Central Committee had drawn up a series of regulations. 1e Indeed, after 
the formation of the government on 19 February the MAOC presented their 
statutes to the authorities. They sought the right to self-defence of workers and 
their organisations, of their press, meetings and premises, their demonstrations 
and public gatherings. Approved by the government, their first official and legal 
activity was their attendance as defenders and guarantors of the official parade 
of workers' organisations and Popular Front political groups in Madrid on I May 
1936.19 The joint IC and PCE manifesto of the same date also declared the 
PCE's intention to defend the Republic, 'against the danger of a bloody fascist 
domination imposed by the force of arms and through an enemy invasion. m2O An 
article in Mundo Obrero on 11 June 1936 demanded that 'we must impose 
Cruz, El Partido Comunista, p. 289 
AHPCE, Microfilm xiv, apartado 183,21 April 1936. 'A todos los comites del partido. Circular del responsable de las MAOC del PCE'. 19 Modesto, Soy del Quinto Regimiento, p. 16 20 AHPCE, Carpetal7, Manifiesto del I. C v PCE: Todos unidos contra la Guerra v Fascismo, I May 1936, p. 24. The Republic was to be defended despite its bourgeois character and inequalities. 
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republican order' as disorder allowed provocateurs, assassins and forces of the 
Right to operate. 
Furthermore, once in parliament, the Party's deputies were in the main 
absorbed in attending to the personal petitions of numerous workers who 
asked for their help, whether it was for injustices committed in the bienio negro 
(the two years of repression following the October uprising) or out of personal 
necessity, for example access to work 21 The Party's parliamentarianism 
certainly raised its profile, particularly in Madrid, as communist deputies became 
known for the assistance they gave to ordinary people. To an extent, the Party's 
position as relative outsider to conventional politics may have encouraged a 
perception of the Party as more approachable and more energetic than some of 
the other organisations on the Left. Dolores lbdrruri has claimed that she and 
her colleagues were frequently involved in the resolution of disputes on behalf 
of the poorest sectors of Madrid society, often because other politicians would 
not get involved: 
When parliament opened its doors, great numbers of delegations from 
towns and villages, especially from the provinces, arrived daily to petition 
their deputies for aid. But to the discredit of some deputies, the people 
were not always received by the men for whom they had voted. 
Consequently, an interesting phenomenon began to take place. When a 
delegation arrived from the provinces and was not received by its own 
21 Cruz, EI Partido Comunista, p. 259 
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deputies, who would plead urgent work, a meeting of heavy duties, the 
people would be so disappointed and disheartened that the 
parliamentary ushers began to advise them to talk to the communist 
deputies. 
At first the visitors were uncomfortable and wouldn't venture to do this 
since they hadn't voted for the communists; they belonged to another 
Party. In a short while, however, asking to speak to a communist deputy 
became routine procedure. 
Of course there is a propagandistic element to lbbrruri's example. But it serves 
to demonstrate the Party's encouragement of the masses in the utilisation of the 
parliamentary channels, which in turn reflects the PCE's new political position 
as a parliamentary party. The communists now recommended that all popular 
demands pass through governmental and Popular Front organisms, including 
the Town Halls. 
lbdrruri's account illustrates both the nature of communist engagement in 
traditional politics and the types of people the PCE was interested in. The 
energetic 'hands-on' approach was symptomatic of the youthfulness of the 
Party, both in terms of the physical age of its leaders and their relative lack of 
experience. This youthfulness was particularly apparent among the leadership, 
and would be an important asset for the Party during the civil war. Jose Diaz 
was just 40 in 1936, and had only assumed the Party leadership in 1932; 
22 Dolores Ib9rtwi, They Shall Not Pass, (International Publishers Co., 1984) pp. 171-2; El iin' in p. 237 
Cruz. EI Partdo Comun p. 289 
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Ibfirruri at 41 was the veteran of the organisation, but only began to have an 
important role after the declaration of the Republic in 1931; Pedro Checa, the 
organisation secretary of the Party was 26 and had been in the post for only a 
year. 24 The lack of an established mode d'emploi meant that the Party and its 
deputies could adopt a more flexible approach to issues, but this also meant 
that their initiatives and solutions were to a certain extent improvised, a 
characteristic which would dominate their responses in the early period of the 
conflict. The sheer lack of personnel in the Party also made for a very different 
organisational and operational structure from that in for example, the PSOE. In 
the PCE leaders had multipurpose roles involving the Party organisation and 
the implementation of Comintern policy, as well as being involved in the Party 
press, public speaking and representing the Party in parliament. This small 
Central Committee and even smaller Politburo, which were responsible for 
running the Party, was an asset, particularly in terms of allowing innovative 
responses to situations, but would also be a drawback during the war, where it 
placed the small leadership under enormous pressure and impeded the 
formation of reliable Party cadres. 
Once the PCE signed up to the Popular Front alliance, the concept of political 
unity as a means to defend the Republic pervaded the PCE's activity, and 
would become increasingly important during the course of the war. On its 
electoral victory in February 1936, the communist leadership professed support 
for the government and for the Republic. In a speech on 24 February 1936, 
Jose Diaz outlined the lessons that could be learned from the electoral victory, 
24 Claudfn, Santiago Carrillo. p. 46 
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that is that left-wing unity produced concrete political results, but he cautioned 
against'exaggerated optimism'. For him 
... [the] triumph of the Popular Bloc represents nothing more than the 
start of the struggle against reaction and fascism. If the bloc is broken up, 
it is clear that reaction and fascism will take courage anew and.... will 
launch the acquisition of their criminal objectives. This cannot and will not 
be. 25 
The concept of political unity clearly referred to the resolutions adopted at the 
Seventh Comintem Congress. There it had been advocated that the choice 
between proletarian dictatorship and bourgeois democracy had been 
superseded, in the short-term at least, by one of bourgeois democracy or 
fascism. Therefore the defence of bourgeois democratic liberties had to be 
secured by 'a broad, people's antifascist front, ' with 'the proletarian united front' 
of communist and socialist workers at its heart, and these would be 
strengthened by a `fighting alliance' with the peasantry and urban petty- 
bourgeoisie 26 Thus the communist movement sought to mobilise as many 
different sectors of society against fascism around the nucleus of a single 
proletarian party. 
In Spain, this policy was pursued through communist support for the broad 
antifascist unity enshrined in the Popular Front, the creation by the PCE of 
antifascist groups, and the promotion of working-class political unity. To this end 
25 Mundo Obrero. 24 Feb 1936. 26 McDermott & Agnew, The Comintern, p. 131 
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the Party tried to organise peripheral groups such as the unemployed, and to 
create agricultural federations in Galicia, independent of the UGT, in a bid to 
attract the small peasantry. 27 The communists responded to socialist criticisms 
of their action by declaring that these were not proletarian organisations but 
were composed of small peasants, and promised their organic incorporation 
into the peasant syndicate of the UGT at the opportune moment. 28 An integral 
part of Popular Frontism for the communists was the strengthening and growth 
of the PCE which would bring the single party of the proletariat a step closer. 
Jose Diaz affirmed this in a speech to communist militants in the Barbieri 
theatre in Madrid: 
Our current preoccupation is to arrive at the creation of a single 
revolutionary party inspired by Marxist-leninist doctrine. To achieve this it 
is essential to achieve an even closer unity of action between 
communists and socialists, in order to reach mutual understanding in 
tactics and political strategy, eliminating all differences between socialists 
and communists. One of the essential tasks for this is the strengthening 
of the PCE29 
Importantly, this was to be a single party dominated by the PCE. As with their 
acceptance into the electoral coalition, the PCE was brought closer to this goal 
by the Caballerista wing of the socialist movement. The Caballeristas also 
aspired to the creation of a single revolutionary party, but one which would be 
led by left socialists, rather than communists. Furthermore, from November 
27 Mundo Obrero, 24 February 1936. 28 Santos Julia, La Izauierda del PSOE p. 182 Mundo Obrero 24 February 1936 
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1935 the Caballeristas had actively pursued this as a policy, and interpreted the 
absorption of the CGTU within the UGT as the first step in this direction. 
However, unfortunately for the socialist movement, the easy success of the 
syndical absorption of the CGTU by the UGT reinforced the Caballerista's 
(mistaken) belief in left socialism's hegemony over the working class; they also 
assumed that a unification of the youth movement, and ultimately of the adult 
parties (both of which Largo Caballero rhetorically supported) would follow the 
same pattern as union unification, which had seen the CGTU subsumed within 
the larger UGT. But they failed to realise the substantive differences between 
syndical and political unity. The left of the PSOE failed to pick up on the fact that 
the Seventh Comintem Congress advocated prior unity of action before 
establishing the party on the basis of democratic centralism - which was simply 
a euphemism for establishing a single party on the basis of the PCE. In this 
respect, there was a certain continuity with pre-1935 communist theory. 
Ultimately the PCE still aspired to lead the working-class. The PCE made this 
ambition more explicit in a letter sent from its Central Committee to the 
executive of the PSOE in March 1936, which was published in Claridad and 
which asked the executive for a response. The executive of the PSOE met such 
proposals with silence, clear in their understanding that the PCE intended to 
engage in liaison committees on an equal footing with the PSOE, 
incommensurate with their minority status-30 In such a way a new organisation 
could come about whose control by the PSOE would have been impossible. 
However, the rejection of the proposal by the centrists of the PSOE encouraged 
30 Julia, La Izauierda, pp. 189-95 
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the left to pursue it, at least rhetorically. The left-wing used the idea of 
unification to gain advantage over their adversaries in the PSOE, in the battle 
for organisational control, while the PCE, in its discussion of the single party, 
also advocated support for the PSOE's left-wing in its struggle against the 
reformists in their Party, who would be jettisoned in the creation of any single, 
revolutionary party of the proletariat. 31 
The danger for the socialist movement was that this idea had also become 
extremely popular with the socialist youth (FJS), which since the election of a 
more radical executive in 1934 increasingly favoured the'Bolshevisation of 
socialism. ' It was hoped that youth unification would serve as an example to the 
parent parties, and the leaderships of both youth organisations were involved in 
negotiations on this point throughout 1935. The shared experience of prison 
together with pressure from the base had a significant impact. The last stage of 
the unification process was given impetus by both the merger of the UGT with 
the CGTU and the advance of centrists to positions in the PSOE, above all 
when Largo Caballero was displaced from the executive. 32 In parallel, unified 
socialist and communist organisations, not sanctioned by their respective 
executives also emerged at this time: in Torre del Mar in the province of Malaga, 
for example, where there had been no previous organisation, the Union of 
Marxist Youth was created. Simultaneously unification meetings occurred all 
over Spain reflecting the groundswell of support for unity (and thus unification) 
31 Helen Graham, Socialism and War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991), p. 21, Santos Julia, La Izauierda, p. 181; pp. 189-193, p. 192 32 Ricard Villas, La formacibn, pp. 52-3 
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initiatives. Unification of the FJS and UJC occurred at a meeting at Las Ventas 
bullring in Madrid on 5 April 1936.33 
However, although the unification bases agreed that the much smaller 
communist youth would join the larger socialist youth movement, there were a 
number of unresolved issues whose potential for damage was unforeseen, but 
which would cause serious problems for both communists and socialists during 
the war. For the PCE the effective reincorporation into the Party of former 
communists expelled from the Party including Bullejos, who had joined the FJS 
in Madrid after 1932, and presided over a 'trotskyist' faction, was a problem. 34 
For the socialists' part, the youth movement was not considering at this time 
any kind of separation from the PSOE. It sought to maintain its organisational 
integrity, requesting, for example that socialist militias and the MAOC be kept 
separate. The socialist aspiration to Bolshevise the Socialist Party was not a 
tactical manoeuvre by the national youth executive, easily manipulated by the 
PCE, but predicated on the belief in the strength of the Caballerista faction in 
the heart of the PSOE. In reality the left-wing of the PSOE was grouped 
predominantly in the Agrupaciön Socialista Madnlena, and outside Madrid they 
had a much smaller following, with the Prietistas dominating the federations of 
the North. Furthermore, particularly within Madrid, communism and anarchism 
were attracting parts of their traditional base. The JSU leadership would 
continue to support the idea of the Bolshevisation of the Socialist Party in the 
first months of war, and only change its policy radically after it witnessed the 
organisational capacity of the PCE in the defence of Madrid, with the result that 
" p. 55, p. 59 34 Elorza & Bizcarrondo, Queridos Camaradas, p. 283 
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its leadership would join the ranks of the PCE and take the organisation with 
them. 35 
On fundamental questions such as the proposals of the KIM (international 
communist youth movement) to create a mass antifascist youth movement, the 
FJS leaders were divided and remained so, failing to resolve the issues prior to 
unification. As a result, the massive influx of new members (in the first 4 weeks 
alone the joint organisation increased its membership from 100,000 to 140,000), 
meant that the new organisation was increasingly less a party of politically 
educated socialist cadres, and therefore less under the control of the PSOE. 
The propaganda apparatus which accompanied unification and the new 
newspaper of the JSU, Juventud, was a contributory factor in the spectacular 
growth of the organisation. Juventud achieved a print run of 150,000 copies for 
the first issue, its character coinciding completely with the orientation that the 
IJC tried to give the youth movement. 36 
Finally, the outbreak of war prevented the celebration of the unification 
congress which should have finally established the tactics of the JSU and 
named a National Committee. In its absence a unified Executive Commission 
was named on 9 September, which assumed all leadership functions. 37 The 
infrastructure was in place for the creation of a mass youth movement which 
would embrace all Spanish youth irrespective of class, background, or political 
affiliation, provided they supported antifascism. It would also spell the loss of 
the socialist youth organisation to the socialist movement, which would have 
35 Ibid. P. 54; Santos Julift, La Izouierda, p. 187 36 Ricard Villas, La formacißn, pp. 61-63 37 Ibid.. p. 64 
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enormous repercussions in wartime. 38 It is imperative to appreciate, however, 
that in its relationship with left-wing socialism and the FJS, the PCE was in 
significant measure assisted in its goal of hegemony of the working class by 
those sectors themselves. The recourse to communist language which the left 
socialists adopted, the 'Bolshevisation of the party', the 'dictatorship of the 
proletariat' and so forth, undoubtedly favoured the communists and blurred 
distinctions between the two, particularly in the minds of the politically 
unsophisticated. 39 Youth unification also reflected a substantial desire for 
working-class unity at the grassroots. Workers often perceived themselves as 
simply 'proletarian' or'Left'. In Madrid youth unity was demonstrated in joint 
youth initiatives in 1935 and 1936 such as the show of youth solidarity at the 
funeral of the young socialist Juanita Rico murdered by Falangist gunmen ao 
Thus the PCE founds itself responding to a particular political and social 
conjuncture, which coincided with its aspirations but which was not created by it. 
The Party's growth can also be seen in this light. Commensurate with its 
ultimate objective of creating a single party of the proletariat, the Party also 
sought to strengthen itself in the period after February 1936, through the active 
recruitment of new members. In this arena the PCE was very successful and 
the Party grew at an almost vertiginous pace. The stance adopted by the 
Comintern responded to a new world view emanating from the Soviet Union and 
its theoreticians, and was instrumental in carving out a new role for the PCE in 
its national milieu. But the Party's growth was not solely attributable to the fact 
38 On the JSU's affiliation to the PCE see Chapter three below. On the nature of the wartime 
organisation see Chapter four. 39 Santos Julia, La Izauierda del PSOE, p. 155 40 Estevez, La vida es lucha, p. 72, p. 96 
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that the Comintem's new policy made communism more palatable. In 
December 1935, in line with the directives of the Seventh Congress, the PCE 
had launched a campaign of affiliation, but saw no significant increase in its 
number of members. It is important to remember that regardless of the 
instructions of the Comintern, the PCE did not operate in a political and social 
vacuum, even more especially now that it had entered into the Spanish political 
mainstream. Undoubtedly the rise of the Right was an international 
phenomenon at this time, but the economic structure of society and the political 
and social organisations which represented its constituent parts was unique to 
Spain. It was the national situation coupled with the timing of the Party's 
entrance into the mainstream which explained the PCE's appeal. 
Between February and July 1936 the Party's membership increased 
dramatically, rising from just over 20,000 to 46,203 in March and to 118,763 in 
July. In Madrid membership stood at 12,000 in July 1936.41 We do not know 
the social composition of the new affiliates to the Party in the months between 
the election and the military uprising, but a significant part of these new recruits 
were from outside the Party's traditional base. Many of these new recruits who 
flocked to the Party just before and during the civil war did so for utilitarian 
reasons, and had an entirely different outlook from that of the revolutionary old 
guard of the Party. 42 Some of these came from the ranks of former militants, 
followers and voters of Lerroux's now defunct Radical Party, a trend which 
41 AHPCE, Microfilm xvi, apartado 197,1937, diciembre: desarrollo numerico del partido desde 
diciembre 1935 a diciembre 1937. In this report Party statistics put membership at 22,497 in 
February 1936, and at 88,523 in July 1936, while another Party report puts the figure 
substantially higher. AHPCE, carpeta 17, 'militantes del partido en marzo de 1936' put the 
Tf ures at 46,203. See also AHPCE, carpeta 17 'militantes del partido en julio de 1936'. ` Rees, 'Good Bolsheviks' p. 198 
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would gather momentum during the course of the war. 43 It would also seem that 
many were attracted by its more moderate policies, although it has also been 
argued that the antifascist Popular Front policies of communist parties across 
the spectrum attracted large numbers of radicalised rank and file workers who 
tended to take the parties' revolutionary credentials at face value. 44 And indeed 
in Spain there were large numbers of radicalised workers. 
Following the victory of the Popular Front, workers became even more strident 
in their demands for material improvements. Frustrated by the slow pace of 
reform, particularly in the area of land redistribution, in some parts of Spain, 
landless agricultural workers took matters into their own hands and occupied 
estates, most notably in the predominantly latifundist provinces of Ciudad Real, 
Albacete and Toledo in the central region, and Jaen in the South. 5 Although the 
PCE had previously always supported the revolutionary seizure of land, within 
three weeks of the election victory the PCE had modified its agrarian policy, 
replacing revolutionary land seizures with an intensification of the application of 
the agrarian reform introduced by the government. It would also seem that this 
message was slow to reach the grassroots, as they had to be reminded of the 
Party's position after the outbreak of hostilities in a Party declaration on 8 
August 1936 46 However, given that land occupations were invariably ratified by 
43 Rafael Cruz, 'Del Partido Recien Llegado'. For the demise of the Radical Party see Nigel 
Townson, The Crisis of Democracy in Spain Centrist Politics under the Second Republic. 1931- 
36, (Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, 2000), especially pp. 330-346 
McDermott & Agnew, The Comintern, p. 133 45 Natividad Rodrigo Gonzalez, Las Colectividades Aararias en Castilla La Mancha, (Junta de 
Comunidades de Castilla La Mancha, 1984? ), p. 42; Luis Garrido Gonzalez, Colectividades 
Agrarias en Andalucia: Jahn 1931-1939, (Universidad de Jaen, 2003), pp. 21-26 
40 Cruz, El Partido Comunista, p. 271 
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retrospective application of the Agrarian Reform Law, the situation on the 
ground was, unsurprisingly, unclear. 47 
The PCE's moderate position was also echoed in the attitude it adopted 
towards the increasing number of strikes occurring in the city of Madrid in the 
summer of 1936, the worst of which was in the construction sector in June and 
July, which at its peak saw over 110,000 workers on strike. 48 The increasingly 
volatile social situation in Madrid was a result of a complex interplay of factors: 
the construction boom of the 1920s and accompanying migration of workers to 
Madrid, followed by an economic slump which affected all employment sectors; 
the large numbers of unemployed with little recourse to assistance from social 
and cultural networks; the incapacity of the UGT to deal with the sheer scale of 
the problem, and the resultant shift in the balance of power between the two 
main Spanish syndicates in the city. The CNT with its method of direct action 
was able to capitalise on the more radical mood of labour relations in the city 
and to offer protection to those emerging sectors without representation. In the 
first months of the Republic, the CNT hardly counted in Madrid, its adherents 
numbering 6,057, with approximately one fifth of those belonging to the 
sindicato gastronömico. Five years later the majority of its Madrid members 
were from the construction industry, numbering 16,919 affiliates, enjoying 
similar numbers to that of the UGT's federaciön local de la edificacibn. 49 
The strikes in Madrid in the summer of 1936 above all reflected an attempt by 
the CNT to gain ground (and members) from the UGT, which had traditionally 
47 Garrido Gonzalez, Colectividades AQrarias, p. 21 48 Paul Preston, Coming, p. 195 49 Santos Julia, De la fiesta popular, p. 56; p. 67; pp. 78-89; p. 173; pp. 188-90 
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represented working-class interests in the city. 5° The general strike, declared by 
the CNT on the fifth anniversary of the Republic in April, appealed to the 
radicalised mood of many workers, and witnessed for the first time, the 
participation of UGT workers, in spite of the opposition of ASM, the PCE, the 
JSU and the administrative council of the Casa del Pueblo. 51 In the construction 
strike of June and July 1936, the UGT leadership found itself caught between 
the criticisms of the reformist wing of PSOE at its loss of control of the Madrid 
workers and the cries of scab and traitor being hurled from anarchist quarters. 52 
The UGT thus initially agreed its support for the strike, siding with the anarchists 
against the PCE, only to seek a negotiated agreement half-way through. 53 
Contrary to what has often been suggested, it is not at all clear that the 
radicalisation of the socialist left occurred in response to anarchist pressure. 
Indeed, as CNT radicalism increased, so did the Caballeristas' tendencies to 
adopt more moderate positions. " Nevertheless, the vacillation of the left 
socialists over the construction strike, and the radicalism of the CNT created a 
space for the PCE in the middle ground. The PCE consistently urged caution in 
respect of the strikes, both outside and inside the UGT. 55 In the summer 
construction strike the PCE strongly censured the 36 hour week that the unions 
demanded. It thought this unreasonable and claimed that a working week of 40 
hours was fairer. 56 Within the UGT, this position made the communists deeply 
unpopular as was demonstrated at the assembly in the Madrid bullring which 
50 Santos Julift, 'Economic crisis, social conflict and the Popular Front Madrid 1931-36' in 
Revolution and War in Spain 1931-39 (ed. ) Preston , p. 154 31 Santos Julia, La Izauierda del PSOE, p 249 52 Graham, Socialism and War, p. 49; Santos Julia, La lzauierda del PSOE p. 258. 5' Santos Julia, La lzauierda del PSOE, p. 188; p260 u Graham, Socialism and War, p. 45 56 The Communist trade union organisation the CGTU had merged with the UGT in 1935. 56 Cruz, El Partido Comunista, p. 270 & Santos Julia, La lzauierda del PSOE, p. 183 
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decided the petitions of the construction sector. Once the strikes had started, 
the PCE did side with the workers, but also spoke in meetings in favour of the 
pacific channelling of conflicts and concessions. Meanwhile, the Caballeristas' 
realisation that they could not follow the CNT to the brink with the strike 
ultimately reinforced the moderates' position in the UGT, which was 
represented by both the communists and Prietista socialists. 
Most significantly, the role of moderation that the PCE had carved out for itself 
in these scant few months, would be, despite the initial ambiguity of its position 
once war broke out, its hallmark throughout the Civil War. 
The road to civil war: communist responses 
Madrid's construction workers were still on strike when the military garrison in 
Melilla, Spanish Morocco rose in support of the military coup organised by a 
group of generals in the Spanish army. The risings spread to garrisons all over 
mainland Spain on 18 and 19 July with varying degrees of success. The 
conspirators were a small minority in the army but the rising was backed in 
many places by the junior officer class whose career aspirations had been 
curtailed by Republican budgetary restrictions. 57 Generally speaking, senior 
army officers remained loyal to the Republic. The conspirators were aided by 
some sectors of the Civil and the Assault Guard, and local right-wing political 
groups especially Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera's Falange and the JAP. In 
57 Helen Graham, The Spanish Republic, p. 79 
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Navarra the traditionally Catholic Carlists had allied themselves with the rebels 
on account of the Republic's anticlericalism. 
Although the situation remained fluid to a certain degree, by 20 July certain 
characteristics of the two camps could be discerned, both in geographical and 
socio-cultural terms: the landowning classes and provincial petit bourgeoisie 
(joined by the industrial bourgeoisie if they happened to find themselves in or 
could reach the insurgent zone) sided with the rebels while the industrial and 
rural proletariat and the urban petit bourgeoisie remained loyal to the Republic. 
Peasant Spain, the area above Madrid stretching east to Salamanca and west 
to Zaragoza was in insurgent hands. Parts of Galicia had also been taken, with 
the cities of Vigo and La Coruna falling later. Latifundist Spain was divided. The 
insurgents had captured seven of the fourteen provincial capitals to which this 
term could be applied. In Andalucia, the cities of Sevilla, Cordoba, Granada and 
Cadiz had been taken, as well as Caceres (Extremadura) and Albacete (which 
was quickly recaptured by the Republic). This contrasted with the urban 
situation: five of the country's seven largest cities were in Republican hands: 
Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Malaga and Bilbao. Resistance continued for a 
few days in Sevilla and Zaragoza, but the working classes there had been 
disorganised. Where the insurgents had been defeated civilian resistance had 
played a large part. But - contrary to popular belief - in no major town had the 
people alone crushed the military revolt. The loyalty of the security forces was 
essential to victory. Equally, the police forces had nowhere fought successfully 
without strong civilian support. The combination of the two in attack brought 
victory in Barcelona, Madrid, Mdlaga and Gijon, quickly followed by Valencia 
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and San Sebastian. 58 The retention of the major cities by the Republic together 
with the failure of the insurgents to capture decisively many areas, meant that 
initially the Republic had the upper hand. 
In Madrid, one of the conspirators, General Fanjul, had gone to the Montana 
barracks on 19 July to take command of the 1,200 officers and men of the 
infantry and engineers regiments. They were joined by some 250 Falangists 
(who had been operating clandestinely in the city since the organisation was 
made illegal in March 1936). Here they awaited columns advancing from 
outside Madrid, from Getafe, Cuatro Vientos and Carabanchel. Although the 
news of the rising in Melilla was not published in any of the newspapers of the 
capital, Indalecio Prieto, the Socialist Party leader had appeared before the 
Cortes to announce it. Word quickly spread around the local trade union and 
political organisations, and many madriler os mobilised themselves, making 
their way to local party and union offices. Members of the MAOC were also on 
stand-by. On 18 July the socialist and communist parties issued a joint 
statement broadcast on the radio supporting the republican government, and 
calling on working class people to prepare to fight in the streets. The CNT also 
came out in support of the Republic siding with the socialists and communists in 
asking that the people be armed and declared a general strike. A number of 
army officers sympathetic to the Republic handed out a few rifles to card- 
carrying members of left-wing organisations, but the republican Prime Minister 
Casares Quiroga vacillated, fearful of arming a radical working class rabble and, 
keen to play down the scale and significance of the revolt, issued a number of 
68 Ronald Fraser, Blood of Soain: The ExDerience of Civil War 1936-1939, (Middlesex, Penguin, 
1981), pp. 70.1, p. 106 
92 
decrees dissolving those military units involved in the rising and relieving troops 
of their duty of allegiance to rebel officers. 
That evening the government resigned, but its replacement headed by the 
Uniön Republicana leader, Martinez Barrio was met with indignation from the 
people in the street. Unidn Republicana was the party furthest to the right in the 
Popular Front and the cabinet, an exclusively republican one. This was widely 
interpreted as a betrayal of working class interests, especially as workers were 
already taking on the rebels with what little arms they had - in the streets of 
Madrid, and in the mountains of the Guadarrama to the north of the capital. 
Martinez Barrio resigned on the morning of 19 July and in his place Azara 
appointed another all-republican government under Jose Giral of lzquierda 
Republicans who allowed the arming of the workers. Lorries were sent from the 
government arsenals to the headquarters of both the CNT and UGT. But the 
bolts for the vast majority of the 65,000 rifles distributed were still inside the 
Montana barracks, which refused to accede to orders from the Ministry of War 
to hand them over. On 20 July the militias' siege of the barracks gave way to an 
assault by cannon fire. With the support of some Civil and Assault guards, the 
barracks were taken and General Fanjul taken prisoner, although at 
considerable human cost. Large numbers of the militias had not been armed 
and many were killed when a white flag was raised by the rebels who 
subsequently fired on the surging crowd with machine guns. In turn when the 
barracks were finally overrun many officers chose to commit suicide or were 
killed by a vengeful crowd. Of the 145 officers inside the Montana, 98 died 
either in action, before firing squads, massacred or at their own hands. Those 
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that survived were arrested and transferred to the Model Prison, although in the 
confusion some managed to slip away unnoticed. 59 
Although communist sources have tended to overstate the role of the Party and 
its preparedness for the attempted coup, 60 research indicates that working-class 
organisations anticipated a military conspiracy. The socialist movement was 
divided in its evaluation of the threat. The moderate socialist leader Indalecio 
Prieto repeatedly warned the Prime Minister, the Left Republican Casares 
Quiroga, who buried his head in the sand. 61 The socialist left were suspicious 
of Prieto's warnings, believing them to be a mere tactic into winning support for 
his premiership of the government, which it refused to sanction. 62 As a result, 
the leadership of the UGT appeared so completely unaware of danger that they 
sent a large delegation to the Seventh Congress of the International Syndical 
Federation in London at the beginning of July. 63 Nevertheless working class 
organisations maintained vigilance, and prepared themselves for combat. 
Socialist and communist militias kept watch in the street of Madrid, particularly 
around the environs of the barracks, and CNT members constituted comites de 
barrio (neighbourhood committees), in order to defend themselves. " The PCE 
had been working clandestinely within the armed forces for some time, and in 
1935 had created antifascist soldiers' and corporals organisations in a number 
of regiments. In Madrid, the Party claimed organisations in all the barracks, 
although in the provinces the work and the organisation were much weaker. In 
59 Fraser, Blood of Spain, p. 49, p. 53, pp. 76-78; Graham, The Spanish Republic, pp. 79-82 60 See, for example, Lister, Memories de un luchador, chapter four, Modesto, Sov del Quinto 
Re imiento pp. 17-26; lbdrruri, EI ünico camino, pp. 263-67 
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the days immediately before the uprising a team of ten people maintained 
constant contact with the barracks, and apparently thwarted an attempt by rebel 
sympathisers to remove bolts from the guns at the Artillery Park. The head of 
the Park, lieutenant Colonel Rodrigo Gil informed the PCE of this attempted 
manoeuvre and the weapons were later used to arm the people. 65 
But while the Party anticipated the coup, initially it seems to have profoundly 
misunderstood the nature of the uprising and therefore failed to formulate an 
appropriate response. In a telegram sent by Codovilla to Moscow in response to 
requests from Dimitrov for information on the military uprising it is clear that 
Codovilla misunderstood the situation, applying to all of Spain the experience of 
the capital, where popular mobilisation had put down the insurrection. In the first 
two weeks of war, the Comintern secretariat received misinformation to the 
extent that the international press presented a more reliable account of events 
than their own representative in Spain. Similarly, the Comintem felt compelled 
to communicate repeatedly the necessity to defend the Republic, support the 
Popular Front, and to avoid getting carried away with plans for after the 
ss victory. 
In light of Codovilla's untrustworthiness, the Comintern sent Maurice Thorez, 
Jacques Duclos and Andre Marty from the French Communist Party (PCF) to 
85 Lister, Memorias de un luchador, pp. 59-67; Modesto, Soy del Quinto Reaimiento, p. 18. 
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Spain, in order to act both as reliable sources of information and to assist the 
leadership of the PCE who seemed to be struggling with the situation. 67 The 
PCF had a key role in disseminating in Europe the message that what was 
happening in Spain was a popular mobilisation in defence of the democratic 
Republic. They were also responsible for entering into discussions alongside 
representatives from the PCE with the other political forces on the Republican 
side in order to establish a communal line of conduct to crush fascism. 
Besides the fact of Codovilla's ineptitude, this intervention was necessary from 
a purely practical point of view. Several reports from Andre Marty to the 
Comintern secretariat outlining the activity of the Party from 18 July to the 
beginning of October make clear that the Party leadership was a tiny force 
numerically and was stretched beyond its capacity and capabilities. Marty found 
the Party's organisational ability in complete disarray: 
The party committees discussed urgent questions (collection of weapons 
and explosives; supplies, questions of housing and so on), but without 
setting forth perspectives [for the future] or still less following a general 
plan. 68 
In this period he also claims that the 'large role of the party' often faded away, 
enabling the CNT to 'come forward as the saviour of the situation with its ideas 
about the national defence council' and that the CNT was at least as dominant 
in Madrid as the UGT. The leadership of the Party, which was represented by 
671bid., pp. 301-307 68 Radosh, Habeck & Sevostianov, Spain Betrayed, Document 14, Report from Andre Marty to 
the Comintern on the condition of the PCE, p. 35 
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the politburo alone, was completely absorbed in practical matters. It had no time 
for party agitation or for political work. 69 
The second report suggested that the Party had been able to regain the 
initiative by the beginning of September, and was able to organise mass 
meetings, including the first inner-Party gathering since the beginning of the war. 
The leadership was beginning to act independently, but its leaders were terribly 
overworked. Many from the leadership headed the struggle in the first few days 
of the conflict. The Central Committee no longer existed due to several of its 
members being killed at the front; others were expelled or removed for various 
reasons. 70 
Although representative of an individual view on the condition of the PCE, and 
perhaps symptomatic of the communist tendency to be overly self-critical, 
Marty's report offers a valuable insight into the workings of the Party in the first 
few weeks of the conflict. Research by Tim Rees has also revealed that the 
Party leadership and the Comintem representatives on the ground in Spain 
were often overwhelmed by the situation, a state of affairs compounded by 
frequent and indiscriminate requests from Moscow for reports and other 
paperwork. " 
Marty's report also depicts a rather weak organisation with a distinct lack of 
purpose or at least clear direction in the initial stages of the war. The fact that 
69 Ibid., Document 14, p. 35 and Document 15, Summary of the general situation in Spain by 
Andn3 Marty to the Comintern, p. 50 70 Ibid., Document 15, pp. 50-51 71 Rees, 'The Highpoint of Comintern Influence? ' pp. 150-51 
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much of the leadership was involved directly in combat, and that some lost their 
lives does not suggest a party contriving to assume power. This is consonant 
with Rees's findings which demonstrate that the Party at crucial times, at least 
until the arrival of the Comintern delegate Togliatti in the summer of 1937, 
seemed rudderless and unable to make decisions. The Party, reliant on 
directives from the Comintern, were let down by erratic communication 
channels between the Comintern headquarters in Moscow and the PCE in 
Madrid. As a result the Party found itself bereft of Comintern guidance at 
crucial times, and consequently had to improvise solutions as best they could in 
line with general Comintern policy. 72 Marty also highlighted the relative strength 
of the unions juxtaposed with the relative political weakness of the PCE which 
at this time reflected the very real situation in Madrid. The PCE was indeed 
growing at a steady pace, but as with other political parties, the PCE influence 
had been eclipsed by the trade unions. The CNT was challenging the legitimacy 
of the UGT to represent working-class interests in Madrid, as we have seen, but 
nevertheless, it was the UGT who was the dominant force in Madrid. 
In spite of its apparent disorganisation, the PCE had, by the beginning of 
August, formulated a set of ideas concerning its theory of war, clearly influenced 
by the Comintern, which would change little over the course of the next three 
years. In a Party manifesto published in August 1936 entitled `Balance de un 
mes de lucha', the PCE set out its ideas about the nature of the war and what 
was required in order to win it. The central themes which the Party adopted for 
the duration of the conflict were set out here. The war was characterised as a 
72Ibid., pp. 150-51 
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struggle between democracy and fascism, reflecting the preoccupations of the 
Comintern. It was also a war between reaction and progress, in which the Spain 
of science, culture, art, and workers was under threat. It was also described as 
a national war in which the independence of Spain was in danger (In the 
respect that fascism represented a threat to national sovereignty). 73 All these 
ideas would continue to be articulated by the PCE and the JSU during the 
course of the war. There were also clear echoes of Popular Frontism and the 
need to mobilise a broad front against fascism. This front, championed by the 
Party, particularly after February 1936, as a means to protecting the Republic 
from its political enemies, was even more necessary now that the Republic was 
engulfed in a civil war. 
The Republic attacked by the military uprising on 18 July was already fragile. 
The govemment's vacillation in arming the people, even when the Republic was 
under attack from its enemies, only served to further undermine the faith of the 
masses in its institutions. 74 The disintegration of army, police and judicial 
functions wrought by the coup and wholesale desertions of personnel meant 
that the Republic was deprived of the means to exert its authority over its 
population. The organs of state, ayuntamientos and diputaciones - town halls 
and county councils respectively - were paralysed, not least because in the 
confusion that reigned across Spain during the first few days of the rising many 
middle-class republican functionaries and elected officials prevaricated or `went 
missing', fleeing their public responsibilities. 75 In the majority of areas where 
AHPCE, Carpeta 17, Manifiesto del PCE. Aaosto 1936: 'Balance de un mes de lucha 74 See Paul Preston, Coming, especially chapter seven, for a resume of the pre-war situation. 75 Helen Graham, 'The Spanish Popular Front and the Civil War' in The Popular Front in Europe, 
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the coup had been resisted (with the exception of the Republican Basque 
Country) local committees sprang up to organise everyday life: transport, food 
supplies, communications and so forth. The constitution of these local 
committees varied and was dependent on the relative strength of the political 
forces in a given area. 76 In Madrid the declaration of the general strike had 
assisted the government in its resistance to the rebels but also meant that 
influence over many sectors of the working population had passed to the unions, 
especially the UGT, which was particularly strong in the capital. Union and 
neighbourhood committees were formed as well as collectives and cooperatives 
overseen by worker committees both in the municipal sector and to some extent 
in private industry and commerce. But this occurred on a significantly smaller 
scale than in Barcelona and it was driven more by practical imperatives, given 
the proximity of the city to the front, than by popular ideological and cultural 
preferences. n In terms of urban collectivisation there were dramatic differences 
between Madrid and Cataluna: it has been suggested that around 560,000 
individuals were involved in industrial collectivisation in Cataluna, which could 
have affected as many as 1,020,000 families, whereas in the centre it was 
much less, with perhaps around 30,000 persons involved. 78 But while influence 
had passed to the unions, that is not to say that the leaderships were always in 
control of their affiliates. The period between the February elections and the 
coup was already characterised by a radicalisation of workers in the capital who 
were frequently beyond the control of leadership. The coup further exacerbated 
this situation. 
76 Graham, The Spanish Popular Front p. 114 n Graham, The Spanish Republic, pp. 96-7 78 F. Mintz, Autogestion et anarcho-syndicalisme: analyse et critiques sur I'Espaane 1931-1990. 
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Agrarian collectivisation also occurred, but this phenomenon actually pre-dated 
the military coup, was much more widespread than urban collectivisation and 
was less directly related to the transfer of power in the wake of the uprising. 79 
On the whole, expropriation of land in general was less common in the province 
of Madrid than in the south, where the direct occupation of lands was 
concentrated in the provinces of Jaen and Granada 80 Furthermore, in contrast 
to the central region, in Jaen local Communist Party affiliates had been involved 
the occupation of estates along with other political and syndical groups. 81 This 
seemed to contradict the moderation that the PCE leadership had been 
promoting in the spring of 1936 and which it continued to articulate into the 
summer of 1936, and beyond. Despite this apparent divergence between the 
leadership and the grassroots, the Party's central organ articulated the 
leadership's line: On 21 July Mundo Obrero proclaimed 'It is essential to create 
order in the Republic' and on 30 July declared that 'we are defending a regime 
of liberty and democracy... it is the democratic bourgeois revolution which in 
other countries occurred more than a century ago. ' The truth of the matter was 
however, that the Party's central direction had been severely undermined in the 
first few weeks and months of the war, and as a result, local organisations 
made choices pertinent to the circumstances in which they found themselves. 82 
79 Jacques Maurice, 'Problematica de las colectividades agrarias en la Guerra Civil' ric ltura 
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Within the city of Madrid, the Communist Party found itself responding to a 
situation in which the authority of the central government had been severely 
weakened. A series of governmental decrees compounded the problem, but in 
the face of possible civil war, in reality it had had little choice. On 19 July the 
government had decided to arm the people, issuing weapons to those that 
could be vouched for by the Casas del Pueblo. 83 On 21 July the government 
dismissed all hostile elements from their public sector posts, M thus rendering 
ineffective many sections of the army, police and civil service. In these 
circumstances new appointments often required the backing of antifascist 
political and syndical groups in what amounted to a rather crude test of 
Republican loyalty, rendered necessary by the fact that the state apparatus was 
riven down the middle. Civil servants, for example were required to 'reapply' for 
their jobs with an application to the Administrative Militias organised by the 
National Union of Civil Servants. Such applications were frequently 
accompanied by a declaration of antifascist tendency or display of credentials 85 
With a great number of arms in circulation and a weakened police force, the 
enforcement of law and order and the administration of justice passed to 
political and syndical organisations. 
Despite a broadcast from the Interior Ministry on 26 July reminding the public 
that the arrest and detention of the population could only be effected by agents 
of authority, assault guards or civil guards, and that the function of militias was 
83 El Sol, 21 July 1936, Fraser, Blood of Spain p. 75 °t Gaceta de Madrid, 22 July 1936 
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to inform on those suspected of being enemies of the regime, party and union 
groups operated checas (secret police units) out of their local offices. Such a 
situation arose when the role of the militias was ambiguous. Other government 
organs, for example the Information Cabinet of the very same Interior Ministry 
on 23 and 24 July had called on the militias to help the ministry in the control of 
the streets, protection of buildings and the uncovering of enemies within the 
city. 86 The reality was that with police functions dislocated and government 
departments infiltrated by rebel sympathisers, the Republic was extremely weak 
and was forced to rely on these loyal elements. 
There is plenty of evidence to suggest that members of the PCE were involved 
in the administration of public order in the city and in maintaining vigilance 
against the Falangist elements operating clandestinely in the capital. The Party 
mounted its own investigations of people and their property, usually if they were 
suspected of being 'dangerous fascists' or members of the Falange. There are 
some 200 such warrants authorised by the Madrid Provincial Committee for the 
searching of premises of suspects in August and September 1936.87 Pedro 
Checa, of the PCE leadership and the Madrid Provincial Committee was 
responsible for directives for the conduct of interrogations of those under 
serious arrest. " There is also documentation which authorises one Agapito 
Sainz de Pedro to carry out investigations in a number of properties listed as 
86 Javier Cervera, Madrid en Guerra. La Ciudad Clandestina. 1936-39, (Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 
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belonging to dangerous fascist elements in September 1936.89 Sainz was also 
allegedly involved in sacas, the removal and execution of prisoners from state 
prisons, activity recorded in the Causa General. 90 In Madrid it would also appear 
that communists, anarchists and socialists collaborated with each other in the 
detection of hostile elements. 91 
Daily existence was punctuated by the occurrence of paqueos - lone riflemen, 
often Falangists, firing at the militia patrols policing the streets, from open 
windows or rooftops. It was also punctuated by the paseos -a disturbing 
development in the administration of revolutionary justice. The term derives 
from the ordinary meaning of the word -a walk - and was a euphemism for 
execution because the paseo always ended in death. The Party chequistas 
would usually act after an anonymous denunciation. Motives for denunciation 
were varied and were frequently the result of a class and sometimes personal 
hatred; many people used them to settle personal scores. People could be 
denounced for right-wing views, affiliations or collaborations, for an anti- 
Republican past or for having opposed some strike action or other or for 
approving of the repression in October 1934.92 It was sometimes the case that a 
person was not guilty at all, as recounted by the socialist newspaper editor and 
later Interior Minister Julian Zugazagoitia in his memoirs: a man about to be 
executed in such circumstances hands over a piece of paper which turns out to 
89 AGC, PS Madrid, Carpeta 391, Leg. 4, doc 205 Typed document authorising Sainz de Pedro 
to search the premises listed of a number of 'dangerous fascists' in Madrid (names and 
addresses supplied). 90 Cervera, Madrid, p. 97. For a discussion of the sacas see chapter 3 below. We should 
exercise some caution with books such as this which rely heavily on the Causa General. See 
chapter 3 below for a discussion of its origins and limitations. 81 Franz Borkenau, The Spanish Cockpit, (Phoenix Press, London, 2000), p. 127 92 Cervera, Madrid, p 56 
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be an IOU. The man who had denounced him had owed him money. The lender 
was freed and the debtor subsequently arrested and shot by the same group. 93 
Communists, as well as socialists and anarchist organisations have been 
implicated in these extra judicial killings. It is claimed that there were several 
hundred checas in Madrid alone: 55 in the district of ChamberI, 26 in 
Buenavista, 73 in Universidad, 49 in Palacio, 11 in Canillas, 21 in Puente de 
Vallecas and 54 in Congreso. 95 However, although the checas appeared to 
operate entirely beyond the law, the very nature of the checas and their 
authority to carry out such justice was ambiguous. On the one hand, there were 
many who felt that in the absence of a judiciary that could be trusted, and with 
the tangible threat to the Republic ever present in Madrid, such revolutionary 
measures was justified. On the other the checas seemed to be imbued with a 
semi-legal authority. 
One of the first to begin the crackdown on those disaffected with the regime 
was the official checa, located firstly at Bellas Arles and later at Fomento. 
According to various testimonies it was at the start of August that the director 
general of Security, Manuel Mufioz Martinez established this centre, known as 
the Provincial Committee of Public Investigation at a meeting of representatives 
of Popular Front organisations. Its mission was to investigate the conduct of 
93 Julian Zugazagoitia, Guerra v vicisitudes de los espaf oles, (Tusquets Editores, Barcelona, 
2001), pp. 90-91 94 Jesus de Galindez, Los vascos en Madrid sitiado, (Editorial Vasca Ekin, Buenos Aires, 1945), 
pp. 41-43 
w* Rafael Casas de la Vega, El Terror. Madrid 1936, (Editorial Fenix, Madrid, 1994), p. 82. This 
book should be treated with caution as it primarily draws on evidence from the Causa General, 
which the author takes as proof of definitive guilt. See also Javier Cervera, Madrid. pp. 62-66 
for the most formidable checas, p. 67 for a sketch of the socialist Garcia Atadell who ran the 
'Dawn Brigade', and p. 70 for the implication that communists were involved in the paseas. 
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persons disaffected with the regime. It was comprised of three representatives 
of all the political and syndical organisations which supported the Popular Front, 
including the CNT, 96 but gained a reputation for summary executions. According 
to one person active in the republican regime who lived in Madrid during this 
period, to be taken the Clrculo de Bellas Arles meant to be found at dawn at the 
Casa del Campo, with one's neck shattered by a bullet. 97 Although the usual 
procedure for detention of a suspect rested on a denunciation, at times the 
archives of the Interior Ministry were used to uncover 'enemies'. The file of 
Political Nuances (el fichero de Matices Politicos) or of the Control Lists of the 
General Department of Security (el fichero de Control de N6minas de la 
Direcci6n General de Seguridad) contained information on madnlenos who had 
been members of political parties, or organisations hostile to the Popular Front 
and was created after the seizure of the archives of rightist organisations. 98 
The interrelatedness of the checas with revolutionary justice on the one hand 
and official structures on the other raises two points. Firstly, although the 
political leaders had called upon members of their respective organisations to 
assist them in the enforcement of law and order, they were not always 
controllable. Secondly, the whole of the Republic and its institutions were 
tainted by these events. Acknowledging both these points makes it easier to 
understand how the PCE (and the JSU) could be implicated in the occurrence 
of paseos and yet at the same time be seen to want to do everything it could to 
bring about the end of such arbitrary justice. As we have already seen, the 
96 Cervera, Madrid, p. 176, p. 227, Ian Gibson, Paracuellos: Como Fue, (Barcelona, Argos Vergara, 1983), p. 42 97 Arturo Barea, The Foroing of a Rebel (London, Granta Books, 2001), p. 547 98 Cervera, Madrid, p. 61 
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communists had favoured both legal and extra-legal approaches to protect the 
working-class between February and July, although the leadership increasingly 
supported established political channels to articulate demands and resolve 
conflicts. It is also clear that the grassroots had not necessarily absorbed the 
nuance of their arguments, and believed that the revolutionary juncture had 
arrived. The MAOC and socialist militias before the outbreak of war had been 
involved in street-fighting and confrontations with the extreme right-wing youth 
organisations of the JAP and the Falange. 99 In many respects the execution of 
revolutionary justice once the war had broken out was a continuation of this 
activity. 
Given the rapid influx of new members to the PCE, it is also possible that many 
joined the Party for personal advancement, or for the protection offered by a 
Party card. The Party leadership became increasingly concerned about the 
types of people joining the Party, 10° and an article which appeared in Milicia 
Popular, the newspaper of the communist Fifth Regiment, formed from 
elements of the pre-war MAOC, reflects concerns over the conduct of their 
militia: 
The revolutionary ethic is just that, an ethic, it is not a lack of self-control. 
And revolutionary justice is also justice, not brutality or irrational stupidity. 
The irresponsibles do not serve peace or war. Nor do they serve the 
revolution. 101 
99 Blanco Rodriguez, El Quinto Regimiento, p. 26 10° See Chapter five below. 
101 Milicia Popular, 12 September 1936. 
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This is an oblique attack on the anarchists who were widely perceived to be the 
'uncontrollables' in Madrid, but is also a warning to its own groups. 102 The JSU 
leader Santiago Carrillo, who from November 1936 would take firm measures to 
put an end to the paseos in his capacity as Public Order delegate on the 
Defence Council of Madrid, talked of the embarrassment of the paseos for the 
Republic, particularly in the international arena. 103 Given that the Comintern 
was pushing the Popular Front policy of broad anti-fascist unity in the hope of 
securing an alliance with Great Britain and that the Republic itself was keen to 
foster good relations with France and Britain in the hope that they would sell 
them arms, it seems unlikely that the PCE leadership, or indeed the Comintern, 
would encourage acts of revolutionary 'justice'. 
The Popular Tribunals that were officially created on 23 August were an attempt 
by the Republican authorities to bring a semblance of due process to 
revolutionary justice. These were composed of a jury of representatives from all 
the Popular Front parties and presided over by a professional judge, assisted by 
two others. 104 They were designed to put an end to the paseos and summary 
'justice'. But although this marked the beginning of a state recuperation of 
control over the application of justice and recourse to violence, it would be 
several months before this process was complete. 
In the meantime a new government was confirmed by the Republic's president, 
Manuel Azafia on 4 September 1936. It had been hoped that an agreement 
102 Cervera, Madrid. p. 71. Cervera refers to the fact that among public opinion in Madrid it was 
widely perceived that the anarchists were responsible for the paseos. 103 Ibid., p. 68 104 Fernando Diaz-Plaja, La Guerra de Espana en sus documentos, (Plaza y Janes, Barcelona, 1972), p. 93 
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could be reached on the creation of a republican-led cabinet reinforced by 
PSOE participation. 105 This would have offered an acceptable government to 
the radicalised population, whilst saving Republican institutions and presenting 
a picture of moderate government to the outside world. Such an option was 
favoured by most groups within the Popular Front; the republicans, moderate 
socialists, and indeed the PCE. In fact the PCE had been instructed to avoid as 
much as possible direct participation in government by Moscow as early as 24 
July 1936. Curiously, in a study by Ronald Radosh and Mary Habeck 
documents which support this fact have been sidelined, and interpreted as a 
mere tactic in order to present Republican Spain to the rest of the world as a 
democratic bourgeois state rather than a revolutionary communist regime. 
Similarly, communist support for the Popular Front is also seen as a ploy, 
designed to create the impression that'the steps the Comintern desired 
emanated from the entire Spanish polity rather than just the communists. r106 
Such arguments have denied the same Spanish polity any protagonism or 
responsibility of its own, and disregard the relative weakness of both the PCE 
and the Soviet Union at this juncture. They also certainly overlook the fact that 
communist participation would have run counter to both Comintern and Soviet 
policy at that time, which was primarily driven by a search for alliances 
especially from Britain and France against fascism. 
However, just as he had blocked attempts by the moderate socialists to enter a 
republican-socialist government under the premiership of Indalecio Prieto in 
105 Helen Graham, The Spanish Republic, p. 132 106 Radosh, Habeck & Sevostianov, Spain Betrayed, Document 6 Telegram from Dimitrov to 
Dfaz, instructing the PCE on the course of action to take in the developing war, pp. 13-14 and p. 2 
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May, so Largo Caballero vetoed this sort of coalition again in September. Largo 
wanted the premiership for himself. It was Largo's symbolic importance among 
working-class constituencies, as a guarantee of Left unity and proletarian 
ascendancy, which overrode the reluctance of the more moderate groups and, 
indeed, President Azana himself. His radicalism was seen as little more than 
empty rhetoric, a view increasing held by the moderate wing of the PSOE, 
especially after the failure of the revolution of October 1934. For this reason it 
was considered reasonably `safe' to appoint him as Prime Minister. Largo also 
made his acceptance of the premiership conditional on the inclusion of the PCE 
in the cabinet for fear that they gain would credit from the freedom of opposition, 
much to the reluctance of the Communist Party. 107 
The new cabinet included Largo Caballero as Premier and Minister for War, the 
socialists Julio Alvarez del Vayo, Angel Galarza, Anastasio de Gracia, Juan 
Negrin and Indalecio Prieto as ministers for foreign affairs, the Interior, Industry 
and Commerce, Finance, and War respectively; the communists Jesüs 
Hemändez and Vicente Uribe as ministers for Education and Fine Arts, and 
Agriculture; the Left Republican Mariano Ruiz Furies as minister of Justice; the 
Union Republican Bemardo Giner de los Rios as minister of Communications 
and Jose Tomfis y Piera, of the Left Republican Party of Cataluna, the Esquerra, 
as minister of Labour and Health. 108 These were joined later in the month by the 
Left Republican Julio Just as minister of Public Works, and Manuel de Irujo of 
the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) as minister without portfolio. Largo also 
sought to bring the CNT into the government for the first time in the movement's 
107Letter from Dimitrov to Voroshilov, 8 September 1936 in Radosh, Habeck & Sevostianov, 
Swain Betrayed, p. 18 
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history, and throughout September and October he worked towards this end, 
finally securing its inclusion on the eve of his government's evacuation from 
Madrid, on 4 November. Although the CNT gained four titular cabinet portfolios 
these really amounted to two politically significant posts: the moderate 
syndicalist Juan Peirb and his colleague Juan Lopez took over industry and 
trade between them, whilst the more radical FAI leader, Juan Garcia Oliver, 
was given the justice portfolio. His fellow FAI member, Federica Montseny, 
became health minister and the first woman in Europe since Aleksandra 
Kollontai to occupy a ministerial post of cabinet rank. It seems likely that the 
appointment of a CNT member to the justice portfolio was made with the 
intention of reining in the patrols, 109 as despite the creation of the Milicias de 
Vigilancia (Vigilance Militias) on 17 September 110(with the intention of doing 
just that) the irregular patrols, bound by no due process, continued to operate at 
the margins of the authority, and earned themselves a reputation for violence 
and looting. "' 
The Fifth Regiment 
In contrast to a somewhat muddled start in the political and social arenas, the 
PCE was able to demonstrate its relative organisational strengths and abilities 
in the military domain. It seems clear that the PCE anticipated the uprising, 
emphasising to the soldiers it was in contact with that in the event of an uprising 
they should do everything they could to stop the troops going out on the 
109 Graham, The Spanish Republic, p. 165 70 Gaceta de Madrid. 17 September 1936 
111 Graham, The Spanish Republic, p. 162 
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streets. 112 We must be careful not to over-emphasize the role of the PCE in the 
suppression of the attempted coup in Madrid, but the Party did value military 
preparedness very highly, as the existence of the MAOC demonstrates. This 
was consonant with the Soviet experience. Soldiers had played a decisive role 
in the March 1917 revolution, which was partly the result of years of agitation 
within the army by the revolutionary parties in Russia. 113 
Communist Party culture also lent itself naturally to a conflict situation. As 
Fernando Claudfn has argued 
If the Bolshevik type of party - extreme centralisation, almost military 
discipline, rigorous hierarchy, selfless militancy, almost religious faith in 
the 'cause' was for anything, it was precisely for the armed struggle. ' 14 
And it was precisely this which gave the Party the advantage over other groups 
in the first few months of war. It is, nevertheless, important not to over-state its 
capacity in the initial stages of the war. The Party was better suited than most to 
this type of situation, but it was far from organised and well prepared for what 
occurred, and nor could it count ön much in the way of an organised militia. 
Although communist doctrine supported the creation of militias, in reality the 
MAOC that had existed in one or other form since 1933 were numerically weak 
and disorganised, comprising around 2,000 nationally by May 1936. By the time 
112 Enrique Lister, Memorias de un luchador, pp. 59-61 p. 74 1" Mark Von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship: The Red Army and the Soviet 
Socialist State 1917-1930, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, USA & London, 1990), p. 14 
114 Claudin, Santiago Carrillo, p. 44 
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of the uprising they numbered about 1,500 in Madrid and 4,000 nationwide. Nor 
did the image of a structured and disciplined organisation visible in some of its 
parades from the spring of 1936 coincide with internal reality, for indiscipline 
was rife and some militia groups had to be excluded. 115 Back in 1935 steps 
were taken to bring the MAOC groups under the direct control of the local 
communist radios'in order to avoid deviation in mission and tactics'. '16 
Although the PCE had repeatedly denounced the plot of rebellion, there was 
never a general mobilisation of the MAOC before the uprising occurred. The 
groups were involved in vigilance activity in the days prior to the attempted coup, 
but their response when the time came was limited owing to a distinct shortage 
of arms. Nevertheless, young male members of the MAOC, largely drawn from 
the UJC and increasingly, from the peasantry, "' were instrumental in the 
formation of the first militia groups. Within the Ministry of War, some members 
of the UMRA (Union Militar Republicana Antifascista), an antifascist officers 
organisation, with lieutenant colonel Hernandez Saravia at its head, organised 
five battalions of volunteers commanded by the lieutenant colonels Mangada, 
Marina and Lacalle and the commanders Sanchez Aparicio and Femändez 
Navarro. The Fifth Battalion had been involved in the taking of the Montana 
barracks, and had had as its recruitment zone the district of Cuatro Caminos. It 
was made up of members of the MAOC, commanded by Manuel Camero, 
leader of the Radio Norte del PCE and Francisco Galan, together with Enrique 
Castro Delgado as envoy from the Provincial Committee of the PCE. They 
115 Blanco Rodriguez, El Quinto Regimiento, pp. 18-22 116 AHPCE, Microfilm xii, apartado 152, 'Boletin informativo de las MAOC de Madrid v orovincla. 
no. 2'. 'Blanco Rodriguez, EI Quinto Regimiento, pp. 23-24 
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occupied the Silesian convent on Francos Rodriguez and from here some of the 
first militia columns left for the sierras. 118 On 20 July Modesto, as national 
leader, visited all the districts of the MAOC in Madrid to transmit the orders of 
the PCE leadership for all detachments to organise recruitment of volunteers in 
local PCE offices and to concentrate them in the barracks of Francos Rodriguez, 
creating the bases of what would be the Fifth Regiment of Popular Militias. 119 
The name the Fifth Regiment was not used until end of July. 120 
The Regiment quickly extended beyond Madrid. Command and recruitment 
centres were created in various cities. In the beginning the creation of units 
seems to have been a response to a fear of being left behind in the process of 
forming militias which other organisations such as UGT and CNT had been 
involved in. 121 Moreover, in the first days and weeks, the organisation of these 
militias was haphazard. It seems there was no formal meeting to constitute the 
Fifth Regiment, which rather evolved. Most of the first commanders of the 
regiment - Enrique Castro, del Val, Barbado, Modesto, Gallo, Galan and Lister - 
developed their activities in the first days on the fronts of the Sierra with little 
contact with the barracks of Francos Rodriguez. Indeed much of the training of 
the first militias took place behind the front lines in the Sierra de Guadarrama. 122 
Militia leadership was also ambiguous, with some such as Enrique Castro or 
Enrique Lister over-emphasising their own roles, a tendency endemic in 
18 See map 4. '" Modesto, Soy del Quinto Regimiento, p. 25 120 Blanco Rodriguez, El Quinto Repimiento, pp. 27-28; p. 38 121 Ibid., p. 47 In Albacete it was led by Jose Silva, in Valencia Jose Antonio Uribes, in Alicante 
Antonio Guardiola, in Murcia Luise Cabo Giorla, in Almeria Antonio Navarro and Juan Maturana, 
in Jaen, Valenzuela, in Espejo, Joaquin Feijoo, in Andüjar, various, in Guadix and Baza, 
Adriano Romero. 
122 Modesto, Soy del Quinto Regimiento, pp. 37-38 
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communist memoirs but made all the more complicated by the later dissociation 
of these two from the PCE. It would appear that initially Carlos Contreras (the 
pseudonym of Italian communist Vittorio Vidali) was chief of the Fifth Regiment 
with Castro as his second-in-command. Within a few days Castro and Francisco 
Barbado assumed the leadership with Contreras as political commissar. Lister 
was appointed chief on 19 September. The political leadership also underwent 
a series of changes in the first weeks of the conflict as the national leadership of 
the PCE came to terms with the situation. Initially under the direction of the 
leadership of Radio Norte and the Provincial Committee the militia was soon 
under the control of the politburo itself. 123 
But this relationship was not without its problems. Andre Marty refers to 'friction' 
between the politburo and the Regiment, the latter complaining about the lack of 
attention from the Party, from which it received nothing 'but the most general of 
directives. ' This in turn reflected a serious shortcoming on the part of the Party, 
as in general it lacked any concrete knowledge of military matters. It was the 
most active elements of the middle cadres of the Party who had been 
instrumental in the organisation of the militia units which became the Fifth 
Regiment. Thus the most dedicated people the Party had were involved at the 
front. t24 
Despite its military naivete, the Party seemed to learn quickly from the situation 
and to develop a clear idea of what was required early on in the conflict. Already 
the Party appeared to understand that the conflict could be lengthy and that the 
123 Ibid, pp. 39-41 124 Radosh, Habeck & Sevostianov, Spain Betrayed, p. 35 
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reorganisation of the armed forces and the rearguard was necessary. In so 
many ways these lessons were being learned first hand by its leaders operating 
as commanders and political officers on the front line. 125 But while the PCE 
concurred with the politicians of lzquierda and Union Republicana on the need 
for a reconstructed army, it differed dramatically from them on the subject of the 
character of the new forces. For the Party, the very fact of the uprising had 
revealed the rottenness of the old army, and the desperate need to create a 
new, fully representative replacement. 126 
A series of Government decrees in August 1936, among them one for the 
creation of an army based on volunteer battalions were ill-received, and 
revealed a desire on the part of the republican-led government to recreate the 
old army. 127 It was proposed that the battalions be led by officers and career 
NCOs. They were to wear uniforms and would serve a minimum of two months 
or the duration of the campaign. They would also have the same rights as 
soldiers and preferential entry into the state corps. 128 Unsurprisingly, given the 
antimilitarism of large sectors of the working-class, these were unpopular. The 
republicans seem to have misunderstood the nature of the conflict, (for it was at 
its heart a class war) and the fact that other political groups and not least the 
people themselves would not permit a return to the status quo. The PCE also 
opposed any concept based on a recreation of the old army, but was more 
nuanced in its response. The PCE advocated the creation of an army for the 
Republic, but believed it should be based on the militias that were already in 
125 Enrique Lister, Memorias de un luchador, p. 88; p. 110 126 AHPCE, Carpeta 17, Manifesto del PCE. Aaosto 1936: 'Balance de un mes de lucha. ' 12" Gaceta de Madrid. 3 August 1936 
'28 Blanco Rodriguez, El Quinto Regimiento pp. 79-80 
116 
existence and, that like the Fifth Regiment, it should be composed of the forces 
of the Popular Front. The Party articulated its ideas through the pages of its 
militias' press organs: the difference between militarism, which the militias so 
opposed, and the militarization of the militias which it advocated, was explained. 
Militarism turned soldiers into automatons, whereas militarization required 
voluntary submission to discipline and enthusiasm for obedience, predicated on 
an understanding of what is to be obeyed. 129 The popular army it favoured was 
based on mando ünico (a single military command) which was essential in war, 
and also 'camaraderie and discipline'. 130 
The most decided opposition to the militarization of the militias came from the 
anarchists. But there was hostility also from socialist quarters, especially in the 
first few weeks of war, when the left socialists around Largo Caballero felt 
confident in the militia system. 13'Yet, the success of Mola attacking from the 
west in Guipüzcoa, and the action of Quiepo de Llano in Andalucia, dispersed 
the militias easily and highlighted their deficiencies. It is also forced a 
reconsideration of militarization and the creation of a popular army, particularly 
by Largo Caballero, who was now head of the government. With this in mind a 
decree was published on 30 September which would establish the militarization 
of the militias in the centre zone on 10 October and in the remainder of 
Republican territory on 20 October. 132 Militarization involved the mobilisation of 
all politically reliable officers and NCOs and the militia battalions were to form 
'29 iSalud! Oraano del Regimiento 10 de mavo de los Carabancheles, 29 October 1936 130 Milicia Popular, 20 August 1936 
131 Blanco Rodriguez, El Quinto Regimiento pp. 91-92 132 Ibid., p. 97 
117 
the basis of the Mixed Brigades, the beginnings of the new army. 133 The 
second decree established new minimum and maximum ages for military 
service - 20 and 35 years respectively and subjected the militia battalions to 
military justice, although those not wishing to be militarised could communicate 
this to the Comandancia de Milicias and they would be removed from their 
lists., 34 
Communist sources attribute to the Fifth Regiment a significant role in the 
militarization that took place, claiming for themselves a decisive role in the 
creation of the mixed brigades. 135 Unquestionably, the Fifth Regiment was more 
advanced than other units. It had its own General Command (Comandancia 
General) which was responsible for the administrative and military leadership of 
the Regiment and which was divided into several sections: organisation, 
information, operations, services and social work, and it was also quite 
sophisticated in its internal structure, with each of its units designed to be 
autonomous, (each carrying its entire military infrastructure within itself). 136 
These undoubtedly influenced the way that the new popular army was 
structured and would become the blueprint for the Mixed Brigades. The first six 
mixed brigades created by decree on 10 October were formed exclusively from 
units of the Fifth Regiment, with Lister commanding the first. 137 
133 Gaceta de Madrid. 29 September 1936 
13' Gaceta de la Reoiiblica. 30 September 1936 
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The popularity of the Regiment is also unquestionable. Enrolment figures 
indicate a trend rather than a complete total, given that not all who joined had 
been originally enrolled by the Regiment. Groups who had gone to the front of 
their own accord would later incorporate themselves, as well as peasants from 
nearby villages, and some groups not belonging to communist organisations: 
Table 2.1 Fifth Regiment recruitment figures (Jul-Dec 1936): 
July 7,900 
August 14,800 
September 24,100 
October 11,300 
November 5,250 
December 1,550 
Total 64,900 
Source: Blanco Rodriguez, EI Quinto Regimiento, p. 240 
With a view to achieving the best results from its soldiers, the Regiment had its 
own social work section (Comisibn de Trabajo Social), also known as the 
political section. This was created at the beginning of the conflict and was 
responsible for the publication of Milicia Popular, which ran from 26 July until 24 
January 1937. It had a variety of contributors: Ramon J. Sender, Jose Bergamin, 
Rafael Alberti, Maria Teresa Leon, Miguel Hemändez and Mikhail Koltsov. The 
section was also involved in street theatre, and radio transmissions, and 
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perhaps even more significantly, in the projection of film both in cinemas in the 
rearguard and at mobile screenings at the front. 138 
Through the Commission the PCE also pioneered the role of the political 
commissar, as along with the battalions of the JSU the Fifth Regiment was the 
first militia unit to have commissars. Lister was designated a political delegate 
of the column he accompanied to Guadarrama on 23 July; and the JSU leader 
Santiago Carrillo was appointed political commissar in the Largo Caballero 
Battalion formed by the youth organisation in Madrid. 139 The concept appears to 
have its origins in the experience of the Russian Revolution and Civil War. It is 
not clear who was directly responsible for the importation and dissemination of 
the idea of the commissar, although it would seem that Carlos Contreras 
inspired its basic lines of action. Nevertheless, unlike the Red Army institution, 
which grew out of the need to rely on individuals who were professionally 
qualified but politically suspect, 140 the origins of the commissars within the Fifth 
Regiment had much less to do with maintaining vigilance over its soldiers and 
the loyalty of the professional officers. Particularly at the beginning of the war, 
the loyalty of the volunteers was not an issue, and the need for commissars 
arose out of the exigencies of war. It was the reality of the first columns which 
highlighted the need for mediation between militiamen and the military 
command. Unsurprisingly in the circumstances, the milicianos mistrusted 
military professionals, and discipline was poor. 141 One of the key tasks of the 
138 See further chapter four below 139 Enrique Lister, Memorias de un luchador, p. 81; Pedro Montoliü, Madrid en la Guerra Civil: 
Los Protaaonistas. Vol II, (Sllex, Madrid, 1999), p. 77 
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political commissar was to pay attention to and develop mutual understanding 
between the troops and the command. 142 The commissar was also responsible 
for the discipline of his unit. Formally institutionalised through the creation of the 
Commissariat in a government decree on 16 October, the commissar's role 
would evolve, encompassing other responsibilities relating to the cultural and 
political formation of the soldier, becoming an important (albeit somewhat 
controversial) function within the Popular Army. 
In a different way, the recruitment tactics of the Fifth Regiment also appears to 
have been significantly influenced by the Russian revolutionary model. Special 
attention was dedicated to the enrolment of peasants. For the PCE the human 
reserves for the future army were in the countryside, and more than thirty per 
cent of the Fifth Regiment's militiamen were drawn from the ranks of the 
peasantry. 143 The Bolsheviks had initially ignored the peasantry in its 
recruitment for the Red Army, following Marxist ideology to the letter in 
focussing on the historic role of the industrial proletariat as the vanguard of the 
revolution. It had preferred to target the urban population in recruiting for the 
Red Army. However, two major factors had influenced a dramatic shift in policy. 
Firstly, the Bolsheviks realised that better relations with the peasantry would 
improve the food situation, and that their success against the 'white' armies 
depended increasingly on the attitudes and behaviour of peasants. As Lenin 
had realised, unless a 'red' dictatorship offered something better than a 'white' 
dictatorship, the peasants would be unlikely to give their active support. 
Secondly, the Red Army was unlikely to defeat the whites with the forces it had. 
142 Mundo Obrero, 29 September 1936 143 Blanco Rodriguez, EI Quinto Regimiento, p. 352 
121 
Furthermore, as industrial output plummeted, Sovnarkom (Council of People's 
Commissars) had decreed more and more exemptions from military service for 
categories of factory workers and administrative personnel, so there seemed 
little choice but to turn more decisively to the peasantry. 144 This perhaps 
explains the importance placed on the Spanish peasantry in terms of potential 
combatants. In the province of Madrid different enrolment points were created in 
the towns and villages, for example in Aranjuez; the estate of 'El Campillo' 
between El Escorial and Guadarrama; Collado Mediano and Buitrago. The 
Regiment would give various proclamations in the villages, gather the men in 
the main square, and harangue them. Volunteers were then incorporated at the 
instruction centres. 145 
The PCE had also developed fairly sophisticated ideas concerning the way 
the war should be facilitated by the rest of society. They had a vision of a 
command economy, where all aspects of the economy and society would be 
focussed on contributing to the war effort. This also seems to have been 
influenced by Soviet theory and policy. Central planning under the auspices of 
the Five-Year Plans was already underway in the USSR. After initially 
applauding the heroism and courage of women who took up arms at the front, 
and continuing to support them through the provision of nurseries and schools 
for the children of militiamen and women, 146 the Party's publications tended to 
emphasize the important role women could play in the rearguard. The Party's 
August manifesto called for the immediate transformation of civil industries into 
'u Mark von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, pp. 47-48 15 Blanco Rodriguez, EI Quinto ReQimiento, p. 236, p. 240; see also map of Madrid province, p. 3 above. 
1 Mundo Obrem, 30 July; 14 & 30 August 1936 
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industries of war and the entry of women into factories, workshops offices, 
railways and trams, with all able men going to the front. 147 But a woman's 
capabilities went further than that. She had in her hands the morale of the 
rearguard, and ultimately of the front too. Women were the homemakers, 
responsible for the care and well-being of their families in these difficult times, 
and as wives were the comfort of their husbands on leave from military 
service. 148 The idea that the rearguard and women in particular could play an 
important role in the defence of the Republic and the prosecution of the war was 
also related to the strategy of broad antifascist unity which the PCE championed. 
In a series of articles published in Mundo Obrero the Party called for the 
centralisation of all resources in the hands of the government, and the 
centralisation of provisioning and the implementation of rationing particularly 
within Madrid. 149 The key themes of 'a single power, a single command and a 
single discipline' in the headline on 15 September embodied the Party's 
philosophy of unity, not only in the military sphere to which the article related 
directly, but to all spheres of life during the war. In the civilian sphere a single 
power would be represented by the restitution of the authority of the central 
government, for which the PCE continually manifested its support, through 
press organs, meetings, broadcasts and declarations. The ideas of a single 
command and a single discipline naturally related specifically to its ideas 
concerning the way the war should be executed and the need for military 
discipline within the militia units, including the units of its own Fifth Regiment, 
147 AHPCE, Carpeta 17, Manifiesto del PCE. Aaosto 1936: 'Balance de un mes de luchs. ' 148 
_Milicia 
Popular, 24 September 1936 149 Mundo Obrero, 9,15 & 19 September 1936. 
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which were a constant theme in Milicia Popular, 150 but also extended to 
discipline in the rearguard: 
Militia dress imposes responsibility. Whoever does not understand this 
and who believes that carrying a weapon in the streets of Madrid, when 
he is not already at the battlefront, constitutes a certificate of impunity, 
then he is not worthy of carrying a rifle, nor wear the uniform of a 
militiaman, nor show a union card. These are the three things that no 
man is permitted to dishonour. 151 
In the rearguard discipline could also be maintained by militiamen on leave. 
Visual aids were used to great effect in reinforcing a message similar to the 
Second World War campaign slogans of 'idle gossip costs lives': 
Miliciano... lCallate! lDesconfial Los oidos enemigos to escuchan. 152 
Political commissars and agitators were to be identified from the ranks of the 
better Party militants in order to work to raise awareness among the masses of 
the struggle against fascism, the elevation of morale and the mobilisation of the 
rearguard for essential tasks. The commissar, who was based within the army 
unit, would be complemented by the agitator who would act as liaison between 
the militiamen and civilian quarters. ' 53 An organic relationship between the front 
and the rearguard was central to the PCE's philosophy: mando Onico was seen 
150 Blanco Rodriguez, El Quinto Regimiento pp. 123-28 51 Milicia Popular, 12 September 1936 
152 Milicia Popular, 13 September 1936, and Ministry of Public instruction poster 1936 
'Milicianos contra el espionaje' in Jordi and Amau Carulla, La Guerra Civil en 2000 cartells. vol. 
I jPostermil, Barcelona, 1997), p. 404 
AHPCE, Microfilm xv, 189. 'Nuestras tareas: Boletin Interior del Comit6 Provincial de 
Madrid, ' 6 October 1936. 
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as both an expression of the centralisation of the military command and as an 
extension of the Popular Front in the military sphere. Military unity would be 
complemented by civilian unity achieved through the maintenance of and 
support for the Popular Front and the Republican government. As the war 
progressed, civilian unity would increasingly be couched in terms of political 
centralisation and unanimity. For the PCE, Popular Front unity was a goal to be 
strived for in all aspects of life, and the Fifth Regiment became a microcosm 
and representation of this unity. Its composition was yet another manifestation 
of the unity already so popular among the masses since the electoral victory of 
the Popular Front, channelled but not created by the Party, which had led to the 
successes of union and youth unification. In terms of the political affiliation of its 
soldiers the whole spectrum of republican political and syndical organisations 
was represented within the Regiment. 'M But while the PCE created or 
supported these broad-based groups it also aspired to communist hegemony 
over them. 
The PCE's evolution from an insignificant political and social force, concerned 
with the revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeois Second Republic, to a 
competent military organiser and defender of the same Republic, was quite 
staggering. This new role encouraged a steady increase in affiliation both to the 
Fifth Regiment and the Party itself as well as to the JSU, and translated into real 
influence, which was for the moment, limited to the military sphere. However, its 
rapid progress from one stage to the next left a number of unresolved questions 
concerning its identity. It also meant that within the Party there were a number 
154 Blanco Rodriguez, EI Quinto Repimiento pp. 361-62 
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of very different elements, representing the diverse motivations people had for 
seeking membership. Furthermore, some of these were beyond the control of 
the leadership, who were struggling to keep up with the workload. Both the role 
the Party had begun to carve out for itself and its complex character would have 
even greater significance as the war progressed. 
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Chapter Three. The defence of Madrid: The emergence 
of communist hegemony? 
The defence of Madrid in the winter of 1936 was perhaps the single most 
important event of the entire conflict. Undoubtedly Madrid marked a turning- 
point in the war, and with the failure of the rebels to take the city came the 
realisation on both sides that the conflict would not be over quickly. Beyond this, 
the city acquired a symbolic value on both sides. For the Republic, the 
successful defence of the Madrid resonated through the war effort for the 
remainder of the conflict. Its propaganda value was quickly exploited by the 
communists, which in turn reinforced their belief in victory against all odds. 
The failure of government and military circles to formulate a coherent defence 
policy meant that by the end of October 1936 the rebels were at the outskirts of 
Madrid. Throughout October Largo Caballero's government had debated the 
merits of both an 'external' defence, advocated by General Asensio who 
favoured offensive measures from the Tajo valley, and an 'internal' defence of 
the capital, which would be supported by the fortification of the city and the 
establishment of concentric defensive lines. Broadly speaking, a political 
formation of socialists, Left Republicans, and Pestaria's syndicalists agreed on 
the suitability of external defence, that is, the creation of a series of fronts to 
prevent the rebels' arrival in Madrid. The JSU and the PCE echoed these 
proposals, but crucially, the PCE believed in the mobilisation of the population 
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including the rearguard, for the purpose of creating an iron fortification of the 
city from within. ' 
Belatedly, in mid-October under the direct command of General Pozas a series 
of concentric defence lines were created, staggered along the secondary 
highways extending around Madrid. The lines were not continuous, but had 
their bases in the most important villages and communications centres. These 
four fortified lines of defence were intended to prevent the further penetration of 
Nationalist forces, but by 21 October the first line had been breached, and the 
second line was overrun by 2 November. On 4 November the rebels had 
reached the most important towns on the third line, and on 6 November the last 
line fell. The rebels were now at the gates of the city and the semi-circle of 
hostile forces around Madrid was complete. 2 
For the rebels Madrid's importance derived from its function as the capital of the 
state. To take it would facilitate international recognition. It was the centre of 
communications and the seat of the financial resources of the state, and, with a 
population of more than one million, its political and administrative tradition 
exercised an irresistible attraction. What is more, there was a genuine belief 
that Madrid would fall to the rebels. Viewed retrospectively there is a sense 
among historians that the fall of Madrid would certainly have meant the end of 
'Julio Arbstegui and Jesüs A. Martinez, La Junta de Defensa de Madrid, (Madrid, Comunidad 
de Madrid, 1984), p. 26, pp. 28-30 2 Ibid., pp. 34-35 3 Gabriel Cardona'Las operaciones militares' in La Guerra Civil Esoaßola 50 aP os desk, 
(ed. ) Manuel Tufl6n de Lara [et a! ] (Edicibn Labor, Barcelona, 1986), p. 215 
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the war. 4 However, the leader of the Republican government, Francisco Largo 
Caballero, certainly did not see the war in these terms and on 6 November his 
government left Madrid for Valencia. It was intended that Madrid, if lost, would 
be retaken from the outside. But the secret and rushed manner in which this 
occurred created an overwhelming impression of panicked flight. 5 
Initial opposition to the government's evacuation came from the two communist 
ministers and above all from the newly incorporated CNT ministers. But while it 
was ministers of all political persuasions that were manhandled by the anarchist 
checkpoints at the perimeter of the city, 6 it would be the CNT and the PSOE 
who would suffer the most damage to their prestige in this episode. The 
prominence of the socialists within the government coupled with the perceived 
compromise of the anarchist leadership in entering government led to the 
irreversible tarnishing of these organisations when the government fled the city. 
Keen to emphasis their party's own protagonism, post-war communist versions 
of events certainly propagate this idea. In a variety of sources Santiago Carrillo, 
in particular, has made much of the contrast between government (and socialist) 
inaction or absence and communist resistance. Indeed, socialist absence, and 
particularly the departure of the Caballero government is always cited by 
Carrillo as the reason why the leadership of the JSU solicited entry to the PCE 
4 Cervera, Madrid en Guerra, p. 19 and Graham The Spanish Republic, p. 165. Graham argues 
that while it was not crucial to the military prosecution of the war, the loss of the capital would 
mean loss of legitimacy in eyes of civilian population and foreign opinion. 5 Graham, The Spanish Republic, p. 165 6 J. Alvarez del Vayo, Freedom's Battle, trans. Eileen E. Brooke, (Heinemann, London, 1940), 
pp. 206-8. Ministers from Largo's government including Julio Alvarez del Vayo, the PCE's Jesus 
Hem3ndez and Vicente Uribe, and the CNT's Peird and Lopez had been detained and 
threatened with execution for cowardice by militiamen from the del Rosal column as they 
attempted to travel to Valencia. They turned back towards Madrid but travelled to Valencia by a 
different route. 
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at this time. 7 Carrillo's erstwhile comrade-in-arms and biographer, Fernando 
Claudin, in spite of his later estrangement from the PCE accepts this version of 
events as a fair representation of the situation! 
In contrast the communist press at the time treated the episode sympathetically, 
explaining the necessity of the government's departure to its readership, 9 and a 
wartime JSU activist, Rosario Sanchez, in a recent interview opined that the she 
thought the government was right to leave. 10 However, other sources illustrate 
that prominent socialists themselves were worried or frustrated by the 
government's departure and the consequent loss of prestige for the PSOE. 
Much to the consternation of the Comintern leadership, the socialist 
parliamentary deputy Margarita Nelken was involved in a high-profile 'defection' 
to the PCE, following an abortive attempt to harangue Largo into action over the 
defence of Madrid and the spread of communist influence. " The editor of El 
Socialista, Julian Zugazagoitia stayed behind out of a sense of professional and 
personal duty despite attempts by Indalecio Prieto to make him change his mind. 
Zugazagoitia believed that suspending publication of the Socialist Party 
newspaper would spell the end of the PSOE. Additionally he felt staying to be 
the obligation of his post. To leave someone else in his place would be 
tantamount to saying that their life was worth less than his, for with a rebel 
7 Santiago Carrillo, Memorias, (Planeta, Barcelona, 1993), pp. 186-89; Gibson, Paracuellos, p. 
217 
8 Claudin, Santiago Carrillo, p. 44, p. 45, p. 47. Claudin was expelled from the party along with 
Jorge Semprun in 1964: Jorge Semprun, Literature or Life. trans. Linda Coverdale, (Viking, 
London, 1997), p. 269 e Juventud, 9 November 1936. 
' Pedro Montoliü, Madrid en la Guerra Civil: Vol II, p. 68 
Paul Preston, Doves of War. Four Women of Saain, (HarperCollins, Hammersmith, 2002), pp. 
360-66 
130 
victory, it would be a matter of death. 12 It is such accounts by contemporary 
observers which provide a real sense of the high stakes and the sheer chaos in 
the city. Fearing all was lost, defections to the enemy became a problem in the 
Ministry of War. 13 In other government departments confusion reigned. Arturo 
Barea, who had been working for the Press and Propaganda Department at the 
Foreign Ministry as a censor for press telegrams and telephonic press 
dispatches was given instructions for the twenty-four hours which followed the 
government's evacuation, but nothing more. The evacuation applied only to 
permanent members of government staff, not wartime recruits such as Barea, 
who it was still hoped would stay and do their duty. When his immediate 
instructions had been fulfilled Barea had to search around town to find someone 
in a position of authority who might permit him to continue his work. 14 
Amid this confusion and flight, and despite the propaganda which obfuscates a 
clear view of the situation, the PCE appeared to have been prepared to stay 
and fight. Leaders of the PCE's Madrid Party organisation, such as Antonio Mije 
and Pedro Checa, as well as national leaders such as Dolores Ibärruri and Jose 
Diaz remained in the city. We do not know the origins of this decision to stay 
behind, but it was a terrible risk (which in the event paid dividends). The danger 
was palpable: Carrillo thought it quite possible that he would be strung up in the 
Puerta del Sol as soon as the rebels took the city. 15 Given the proximity of the 
rebel forces, and the decision of prominent communists and JSU members to 
remain, it seems evident that these groups had no exit strategy as such, and 
12 Zugazagoitia, Guerra y Vicisitudes, p. 191 131bid., p. 196 14 Arturo Barea, The Forcing of a Rebel, p. 570, p. 583, p. 590 'S Cervera, Madrid en Guerra, p. 102 
131 
they were prepared to stay until the end (i. e. until death) if the situation 
demanded. Consonant with the PCE's earlier actions, the Party's response to 
the threat to the city was to a certain extent, improvised. The personal sacrifice 
involved also suggests that the Party had an understanding of the situation that 
other groups (including the socialists) appeared to lack. Carrillo wrote in the 
pages of Juventud that 
For foreign opinion the taking of Madrid would signal the victory of the 
rebels and with it the absolute inclination of the international balance in 
all aspects, political and economic in their favour. Because of this Madrid 
cannot be taken by the rebels. It is not just a question for madrilefios. 
The other peoples of Spain are obliged to defend Madrid. To defend 
Madrid is to defend the liberty of Spain and the liberties of Europe. 16 
Although the government had yet to leave the city when this article was 
published, it would seem that the JSU had already gravitated into the PCE's 
orbit. Carrillo's sentiment echoes an earlier declaration in Mundo Obrero that 'to 
defend Madrid is to defend all of Spain. ' 17 Furthermore, clear admiration for the 
PCE's policy of resistance is manifest in an earlier edition of the youth daily 
which carried a report on a meeting of communist militants held at the 
Monumental Cinema in Madrid, at which Jose Diaz had declared 'In defence of 
Madrid every communist should be disposed to give until the last drop of his 
blood'; that each communist should be prepared to 'set the example. i18 In 
contrast with the communist sense of urgency, the tone of EI Socialista on 3 
18 Juventud. 3 November 1936 
U 
Mundo Obrero, 28 September 1936 
1° Juventud, 21 October 1936 
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November was rather subdued, and given to emphasising the success of the 
Republican war effort on other fronts as if Madrid was not of crucial importance. 
Carrillo's reading of the situation is reinforced by British diplomatic 
correspondence from the period. The British government's ambassador in 
Madrid, George Ogilvie-Forbes received instructions on 7 November to 
establish de facto contacts with General Franco's administration `for the 
protection of British interests' should rebel forces enter Madrid. Although it 
clearly stopped short of recognising Franco's government as the legal 
government of Spain, it is evident that the British expected the city to fall, and 
were preparing to do business with the insurgents. 19 
The situation was dire, however many of Madrid's citizens rose to the challenge. 
Contemporary observers have attested to the significant and heroic role 
ordinary people played in saving the city. 20 Considerable numbers of ordinary 
madri/enos threw themselves into civil defence work. Some groups received 
military education from instructors who had been sergeants in the old army. 
Others raised flagstones in the streets as makeshift barricades. Simple cannon 
converted stones into dangerous projectiles. 21 Local trade union leaders 
organised battalions at their places of work. Julian Vazquez, for example, a 
communist garment workers' union leader, had organised a tailors' battalion 
and used a French infantry manual to train his men. UGT and CNT affiliates 
reported to union headquarters and awaited the distribution of rifles, of which 
19 Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1919-1939, Second Series, Volume XVII (HMSO, 
Oxford, 1979), p. 523; no. 359 20 Montoliii, Madrid en la Guerra Civil. p. 33 21 Zugazagoitia, Guerra v Vicisitudes. p. 202 See also Interview with Eugenio Granell of the 
wartime POUM, in Montoliii, Madrid en la Guerra Civil. p. 58 
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there was always a shortage. Some made their way to the trenches in the Casa 
del Campo and the Parque del Oeste without weapons, having to arm 
themselves from the dead and the deserters. The proximity of the front line to 
the centre of the city saw workers taking trams from their workplaces to the 
frontline, often dressed in civilian clothes and carrying their own lunches as the 
unions could not always provide for these rapidly assembled militias. Despite 
fierce fighting in an around the city during November, and further attempts to 
break the deadlock by both sides with the battles of Jarama, Guadalajara, and 
Brunete in 1937, the frontline remained within the city, virtually unchanged, for 
the next 28 months. But it was not only the politically active who volunteered 
themselves at this crucial time. Other citizens too, those who perhaps occupied 
the middle ground between extremes of left and right during the conflict, who 
belonged to a 'Third Spain, ' now lent their support. 22 Republican sympathisers, 
who had perhaps been hitherto ambivalent to the war, picked up rifles or lent 
their support (and raised morale) by bring bread, wine, chocolate, or home- 
cooked food, in short, whatever they had, out to the trenches, at great risk to 
themselves. Mothers allowed their sons to leave without a word of protest. 
Women prepared to defend their homes with burning oil and with knives. 23 
It was the PCE's key role in civilian mobilisation, which earned the Party the 
support of these previously unaffiliated and unmobilised during this period. The 
Party had been calling for defensive work for some time, albeit to little effect 24 
1 
22 The idea of this Third Spain is articulated in Paul Preston's Epilogue in iComrades! Portraits 
from the Spanish Civil War, (HarperCollins, London, 1999), pp. 321-32. 
For vivid personal accounts of the Defence of Madrid, see Fraser, Blood of Spain, pp. 259-71 24 For examples of communist calls for fortifications see El Sol, 23 September 1936; Juventud, 
20,21, & 30 October 1936. Graham seems to suggest that Largo's government did not take 
such calls seriously enough, Graham, The Spanish Republic, pp. 140-41 
134 
Now with war on Madrid's doorstep, the communists called for all-out defence of 
the city with only women remaining in the rear. A role in the city's defence was 
envisaged for all citizens at this critical time. In order to mobilise these different 
sectors and along with their Popular Front line the PCE had promoted mass 
organisations which played important roles both in the winter of 1936 in Madrid 
and throughout the Republican zone for the duration of the war. 25 Women were 
exhorted to provide clothes and food for 'the defenders of [their] homes and 
children, v26 while the time, effort and money wasted by some labour sectors on 
non-essential construction and production was lamented and criticised by the 
PCE 27 The JSU also played an important role and its efforts are reflected in its 
newspaper, Juventud. It emphasised the importance of fortifications work, 28 and 
was involved in the instruction of more than 10,000 people in the handling of 
arms in 30 schools that it had created. 29 Such a close relationship between the 
front and the rearguard was central to the PCE's thinking and developed from 
this period. It was given visual representation in a Madrid Party poster for 
military instruction in the rearguard. 30 In the pages of Juventud a photo of a 
smiling militiaman in the trenches is attributed to 'the new morale coming from 
the rearguard which makes the very indifferent man into a valiant combatant for 
the defence of Madrid. '31 Unity was central to this relationship and to the war 
effort, and the Party's earlier attempts to unite forces on the left, for example 
within the Fifth Regiment, found wider expression in the imagery and 
25 These mass movements included groups such as the Agrupacibn de Mujeres Antifascistas 
(AMA), Socorro Rojo Intemacional (International Red Aid) and Amigos de la Union Sovietica 
(Friends of the Soviet Union). See chapters four and five. 6 Juventud, 8 November 1936 
27 Combate, 20 December 1936,3 January 1937 
28 Juventud, 21 October 1936 
29 Ibid. 1 November 1936 
30 See plate 1. 31 Juventud, 12 November 1936 
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experience of Madrid's defence. Pedraza Blanco's poster for the Madrid PCE 
uses the images of a photograph of central Madrid superimposed on a clenched 
fist, and the caption, 'Unanimous obedience is triumph. '32 
Communist rhetoric and action also clearly referenced the Soviet socialist realist 
model of the heroic narrative: 'we are the young guard that is forging the future. 
The misery is softened knowing that we will overcome or die. '33 In the speeches 
of Ibärruri we find a similar refrain: 'better to be the widows of heroes than the 
wives of cowards' and 'better to die on one's feet than live on one's knees. 34 
The idea of sacrifice played a major role in the Socialist Realist literature of the 
period, which in part at least originated in Russian revolutionary myth (which 
valued its martyrs) and actual Stalinist practice. Death also assumed enormous 
importance in the Soviet sense of history and national identity. Most of the 
events held up as historically great moments - the 1905 revolution, the 1917 
revolution, the Civil War, Lenin's death - were marked by human sacrifice and 
Ioss. 35 Although there are limitations to the extent that life can be said to imitate 
art, there was certainly a current within communist culture which encouraged 
self-sacrifice, although not necessarily to the death. Nevertheless, the PCE's 
wartime policy became closely associated with an idea of 'resistancia a 
ultranza' or resistance to the end. The beginnings of such a stance are clearly 
evident in its attitude towards the defence of Madrid. Furthermore, the 
successful resistance of the city functioned as a point of reference for them in 
32 See plate 2a. 33 Juventud, 7 November 1936 
3' Dolores Ibdrruri, Speeches and Articles. 1936-38, (Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., London, 1938), 
33, Rafael Cruz, Pasionaria. p. 99 
Katerina Clark, The Soviet Novel. History as Ritual, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago & 
London, 1981), pp. 177-79 
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the face of the pessimists who increasingly favoured a mediated settlement 
after 1938. The PCE used the defence of Madrid as a metaphor for the war 
effort as a whole. Madrid was'the heart' of Spain. To defend Madrid was to 
defend Spain. 36 Madrid subsequently became a symbol of resistance and 
heroism of the whole of the Republic and on behalf of the whole Republic. 
Communist-inspired poster art spread this imagery throughout Republican 
territory. A 1937 poster by Marti Bas of the UGT artists union in Barcelona, 
encapsulated this idea, with his socialist-realist inspired image of anonymous 
soldiers on the front line, weapons in hand, and the caption 'To defend Madrid 
is to defend Catalura. '37 
Soviet models of heroism were also transposed onto the Spanish experience as 
a means of achieving popular mobilisation. In particular the parallel between the 
successful defence of Petrograd by the Russian people during the Russian 
revolution and the Spanish people's defence of Madrid was an image invoked 
by a wide spectrum of the Republican press. 38 It is important, nevertheless to 
distinguish between Soviet imagery, which abounded and was a point of 
reference for all left-wing groups, and Soviet influence which was quite a 
separate issue. A Soviet Spain was never the end goal of the war, even for the 
PCE, and in much of the communist press we find articles at pains to point out 
the differences between the two countries, as well as the different path destined 
for Spain. In Juventud on 7 November 1936 an article explained that Spain was 
in the process of forging its own Red Army, but was keen to point out that `our 
36 Combate, 31 January 1937, EI Combatiente, Portavoz del frente de Carabanchel. 24 
December 1936. 
37 See plate 3. 
38 EI Socialista, 7 November 1936; Solidaridad Obrera, 8 November 1936; Juventud, 21 
October 1936 
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struggle is not the struggle of the Russians, nor a national struggle in the strict 
sense of the word, but it is a struggle of the new world that was bom with the 
Russian Revolution, and of the old world that tries to establish by manoeuvre 
and terror the old classes which history has finished with. ' 39 In another article, 
Santiago Carrillo emphasised that collectivisation in Russia could not be started 
until nine years after their victory. Such experiments in Spain must be 
postponed for the future 4° 
Undoubtedly, the prestige of the PCE was boosted enormously through its 
association with the International Communist movement and the Soviet Union 
particularly after the arrival of both Soviet aeroplanes and tanks on the central 
front, and the International Brigades in Madrid in early November. For, while 
Soviet help did not save Madrid, it did permit the maintenance of the war. 41 
The Republic and the Soviet Union 
The issue of Soviet military assistance to the Spanish Republic has been the 
subject of numerous studies and remains the centre of much controversy to this 
day. The circumstances under which the Soviet Government decided to 
provide arms and expertise to the Republican Government are still obscure. We 
simply do not know why or exactly when the decision was made to provide help, 
although, it seems likely that the decision to provide military assistance was 
taken in September 1936, and may have been motivated by the promise of 
39 Juventud. 7 November 1936. 
40 Juventud, 26 December 1936 
41 Gabriel Cardona 'Las operaciones militares' p. 269 
138 
Spanish gold as payment. Undoubtedly Stalin also feared Nazi Germany and 
sought to improve relations with the European democracies and to promote 
Popular Front schemes. 42Another right-wing regime in Europe was undesirable, 
but at the same time the Soviet government did not want to risk antagonising 
Britain and France by openly assisting the Republic. 
Recent re-evaluations of the evidence, substantiated by hitherto unseen 
materials from the former Soviet state archives have contradicted earlier 
contributions to the debate on the extent of Soviet involvement. It now appears 
clear that despite the provision of war materiel by the USSR to the Republic, the 
two sides were not evenly matched militarily. 43 Furthermore, although the Soviet 
government desired the Republic's victory, its intervention was far from an 
attempt to 'sovietise' Spain through the positioning of Soviet personnel within 
Spain (including members of the Soviet secret police, the NKVD). In contrast to 
received opinion Soviet involvement appears to have been characterised by 
inefficiency, ineptitude, and weakness. The majority of Soviet aid was sent in 
the first ten months of the conflict, and diminished as Soviet attention turned 
increasingly towards the protection of its own borders, both eastern and 
western 44 Significantly this aid was not a gift but paid for with Spanish gold. The 
USSR was responding to requests from the Republican government for the sale 
`Z Kowalsky, La Union Sovietica, pp. 196-98; Gerald Howson, Arms for Spain, (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1998), p. 120, p. 123, pp. 127-28 both concur on this point. 43 Angel Vinas, 'The financing of the Spanish Civil War, ' in Revolution and War in Spain 1931- 
39, (ed. ) Preston, p. 282; Howson, Arms for Spain, p. 130; pp. 249-51. Angel Was has argued 
that the foreign resources obtain by the rebels were of the same order of magnitude as those 
received by the rebels. More recent work conducted by Gerald Howson on Soviet archival 
material has found that the Republic was badly disadvantaged. µKowalsky, La Union Sovietica, Part V. 
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of arms, which the Non-Intervention Pact had prevented the Government from 
acquiring on the open market. 
The Russian advisers who accompanied much of the material had also been 
requested and, with the exception of Soviet pilots, were intended to operate in 
advisory and training capacities alone. In the main they did only that, assisting 
the Republican government in the creation of the Popular Army, although the 
dire situation on the Madrid front in November 1936 and the lack of Spanish 
armoured vehicle personnel did see some Soviet tank specialists engaged in 
combat. 45 The advisers worked closely with high ranking members of the 
Republican army, particularly on the military campaigns in the early part of the 
war. Madrid, Jarama, Guadalajara, and Brunete. The relatively junior Kiril 
Meretskov and Rodion Malinovskii worked with the Spanish Generals Jose 
Miaja and Sebastian Pozas, and with Enrique Lister, who was also assisted by 
Alexander Rodimtsev. All three would subsequently assume high-ranking 
positions in the Soviet Red Army. Other more experienced Soviet military 
commanders also played a role: men such as General Vladimir Gorev who 
controlled the Russian artillery, tank and air force units on the Central front, and 
the Soviet aviator lakov Smushkevich was adviser to the chief of the Republican 
air force, Hidalgo de Cisneros 46 It is however, important not to overstate the 
influence of the advisers. While it is likely that they, together with the PCE, 
advocated the adoption of the mixed brigades as the model for the new army, it 
45 Ibid., pp. 246, pp. 259-64, p. 308 " K. A. Meretskov, Na Sluzhbe Narodu, (Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, IPL, Moskva, 1970), 
p. 130, pp. 143-44, R. Malinovskii, ? orbellinos de ira en Espana' and A. Rodimtsev'En la 
direcci6n de Guadalajara', in Baio la Bandera de la Esoafia Reaublicana: Recuerdan los 
voluntarios sovieticos oarticiDantes en la auerra nacional-revolucionaria en Esoa6a. trans. 
Joaquin Rodriguez, (Progress, Moscow, 1975). 
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was also true that the General Staff of the Republican army was already 
receptive to the idea. 7 
The presence of a very few NKVD personnel, (around 20-40 men during the 
entire course of the conflict) has been attributed to a Soviet need to monitor its 
own (rather than Spanish) personnel. In fact, this task itself was hampered by 
the shortage of agents to the extent that it seemed preferable for the Soviet 
authorities to constantly rotate staff, recalling them to Moscow and providing 
replacements every six months or so. This ensured that Soviet personnel 
working closely with Spanish and International Brigade volunteers did not pick 
up any unsuitable ideas, but had the effect of seriously hindering the efficacy of 
the assistance given. 48 The Soviet contribution was also hampered by the lack 
of personnel with actual combat experience. Similarly, relationships between 
the advisors and the Republican army were made difficult by the lack of 
interpreters the Soviet Union could provide. 49 In purely quantitative terms the 
Soviet presence was very small: during the whole war there were scarcely 2000 
Soviet personnel in Spain. Nor did the Kremlin ever seek to integrate the 
various bodies involved in Spain (defence, foreign affairs, Comintern), which 
also served to undermine the efficacy of its assistance. 5o 
The International Brigades, originally the idea of the Comintern, were organised 
in Paris under the supervision of the PCF and the PCI in exile from September 
"Michael Alpert, EI Eiercito Republicano en la auerra civil, (Ruedo Iberico, Barcelona, 1977), 
pp. 82-83 
Kowalsky, La Union Sovietica, pp. 279-81 Kowalsky concedes that there were some soviet 
agents involved in repression of the POUM in Barcelona. 4 Ibid., p. 322, p. 298, pp. 284-87 b0 Rees, 'The Highpoint of Comintern Influence? ' p. 160 
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1936.51 But not all the volunteers were communists. Overall it has been 
estimated that of the 23,000 International Brigaders in Spain at the end of 
December 1936, approximately sixty per cent were communists. 52 Of the British 
volunteers, of 1,500 for whom political affiliation is known, 1,107 were members 
of the CPGB or the Young Communist League, while 110 were Labour Party 
members, and 15 were members of the ILP. 53 Among the German volunteers 
there were a large proportion of German anarchists, many of them already living 
in exile in Spain TM Nor were these part of a well-constructed 'Comintern Army'. 
Especially during the first few months of the conflict, many of the volunteers 
arrived in Spain ahead of the Comintern initiative or were merely coordinated by 
the organisation after they had departed from their own countries. 55 Others, 
such as the members of the KPD who were told by their party that they were not 
needed, travelled anyway. Furthermore, the first of the Brigades who fought in 
the battle for Madrid were not especially numerous. The XI Brigade which went 
into action on 8 November under the Soviet General Kleber, numbered around 
2,000 men, while the XII Brigade, also in position by 12 November 
(simultaneously with the column of 3,000 anarchists led by Durruti), numbered 
no more than 1,700.7 The improvised nature of these early international forces 
should also be noted. Much less than an organised and well-equipped tool of 
51 Cesar Vidal, Las Brigadas Intemacionales, (Espasa, Madrid, 1999), p. 51, pp. 60-1 52 Bill Alexander, Volunteers For liberty: Spain 1936-39, (Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1986), p. 
67 
53 Richard Baxell, British Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War. The British Battalion in the 
International Brigades. 1936-39, (Routledge/Cafada Blanch Studies on Contemporary Spain, 
London, 2004), p. 14 54 Josie McLellan, Antifascism and Memory in East Germany. Remembering the International 
Brigades. 1945-1989, (Clarendon Press, oxford, 2004), p. 18 33 Alexander, Volunteers For liberty, p. 29 says that in the early days some arrived in Spain 
unrecorded. McLellan, Antifascism and Memory, pp. 20-24 Some early German volunteers, 
exiles as well as those from within Germany arrived before the Brigades were formally 
established. 
56 McLellan, Antifascism and Memory, pp. 24-25 57 Vincent Brome, The International Brigades, (Heinemann, London, 1965), p. 80, p. 91 
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the Soviet Union, the volunteers had received minimal training, and many were 
without proper weapons, equipment and attire. 58 The contribution of the 
Brigades was valuable, but they alone did not save the Madrid from the rebels. 
The mixed brigades of the embryonic Popular Army had already checked the 
advance of Varela, preventing troops from crossing the Manzanares river on 7 
November. 59 
The Soviet Union also helped in other, more overt ways. It made no secret of its 
extensive humanitarian aid, financed through supposedly voluntary solidarity 
campaigns which saw the Soviet people raise around 274 million roubles 
(around 11,416,000 pounds sterling) for the purchase of foodstuffs, clothing and 
toys for the people of the Republic. These were in fact orchestrated by the 
Soviet government in order to encourage domestic support for the regime. 60 
Interestingly, in a development parallel to the imagery utilised by Spanish 
communism, the communist culture of sacrifice in relation to Spain was also 
exploited in the USSR. Solidarity with the Spanish Republic was presented to 
the Soviet people as a continuation of the series of struggles against their 
internal and external enemies which began in 1917. Just like the previous 
struggles, the new movement demanded the personal sacrifice of every man, 
woman and child. The campaigns and the housing of child refugees had the 
Alexander, Volunteers For liberty pp. 54-55 59 Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, (Penguin, London, 2003), p. 466 
. 
Kowalsky, La union sovietica, pp. 83-84; p. 87-92. See also Denis Smyth, 'We Are with You*. 
Solidarity and Self-interest in Soviet Policy towards Republican Spain, 1936-39' in The Republic 
Besieged. Civil War in Spain 1936-1939, (eds. ) Paul Preston and Ann L. Mackenzie, 
(Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1996). Even post-soviet Russian secondary sources 
tend to claim that the movement was voluntary, see for example M. T. Meshchenakov, 'SSSR i 
Grazhdanskaia voina v Ispanii' in Otechestvennaia Istonia, 3; 1993, p. 83, p. 94 
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effect of promoting the socialist values of Soviet society and portraying Stalin as 
the saviour and protector of the victims of the Spanish Civil War. 61 
The Madrid Defence Council 
The PCE and its related organisations played a crucial role in the successful 
defence of Madrid, and its organisational ability and solidarity with the people of 
Madrid was understood by the people of Republican Spain, bringing it credibility 
in the coming months and a steady increase in membership. 2 The Party's 
success translated into influence at the national level, where it had responsibility 
for two important ministries in Largo Caballero's government, and where it 
influenced the development of a Popular Army for the Republic. However, its 
reach at the Madrid provincial level was still limited at this stage to informal 
influence through its myriad antifascist organisations. The Provincial Committee 
of the PCE, for example, had little to do with Soviet intervention. It has been 
argued that the creation of the Madrid Defence Council (Junta de defensa de 
Madrid) changed this. Alleged communist dominance of the Council has been 
cited as evidence of the growing hegemony of the PCE in the city and 
throughout the Republican zone. Furthermore, it has been argued that from this 
position of strength the PCE challenged Largo Caballero's authority as head of 
a' Kowalsky, La Union Sovidtica, pp. 101.119, p. 128 62 Party membership for December 1936 (according to official party figures) stood at 142,800 
nationally, with 21,000 in both the provinces of Madrid and Valencia, 13,000 in Jaen province, 
12,000 in Malaga province, and 10,000 in the provinces of Alicante and Asturias, indicating the 
areas in which it was most prominent. AHPCE, Carpeta 17, Militantes del Partido en 31 de 
diciembre de 1936. 
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government and came to dominate police functions in the city. 63 Pioneering 
work in the Spanish archives in the post-Franco era has dispelled many of the 
myths surrounding the activities of the PCE and the JSU on the Council, 64 
revealing the fragile influence of both the Republican authorities and the PCE in 
Madrid in the winter of 1936. 
The origins of the Defence Council lay with the Government's evacuation to 
Valencia. Upon the Government's departure written instructions were given to 
General Jose Miaja Menant, recently appointed commander of the Madrid 
military area and General Sebastian Pozas, the new commander-in-chief of the 
centre army. 65 Amid the chaos the envelopes containing the instructions were 
mixed up, with Miaja receiving those intended for Pozas and vice versa. 
Fortunately Miaja did not follow the instructions on the sealed documents which 
requested that they (inexplicably) not be opened until 6am on the following day, 
7 November. The orders specified guidelines for the creation of a defence 
council and the withdrawal of troops to Cuenca in the event of the fall of the city 
but made no mention of defence provisions. 66 The combination of these events 
certainly reinforced Miaja's view that he had been selected as a scapegoat to 
implement the surrender of Madrid. 67 Since his failure to recapture Cordoba in 
August his reputation had been under a cloud. 68 
63 Burnett Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War, pp. 295-300; See also Pierre Brou6 and Emile 
T6mime, The Revolution and the Civil War in Spain, (Faber & Faber, London, 1972), p. 245 " Arbstegui and Martinez's work was written in 1984 after they had access to the Civil War 
archive and the minutes of the Council meetings. Bolloten's earlier work The Spanish 
Revolution, pre-dates the former, but he offers a response In his later work, The Spanish Civil 
War. 
Graham, The Spanish Republic, p. 167 
Ibid., p. 167 and Zugazagoitia, Guerra V Vicisitudes, p. 209 67 Graham, The Spanish Republic, p. 168; Zugazagoitia, Guerra v Vicisitudes, p. 209; A. Lopez 
Fernandez, General Miaja. Defensor de Madrid, (Madrid, G. del Toro, 1975), p. 72 
"Graham, The Spanish Republic, p. 168 
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Valencia. Upon the Government's departure written instructions were given to 
General Jose Miaja Menant, recently appointed commander of the Madrid 
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63Burnett Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War, pp. 295-300; See also Pierre Brou6 and Emile 
T6mime, The Revolution and the Civil War in Spain, (Faber & Faber, London, 1972), p. 245 64 Arbstegui and Martinez's work was written in 1984 after they had access to the Civil War 
archive and the minutes of the Council meetings. Bolloten's earlier work The Spanish 
Revolution, pre-dates the former, but he offers a response in his later work, The Spanish Civil 
War. 
Graham, The Spanish Republic, p. 167 66 Ibid., p. 167 and Zugazagoitia, Guerra v Vicisitudes, p. 209 67 Graham, The Spanish Republic, p. 168; Zugazagoitia, Guerra y Vicisitudes, p. 209; A. Lopez 
Fernandez, General Miaia. Defensor de Madrid, (Madrid, G. del Toro, 1975), p. 72 
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The Madrid Defence Council was formally constituted on the evening of 7 
November. Miaja's instructions had been to form the Council from 
representatives of all the political parties that formed part of the government and 
in the same proportion suggesting that the Council was intended as a Popular 
Front organisation, with representation also from the CNT. There was no 
indication as to who should nominate these representatives so Miaja allowed 
the organisations to nominate their own based on the portfolios allocated to 
them by him as a result of his prior consultations. 69 It is unclear who 
approached whom, but after consulting with Major Vicente Rojo (who was to be 
his chief of staff), Miaja spoke to the three subcommissars of war who had 
troops on the Madrid front: the socialist Crescenciano Bilbao, the syndicalist 
Angel Pestana and the communist Antonio Mije. Mije also met Miaja with 
Santiago Carrillo and Jose Cazorla of the JSU along with the Communist Pablo 
Yagüe of the UGT Bakers' union Artes Blancas'70 an incident which 
undoubtedly assured the communists an important role on the Council, but not 
their predominance. The importance that the communists attached to this body 
was reflected in the fact that both the PCE and JSU sent national and provincial 
leaders as delegates while the socialists, for example, sent two grassroots 
militants. 71 
"Lopez Fernandez, General Miaia, pp. 59-60; Graham, The SDanish Republic, p. 170 70 Arbstegui and Martinez, La Junta de Defensa de Madrid, pp. 66-68, p. 77 71 Ibid.. p. 77 
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The Council that Miaja appointed reflected, however, neither the exact 
proportions of government, nor of the Popular Front. 72 To observe the 
proportionality of the government it would have been necessary to have 
included representatives of the Basque and Catalan nationalists - an absurdity 
given that the Council's function was to operate in Madrid - and to have 
allocated the socialists and anarchists a greater number of delegates than the 
other parties -4 apiece. Followed to its logical conclusion, the lzquierda 
Republicana should have had greater representation than the Uniion 
Republicana and the tiny Syndicalist Party should have been left out altogether. 
To constitute the Council from members of the Popular Front rather than 
Government would mean the exclusion of the CNT which would not have been 
expedient. And yet the POUM, a signatory to the Popular Front and which 
arguably therefore had more right to be represented, was excluded. Political 
context is a significant factor here: although the POUM enjoyed a sizeable 
following in Cataluna, it was a minimal political force in Madrid. The political 
representation on the Council was ultimately designed to reflect the strength of 
the representative organisations in Madrid and this was a contributory factor to 
the POUM's exclusion, and the inclusion of Angel Pestalia's syndicalists, on 
account of their militia contribution 73 It is unclear why the FAI never participated. 
Council minutes indicate the matter was discussed and the Council did agree to 
72 The delegates were: General Jose Miaja - President; Fernando Frade (PSOE) - Secretary, deputy Maximos de Dios; Antonio Mije Garca (PCE) - War, deputy Isidoro Dieguez Duef as; Santiago Carrillo Solares (JSU) - Public Order, deputy Jose Cazorla Maure; Amor Nuf o Perez (CNT) - War Industries, deputy Enrique Garcia Perez; Pablo Yagüe Esteverd (UGT) - Supply, deputy Luis Nieto de Is Fuente; Jose Carreflo Espana (Izquierda Republicana) - Communications and Transport, deputy Gerardo Saura Mery; Enrique Jimenez Gonzalez 
(Union Republicans) - Finance, deputy Luis Ruiz Huidobro; Fransciso Caminero Rodriguez (Partido Sindicalista) - Civil Evacuation, deputy Antonio Prexes Costa; Mariano Garca Cascales (Juventudes Libertarias) - Information and Liaison, deputy Antonio Ofiate. See Boletin oficial de la junta de defensa de Madrid 13 November 1936. 
73ArOstegui 
and Martinez La Junta de Defensa, pp. 80-81 
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the participation of the FAI without an increase to the number of posts. Mije, 
Carreho and Frade were appointed to approach the FAI with a concrete 
proposition, but the outcome of this is unknown. 4 
One of the criticisms directed at the Council is that the `communist' affiliates 
occupied twice as many seats on the Council as any other ideological group, 
and that they held the majority of key posts. Thus they were able to direct the 
Council's policy using it to repress their political opponents within Madrid (most 
notably the anarchist movement and the POUM), and to challenge Largo 
Caballero's authority. This, Bolloten argues, was a major contributory factor in 
Largo's removal as premier in May 1937.75 In an attempt to demonstrate 
communist dominance Burnett Bolloten claimed that both Miaja and Frade were 
members of the PCE, an assertion which has been contested. 76 But even if we 
include the deputies of the 4 supposedly Communist representatives, we still 
only have a total of 9 `communists' out of a total of 19 councillors. Furthermore, 
an examination of the minutes of the Council is enough to ascertain that votes 
were not routinely taken where a communist preponderance could be brought to 
bear, and that not all the councillors or their deputies were able to attend all of 
the meetings of the Council. Decisions could not be taken that were solely 
favourable to the communists, that is, other groups must have supported the 
`communist proposals. n 
74 Actas de la Junta de Defensa de Madrid, 11 November 1936; reproduced in Arbstegui and 
Martinez, La Junta de Defensa, p. 296 75 Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War, pp. 296-300 6 See Arostegui and Martinez La Junta de Defensa, p. 141 for a discussion of Bolloten's 
sources for this view. "Ibid., p. 140 discusses the question in detail. 
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The Council clashed with Largo Caballero in Valencia and this is taken as 
evidence that the communists used the Council as a tool to undermine Largo. 
Undoubtedly the Council found itself at odds with the premier and there was a 
definite clash of personality between Largo and Miaja, exacerbated no doubt by 
Largo's implicit acknowledgment of Miaja's expendability in assigning him the 
city's defence. However, Bolloten has taken Largo's own memoirs at face value 
disregarding that they were an attempt to explain his own political demise, 
about which he was understandably bitter. He blamed the communists, when 
actually members of his own party had also actively sought his removal. 78 
The fact of the matter is that Largo never specified sufficiently the limits of 
authority of the Council. Only in the military terrain was it clear that the chief of 
the Council should be in constant contact with and subordinate to the chief of 
the Army of the Centre. In his memoirs Largo claims that the Defence Council of 
Madrid constituted itself in frank opposition to the government, in spite of the 
orders given. But other than the orders reserved for the Ministry of War, none 
were given. It would seem that the initial sessions held by the Council were 
characterised by confusion concerning its role. It also became apparent that 
Largo believed the Council should take no decisions without prior consultation79 
Given the proximity of the city to the front line, the pressing needs of the front 
and of the civilian population, the erratic lines of communication and the 
pessimism of the government in believing that Madrid was certain to fall, it 
would have been virtually impossible and highly detrimental to both the military 
effort and the organisation of the civilian population for the Council to have 
75 For a discussion of Largo's fall from power, see chapter four. 79 Arbstegui and Martinez La Junta de Defensa, pp. 102-4 
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consulted Largo on every issue, even if it had been aware of this expectation. 
The Council was not deliberately usurping the authority of the Republican 
government, although Largo chose to interpret it this way. Some commentators 
have ascribed to the Council a revolutionism which it simply did not possess, 
although groups such as the CNT and the POUM might have preferred such a 
stance 80 In reality, the Council was a delegated authority, a prolongation of 
government, and its representatives accepted this. Moreover, such an 
interpretation is clearly supported by the Council's minutes. 
Furthermore, the Defence Council's function as a truly political organisation only 
lasted for a month. It was during this time that the conflicts with Largo Caballero 
occurred, and any ambiguity in the limits to its authority were resolved with the 
restructuring of the Council in late November. Largo sent his cabinet minister 
Alvarez del Vayo as a government envoy to clarify the role of the Council and to 
set out its new form and responsibilities. This reconstruction of the Council 
altered its commissions and emphasised the Council's role as a consultative 
body with no real political authority other than that delegated by the central 
government in Valencia, which was reflected in its new title: the Delegated 
Defence Council of Madrid (Junta Delegada de Defensa de Madrid). 81 
80 See Arbstegui and Martinez La Junta de Defensa, pp. 127-33 for a discussion of how the 
different political groups in Madrid viewed the Junta and a discussion of the historiography on 
this subject. 
81 Ardstegui and Martinez La Junta de Defensa, pp. 90-92 The new structure of the Council was 
as follows: General Jose Miaja - President; Maximos de Dios (PSOE) - Secretary; Santiago Carrillo (JSU) - Public Order, Francisco Caminero (Partido Sindicalista) - the Front; Enrique Jimenez (UR) - Evacuation; Isidoro Dieguez (PCE) - Militias; Amor Nur o (CNT) - Transport; Lorenzo if igo (JL) - War Industries; Pablo Yagüe (UGT) - Supply; Jose Carreflo Espana (IR) - Propaganda and Press. Pablo Vague was replaced by Luis Nieto de la Fuente, also of UGT on 
23 December, Jose Cazorla also of JSU (and PCE) replaced Santiago Carrillo on 27 December 
and Manuel Gonzalez Marfn, also of CNT replaced Amor Nulo. 
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The exclusion of the POUM, the revolutionary dissident Communist Party which 
remained critical of both Soviet brands of Communism and of the Republican 
government's prosecution of the war, is often cited as evidence of the PCE's 
ability to achieve its goals on the Defence Council. 82 And in this area, and this 
area alone the PCE was able to bring Soviet prejudice to bear on the operations 
of the Council. The minutes of the meetings do not reveal the extent of this 
pressure, but outline that a letter was received from the POUM asking for 
membership of the Council, and it was agreed not to reply. The minutes provide 
no reason or any further details. We can speculate that the POUM in Madrid 
was such a peripheral group as to be considered unworthy of any special 
correspondence from the Council at this critical time. Importantly it was the 
Council as a whole which agreed to the exclusion. 
The communist-held portfolios - War and later Militias - both at the Council's 
inception and its subsequent reconstitution, had a certain political importance in 
that they were both entrusted with the development of thinking around the 
creation of a new regular army, but in reality they had little practical function. 83 
Supply was also the remit of the Communist Party-affiliated UGT members 
throughout the Council's existence, and from its very inception this function was 
beset by problems. Its activities and the progress of these activities were closely 
bound up with the fortunes of the Evacuation and Transport functions. A 
problem in one of these areas often had an adverse effect on successful 
provisioning. Like the Transport function, the work of the Supply Commission 
was compounded by the existence of a plethora of organism working in the 
82 Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War, p. 298 
Arbstegui and Martinez La Junta de Defensa, p. 92 
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same arena; a legacy of the atomisation of power in Spain wrought by the 
attempted coup. 84 
In particular the supply function of the Council came into conflict with the 
National Commission of Provisioning (Comisiön Nacional de Abastecimientos), 
a body created by Governmental decree on 3 October 1936 in an attempt to 
resolve the national problem of supply in Republican Spain. Problems arose 
because their respective functions had never been well-defined. It was 
significant that both emanated directly from government authority, and both 
comprised representatives of the political and trades-union organisations of 
Madrid. They often duplicated each others work, and even more importantly 
their existence did not presuppose the disappearance of the committees, 
cooperatives and cooperative shops that supplied their own affiliates. Until the 
beginning of December it seemed that the initiative was with the Supply 
Commission of the Defence Council, coinciding with the period when the 
Defence Council had the most political autonomy. However, in December there 
was a turning-point in the relations between the two bodies. The responsibility 
for provisioning was placed in the hands of the Provincial Commission by the 
Ministry of Commerce, and the Supply Delegation in general was limited to 
85 ratifying and fulfilling the orders emanating from the Provincial Commission. 
This is extremely significant in terms of supposed communist authority through 
the Defence Council and indeed in terms of the supposed authority of the 
84 For a flavour of the problems encountered by the Transport Commission see Ar6stegui and 
Martinez La Junta de Defensa, p. 177, pp. 192-93, and Actas de la Junta de Defensa de Madrid, 
especially 23 November 1936; reproduced in Ar6stegui and Martinez La Junta de Defensa, p. 
235 
85 Ar6stegui and Martinez La Junta de Defensa, pp. 149-50 
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Defence Council itself. It would seem that in certain areas, at least, neither had 
the kind of influence that one would imagine necessary to exercise definitive 
control over the Madrid population. Furthermore, neither the Defence Council 
nor the Provincial Commission was able to curtail the provisioning of the 
population by other organisations/groups, and in reality the vast majority of the 
population obtained food by private or trade union initiative, or indeed, however 
they could-86 Despite various dispositions aimed at strictly regulating the entry 
and distribution of goods this practice continued. 87 The Defence Council 
minutes reveal conflicts with the CNT because of the illegal entry of 
commodities and the existence of clandestine slaughterhouses in Madrid. 88 
One final point on the subject of supply relates to the use made of the 
Residents' Committees of Madrid. Conflict arose between the Defence Council 
and the Provincial Committee when the latter de-authorised the Residents 
Committees from involving themselves in the supply of goods, in a disposition 
published in the press on 27 January. It claimed that the Defence Council had 
not authorised these bodies to collect data on the inhabitants of the houses they 
controlled, despite an earlier disposition by the Supply Delegation to the 
contrary. In a similar vein, a few days later the Provincial Committee ordered 
the dissolution of the district committees which were, like the Residents' 
Committees, part of the same post-coup infrastructure and their replacement 
with Delegations of the Provincial Committee in the various districts. In theory at 
°8 ILK, p. 164 87 Boletfn oficial de la iunta de defensa de Madrid, 16 & 23 January 1937. 8° Actas de la Junta de Defensa de Madrid, 13 & 19 February 1937, respectively; reproduced in 
Arbstegui and Martinez La Junta de Defensa, p. 401 & p. 418 
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least, the organisational structures bom after the coup and dominated by 
political and syndical organisations were being supplanted. 89 
Contrary to the argument that it was the communists who reversed the 
revolution, it would appear that it was the central government under Largo 
Caballero that started this process. 90 This is further reinforced by the fact that 
the cooperatives, the most radical expression of anarcho-syndicalism, were 
suspended by the Provincial Commission, in spite of the Defence Council's 
interest in maintaining them. 91 Undoubtedly, the cooperatives and their shops 
were in reality only supplying to a privileged few and so harmed the communal 
interest and hindered control over the fair distribution of food, but it is interesting 
to note that the supposed bastion of anti-anarchist communism, the Defence 
Council, had championed the cause of these cooperatives. 
The Public Order Commission 
Perhaps the single most controversial aspect of the Defence Council, and 
indeed of communist presence therein, was the activity of the Public Order 
Commission. Although nominally controlled by representatives from the JSU, by 
the time of the Defence Council's creation, the leadership of the JSU had 
aligned itself so closely with the PCE and the Third International that ostensibly 
the Public Order Commission was a communist-dominated function. 
°9 ArSstegui and Martinez La Junta de Defensa, pp. 151-52 90 Bolloten, The Spanish Civil War, see especially Chapters 10,11 and 12. A key argument in Bolloten's work is that the communists reversed the social revolution that was occurring in 
Spain. 
91 Arbstegui and Martinez La Junta de Defensa, p. 170 
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The activity of the Public Order Commission has been attacked post-civil war by 
both the Left and the Right. On the Right, evidence gathered for the Causa 
General (General Cause), documented the guilt of members of the Commission 
in the sacas (literally the removal) of prisoners from the prisons in the period 
from 7 November to 4 December 1936. From these and other sources the 
Causa assigned general responsibility for murders in the republican zone to the 
'criminal' Republican government, and indeed was designed to do so having 
been instituted in April 1940 in order to provide 'a definitive and complete 
account of the criminality that existed under Marxist rule. ' 92 This piece of 
retrospective documentation formed part of the larger framework of Francoist 
post-war justification for the pronunciamiento and subsequent civil war, within 
which the victors attempted to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the legally elected 
Spanish republican government in power on 18 July 1936. 
Although some arbitrary and sporadic removal of prisoners and unlawful 
executions had occurred after the militias had taken control of the prisons, these 
later sacas were characterised by their systematic, studied nature, 93 fuelling 
Post-war accusations that the Republican government had authorised these 
executions. In contrast to the spontaneous sacas from prisons in Albacete and 
Alcalä de Henares by angry mobs in retribution for Nationalist air-raids, these 
Madrid sacas appear to have been calculated acts, and what is more appear to 
92 This was the stated objective of the Causa General (General Cause) instituted by the 
Francoist Attorney-General on 26 April 1940. Before the war was even over, Franco's Interior 
Minister Ramon Serrano Suffer appointed the Bellbn Commission to assemble the evidence 
needed to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the Spanish republican government in power on 18 
July 1936. Julius Ruiz, Franco's Justice: Regression in Madrid after the Spanish Civil War. 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2005), pp. 1-3, p. 68, p. 108 See also Isidro Sanchez, Manuel Ortiz 
and David Ruiz (eds. ) Espana franauista" Causa General y actitudes sociales ante la dictadura. 
LEdiciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, Ciudad Real, 1993). 
Cervera, Madrid en Guerra, p. 85 
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have involved the Republican government (or at the very least its delegates). Of 
these Madrid sacas, the most important are those which involved the removal of 
prisoners from the Model prison (Carcel Modelo) on 7 and 8 November 1936, 
which ended in the massacre of some 1,200 prisoners in the villages of 
Paracuellos de Jarama and Torrejön de Ardoz, on the outskirts of the city of 
Madrid. "The extractions of prisoners were made with lists that had been 
compiled from files on prisoners held in Madrid, and from the files of right-wing 
political parties which had been seized after the coup, which were held at the 
General Department of Security (Direcciön General de Seguridad). The lists 
accompanied with a notification bearing the letterhead of the DGS and 
occasionally that of the General Department of Security delegate from the 
Public Order Commission, Segundo Serrano Poncela. The reason offered for 
their transfer was that the prisoners were either going to be freed or transferred 
to another prison. Some prisoners were transported on municipal double decker 
buses, others, often when they were fewer of them, in lorries. They were 
accompanied by militia groups in cars, who had sometimes formed the firing 
squads. The majority of those were members of the Vigilance Militias. The 
victims were not ill-considered. They were carefully selected: some were 
military officials, others cadres of political formations (especially the Falange), 
some were intellectuals or prominent rightists. There were also some members 
of religious orders. 95 
Aside from the indisputable brutality of these acts, these sacas continue to merit 
particular attention (and controversy) both because of the large numbers of 
94 The numbers are contested. I have used the estimates from sources consulted by Ian Gibson. 
Gibson, Paracuellos, pp. 115-119 95 Gibson, Paracuellos, p. 50, Cervera, Madrid en Guerra, pp. 86-87 
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prisoners involved, and because of the context in which they occurred. Unlike 
massacres which occurred in other parts of Republican Spain and which 
reflected a break-down in central government authority, the Paracuellos sacas 
occurred in Madrid where, as the seat of national government, central state 
authority was at its strongest. 
The definitive allocation of responsibility for these atrocities has proved 
extremely difficult although a number of recent studies have made valuable 
contributions. 96 The major obstacle to a clear understanding of events is the 
unreliability of the sources relating to the massacres. Much of the evidence 
comes from the Causa General which in turn relied heavily on the court 
proceedings of the Francoist military tribunals established after the war which 
sought to find those guilty of 'blood crimes'. In the immediate post-war period in 
Madrid, a 'confession' of murder obtained by the Francoist secret police was 
enough to convince a military tribunal of the defendant's guilt and death 
sentences were common. 97 
While we cannot know for certain what actually occurred during this period, 
certain assumptions can be made. Several signed letters exist which implicate 
government-appointed representatives in the Department of Security or the 
prison services. However, the studies by both Ian Gibson and Javier Cervera 
acknowledge that there is little to suggest that the responsibility for the sacas 
lies with Manuel Munoz Martinez, the head of the Department of Security, as he 
" Ian Gibson's Paracuellos: Como fue, is a balanced and comprehensive study. It pieces 
together a chronology of events from a variety of sources and draws reasonable conclusions 
from the available evidence; see also Javier Cervera, Madrid en Guerra 97 Julius Ruiz, Franco's Justice, p. 3, p. 68, pp. 96-111 
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fled Madrid for Valencia on the afternoon of 6 November along with Angel 
Galarza, Minister of the Interior. 98 The first saca did not occur until the early 
hours of 7 November, and the only order which exists with Mu ioz's signature 
(dated 7 November) is most likely a forgery. None of the orders used in the 
Model or Porlier prisons carried the signature of Munoz. Proof of individual 
involvement in the sacas is hard to come by, but much of the available evidence 
points to communist involvement. Santiago Carrillo is implicated on account of 
his position as Public Order Councillor on the Defence Council. However, he did 
not officially take up this role until 7 November, although in practice he began 
work in the post on the afternoon of 6 November, and recalls agreeing then with 
Miaja on the necessity to begin the transfer of prisoners. Segundo Serrano 
Poncela as General Department of Security delegate for the Public Order 
Commission is also heavily implicated as his signature appears on many of the 
documents authorising the transfer and freedom of the prisoners used by the 
militiamen to remove prisoners from the prisons. A signature alone however, is 
not enough by itself to prove absolutely his involvement, especially as it too 
could be a forgery. 99 Carrillo also has seemed keen to implicate Serrano 
Poncela. In an interview with Gibson he alludes to Serrano's dismissal from his 
post at the end of November because of an abuse of power, largely related to 
incidents of petty theft, but with an implication of more serious misconduct 
which is never properly explained. 100 Given that Carrillo may have other motives 
for making this suggestion it should not be taken as proof. 101 
9° Gibson, Paracuellos, p. 114; Cervera, Madrid en Guerra, pp. 91-92 °D Cervera, Madrid en Guerra, pp. 91-95 100 Gibson, aracuell s, pp. 198-208 Interview by the author with Santiago Carrillo. 101 Graham, The Spanish Republic, p. 193, ft 237, Carrillo subsequently denounced Poncela. However, as Poncela became alienated from the JSU during war, Carrillo may have had a 
hidden agenda. 
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Although, the delegates who made up the Public Order Commission, were not 
officially appointed until 9 November, 102 it would appear that they began working 
on the night of 6-7 November and that furthermore, an investigation committee 
(consejo de investigacibn) within the DGS was created under the presidency of 
Serrano Poncela. Under Carrillo's leadership the Commission abolished all but 
one of the 'checas', so legitimating the cross-party body of the Comit6 
Provincial de lnvestigaciön Püblica (the Provincial Committee of Public 
Investigation), otherwise known as the Fomento checa. This had been created 
by Manuel Munoz Martinez at the start of August 1936, and included all the 
political and syndical organisations of the Popular Front, and libertarian groups. 
Its purpose was to investigate the conduct of persons disaffected from the 
regime. 103 The CPIP was now absorbed by the investigation committee. Five 
members of its executive, Manuel Ramos Martinez (FAI), Manuel Rascon 
Ramirez (CNT), Antonio Molina Martinez (PCE), Felix Vega Saez (UGT) and 
Arturo Garcia del Rosa (JSU) were joined by three communists appointed by 
Carrillo: Juan Alcdntara Cristobal, Ramon Torrecilla Guijarro, and Santiago 
Alvarez Santiago. 104 Both Ramon Torrecilla Guijarro and Arturo Garcia de la 
Rosa have claimed subsequently that this body began work in the early hours of 
the 7 November. 105 Within this delegation the UGT, CNT, FAI and PCE were 
102 They were Luis Rodriguez as Secretary, Alfredo Caballo as Radio Transmissions delegate, Fernando Claudin as Press Cabinet delegate, Federico Melchor as Security, Assault and Republican National Guard delegate, and Segundo Serrano Poncela as the General Department of Security delegate. 
An article in Juventud on 10 November 1936 refers to the appointments made the previous day, but the Boletin Oficial del la Junta de Defensa de Madrid, 13 November 1936, refers to a disposition by Carrillo dated 8 November. t03Cervera, Madrid en Guerra, p. 176 104 Gibson, Paracuellos, p. 45; Ardstegui and Martinez La Junta de Defensa pp. 260-69 05 Gibson, Paracuellos, pp. 45-46. Torrecilla's declaration appears in the Causa General, but 
was corroborated by de la Rosa who the author interviewed in October 1982. 
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represented, suggesting that the libertarians worked alongside their socialist 
and communist counterparts. However, it was also the case that the PCE was 
able to establish hegemony within this group. 
With the departure of Munoz Martinez a vacuum was left in the Madrid DGS 
which was filled by the investigation committee. 106 Given, then, that the lists 
used to extract the prisoners were compiled from files held at the DGS, that the 
personnel of the CPIP would have had access to these files (and used them at 
times to uncover rightists), 107 and that from 7 November members of the CPIP 
were working at the DGS for the Public Order Commission, it seems plausible 
that these individuals played a part in the events that ensued. Ian Gibson has 
also drawn this conclusion. It seems most probable that the government had put 
into action plans for the evacuation of the 'fascist' prisoners before it left from 
Valencia, but the power vacuum in Madrid on 6-8 November left the prisoners in 
a vulnerable position, which was exploited by members of the CPIP/DGS who 
carried out the massacres. 108 
Furthermore, it seems unlikely, given the massive expeditions of prisoners 
undertaken, that this was the work of either isolated individuals or a small 
committee acting for personal reasons or vengeance or so-called 
uncontrollables. These appear to have been planned and coordinated actions. It 
is possible that the three communists appointed by Carrillo, as representatives 
in the DGS for the prisons of Ventas, Portier and San Anton were involved in 
106 Ibid., pp. 198-99 107 Cervera, Madrid en Guerra, p. 61 108 Gibson, Paracuelios, pp. 228-29 
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the selection of the prisoners. 109 But we should be cautious as much of the 
evidence that implicates PCE members in the sacas comes from the Causa 
General. Additionally, although the PCE appears to have endorsed their 
applications to join the DGS as policemen we do not know for how long they 
had been members of the Party, their previous backgrounds, nor if they were 
acting on the orders of their Party or professional superiors. 110 This again 
raises questions concerning the Party's composition during the civil war and the 
extent to which members were under the leadership's control. Furthermore, 
when we consider the difficulty experienced by the government itself when 
trying to leave Madrid, the confrontations between some of its members and 
anarchist patrols, we can only assume that at the very least these groups 
acquiesced in the removal of prisoners from the city, even if they had not been 
aware of the execution plans. It would appear therefore that such an 
undertaking had the connivance if not the participation of several political and 
syndical groups. 
Some works on the subject have tried, somewhat unconvincingly to link the 
events at Paracuellos and Torrejön with the work of Soviet agents in Spain. "1 
Carrillo himself intimated to Gibson that he thought that Soviet agents were 
ultimately responsible. ' 12 But given his known divergence from the USSR after 
109 Ibid., p. 53 Based on the testimony of Torrecilla in the Causa General Alvaro Marasa Barasa Andres Urresola Ochoa and Agapito Sainz were representatives in the DGS for the prisons of Ventas, Portier and San Anton respectively. 10 Cervera, Madrid en Guerra, p. 97 1'1 Gibson, Paracuellos, for further detail, especially, pp. 69-70, p 113, p. 127. There are a 
number of works which suggest NKVD involvement, but there is little concrete evidence to 
support such claims. See for example, the loosely autobiographical Diario de Is guerra esaahola, 
by the Russian writer Mikhail Koltsov (Akal, Madrid, 1979), or the book by the Daily Express 
correspondent in Madrid during the war, Sefton Delmer, Trail Sinister. (1961). 112 Gibson, Paracuellos, p. 232 
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1968,1 13 this seems a little too convenient. In his interview with Gibson, Carrillo 
attempts a variety of explanations ranging from the actions of opportunistic 
militiamen in the two localities beyond the rule of law, to the hand of the NKVD. 
Interestingly enough he concludes with a justification of the events. It would 
seem that he believed at the time that those in positions of authority would not 
live beyond the next few hours, possibly days, let alone be required to face the 
consequences of certain actions years afterwards. This is no proof of guilt but it 
is relevant to events subsequent to 7 November. 
Carrillo has claimed in an interview with Javier Cervera that he knew nothing of 
events until he was approached by the diplomat Felix Shlayer who brought him 
the news. ' 14 We do know that over the course of the next few days the events 
were known and discussed within government circles. On 10 November the 
Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) cabinet minister Manuel de Irujo, wrote to 
Miaja's secretary asking for numbers involved in the massacre, details of who 
had authorised the removals and from which prisons. 115 It is likely that Irujo had 
been alerted to the news of a possible massacre by members of the PNV in 
Madrid who had dedicated themselves to saving Basque prisoners in danger. 116 
Irujo's Catholicism may also have been a factor here given that priests were 
among the executed. He was also, along with Prieto, the only cabinet minister 
to vote consistently against implementing the death penalty. On 11 November 
at a meeting of the Defence Council the Councillor for Evacuation Francisco 
Caminero asked Carrillo if the Model prison had been evacuated, a question he 
113 Gregono Moran, Miseria y arandeza del PCE. 1939-1985, (Planeta, Barcelona, 1985), p. 440 114 Cervera, Madrid en Guerra, p. 101 1t6Ibid., p. 100 "6 Gibson, Paracuellos, p. 122 
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thought to be very urgent. Carrillo replied that it had not, but added he had 
already taken measures to that end, to which Dieguez, deputy Councillor for 
War, proposed that the evacuations continue because the number of prisoners 
was a serious problem. To this Carrillo replied that he had been approached by 
the diplomatic corps who had expressed their concern over the situation in the 
prisons and for this reason he had suspended the evacuation. The deputy for 
War Industries proposed that the prisoners be transferred with maximum 
security and the discussion was concluded with a vote of confidence being 
taken in Carrillo to resolve the question. ' 17 This dialogue would suggest that the 
evacuations had already begun, and that there had been some serious 
questions over how they had been conducted. 
Regardless of what has been claimed or alleged since that time, it is clear that 
ultimately it was Carrillo who bore official responsibility for the prisoners who 
met their deaths and that furthermore, despite being aware of abuses of 
authority at this point, he appears to have done little to halt the unlawful removal 
and execution of prisoners, which continued until the beginning of December, 
albeit on a much smaller scale. His attitude suggests a certain ambivalence to 
the fate of the prisoners and in many ways reflects the concerns and attitudes of 
many of those left in Madrid, who perceived very clearly the threat of the fifth 
column and the threat to their lives if the rebels should enter the city. Carrillo's 
main objective was that Franco should not be able to organise two or three 
army corps from his imprisoned sympathisers, and in this objective he 
117 Actas de la Junta de Defensa de Madrid, 11 November 1936; reproduced in Arbstegui and 
Martinez La Junta de Defensa, p. 295 
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succeeded. ' 18 However there is no evidence for his direct involvement, and 
furthermore, post-war he was not immediately associated with the massacres. It 
has been argued convincingly that Carrillo's association with the atrocities was 
emphasised only after he became general secretary of the PCE in exile, and it 
was the Franco dictatorship which raised the issue to prominence. 119 
Ultimately the massacres occurred within a context where violence had become 
widely employed for the administration of 'justice' and as a consequence seems 
to have been more generally accepted. The evidence for communist 
involvement is difficult to dismiss. However, whilst not trying to defend the 
indefensible it is important to contextualise what happened. The individuals 
involved were responding to an extraordinary set of circumstances in which 
ordinary people committed atrocities. One should also bear in mind the extreme 
youth of the council delegates; many of whom were barely into their twenties. 
Furthermore, the close cooperation of almost all political and syndical groups in 
the administration of justice and other state functions and the continuity 
between quasi-legal institutions such as the CPIP and the DGS, means that 
ultimately all actors on the Republican stage share collective responsibility for 
what occurred. The PCE, while undoubtedly culpable, became a convenient 
scapegoat for this episode and others, reflecting a post-war trend of blaming the 
communists for the Republic's ills. 
The sacas ceased after the appointment of the CNT's Melchor Rodriguez as 
head of the Special Delegation of Prisons of Madrid of the General Direction of 
18 Cervera, Madrid en Guerra, p. 102, Carrillo is quoted when he was a councillor. 1e Claudfn, Santiago Carrillo, p. 49 
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' Prisons by the Republican government in Valencia on 4 December, 12° reflecting 
both a clear assertion of central government authority and a determination on 
Rodriguez's part to gain control of the situation. 
The Public Order Commission and the CNT 
The Public Order Commission has also drawn criticism from the left for 
allegedly facilitating communist dominance over police functions in Madrid, to 
the extent that the newly created secret police corps became a mere arm of the 
Soviet secret police. 121 Such assertions are highly tenuous and have been 
refuted by various scholars of note. 122 However, the Defence Council did inherit 
the serious problem of uncontrolled repression occurring in the streets of Madrid, 
and without the monopoly on coercive power, the Republican authorities' 
legitimacy was badly tarnished both within its territory and in the outside world. 
Recuperation of state authority required the disarming of the rearguard, the 
detection and neutralisation of the fifth column, 123 the regularisation of the 
120 Gibson, Paracuelios, pp. 177-78 Rodriguez prohibited the removal of prisoners between the hours of 6pm and 8am, insisted that the orders were always to come from him either by telephone or by letter bearing his personal stamp and signature. If the authorities were in any doubt they could call him, and he would accompany the prisoners to a safe place, which he did 
on more than one occasion. 12' Rolloten, The Spanish Civil War, p. 299 and Burnett Bolloten, The Spanish Revolution, p. 207 
122Bolloten's main sources remain Walter Krivitsky and Alexander Orlov - who both defected to the west and had motive for making such claims. See Herbert Rutledge Southworth. "The Grand Camouflage': Julian Gorkin, Burnett Bolloten and the Spanish Civil War', in The ReDublic 
Besieged, (eds. ) Preston and. Mackenzie, for a critique of some of Bolloten's sources. As discussed above Daniel Kowalsky has refuted the existence of vast numbers of Soviet 
personnel in Spain, arguing for a relatively weak and haphazard role played by the Soviet Union in the war. 12' The term 'fifth column' has its origins in the Spanish Civil war in the weeks prior to the 
assault on Madrid. It is usually attributed to General Mola, who at the start of October, believing 
that the capture of Madrid was imminent, claimed that the capital would fall by the actions of the four columns of Varela that were approaching the city and the activities of the fifth that could 
already be found inside. 
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judicial apparatus and the creation of a new police force, subject to the new 
established power. 124 
The JSU's responsibility for the Public Order portfolio required the organisation 
to take on this recuperation of state authority on behalf of the government, 
bringing it into conflict with the members of the CNT and FAI, and partly 
explaining the origins of allegations of repression. In pursuit of the fifth column 
the PCE and the JSU would be criticised for their over-zealous persecution of 
CNT members. While the communist movement as a whole became obsessed 
with infiltrators and spies during this period, Madrid's proximity to the front line, 
and its strategic importance meant that the presence of the fifth column was 
nevertheless a real concern for those involved in the defence of Madrid and 
heavily influenced communist activity in official capacities in the autumn and 
winter of 1936, and beyond. 
With the armed forces and civil guard in disarray as a result of the military coup 
and subsequent outbreak of civil war, the Republican government had not 
known who it could trust. On 31 August 1936 the Giral government took the first 
steps towards restructuring the armed forces with the promulgation of a decree 
for the purging and reorganisation of the Civil Guard, henceforth to be known as 
the National Republican Guard. Under the Largo Caballero government 
thousands were recruited for this new corps and the same was true of the 
Assault Guards. Steps were taken to bring the independent squads and patrols 
of working-class organisations under government control. A decree of 17 
124 Arbstegui and Martinez, La Junta de Defensa, p. 228 and repeated in Cervera, Madrid 
Guerra, p. 74 with a slightly different emphasis. 
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September incorporated them into the Vigilance Militias under the authority of 
the socialist Minister of the Interior, Angel Galarza. They were to collaborate 
with official police forces in the maintenance of internal order. All militiamen 
performing police functions who did not belong to the new corps were to be 
regarded as `disaffected elements', while its members were given priority if they 
wished to enrol in the regular police forces. Members of the communist, 
socialist and republican parties were quick to avail themselves of the 
opportunity to enter the official police corps, but the anarcho-syndicalists held 
back and in many places clung tenaciously to their own police squads and 
patrols in defiance of the govemment. 125 In these first few months of the conflict 
there were 1,909 applications to join the police of the General Department of 
Security and not a single one was from a CNT member. 126 Undoubtedly there 
were ideological and cultural reasons why anarchists would find it anathema to 
join the police forces but increasingly they would find themselves on the wrong 
side of the forces of law and order. 
The Public Order Commission did much to restore faith in the Republic and 
greatly facilitated the government's monopoly on legitimate violence. On 9 
November 1936 the Public Order Commission announced a twenty-four hour 
amnesty during which all weapons must be handed in to the police stations of 
the General Department of Security. After the twenty-four hours had elapsed, all 
persons carrying arms were to be considered disaffected from the regime and 
were to be judged in accordance with the laws of war. 127 The interior vigilance 
125 Bolloten, The Spanish Revolution, pp. 204-06 '26 Cervera, Madrid en Guerra, p. 70 uT Mundo Obrero, 10 November 1936 Excepted in the disposition were the regular forces 
dependant on the Public Order Commission, or on the War Commission, the directors of 
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of the capital and its approach roads were exclusively the charge of the forces 
organised by this commission. The political and syndical organisations were 
authorised to establish vigilance posts in the localities which they occupied, but 
not outside these localities. 128 Miaja had asked Carrillo as Councillor for Public 
Order to bring about the immediate elimination of assassinations, and Carrillo 
had dealt with his request by bringing the Party police under the control of the 
Commission for Public Order. The numbers of illegal deaths dropped 
dramatically from this point. 129 
The Defence Council earned great prestige for itself among madrilellos, 
precisely because of its progress in the arena of public order. 130 Santiago 
Carrillo has explained that his commission was able to achieve what the 
government had hitherto struggled to do, because of the proximity of the rebels 
to the city. Many who had been involved in the administration of 'revolutionary 
justice' left Madrid, fearing the 'justice' of the enemy. 131 
However, as we have seen, anarchist groups tended not to sign up for the 
newly created security and police forces. Furthermore, they were most resistant 
to the imposition of these forces and their own consequent removal from posts 
of vigilance. Despite the earlier decree, groups associated with the anarcho- 
syndicalist federation continued to operate at the margins of authority and this 
issue came to a head with the shooting of the Council's Supply delegate, the 
syndical or political organisation and citizens mobilised with the special authorisation if the 
Commission. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Cervera, Madrid en Guerra, p. 74 130 Zugazagoitia, Guerra y Vicisitudes, p. 231 131 Gibson, Paracuellos, p. 194 
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UGT's Pablo Yagüe on 23 December 1936 when he was travelling along the 
road to Aragon on official business-132 Contemporary communist and anarchist 
accounts of the incident varied dramatically and a ferocious war of words in 
their respective press organs ensued. 133 What seems certain was that Yagüe 
and his convoy were attacked by a group of soldiers from an anarchist militia at 
one of the checkpoints on the road to Aragon. 134 
The consensus of the Council appeared to be that this group was probably only 
loosely connected to the anarchist movement, and in no way had this action 
been sanctioned or approved by the CNT leadership. But the CNT incurred the 
wrath of many, including the PCE and general Miaja, by harbouring the 
perpetrators in a libertarian ateneo (cultural association). Carrillo had ordered 
the detention of those involved but when the police arrived, members of the 
ateneo refused to hand over the assailants saying that they were under the 
safeguard of the regional committee of the CNT. 135 The Communist press and 
its representatives on the Council called for the death penalty, while the 
anarchist movement demanded absolution from all blame for their coreligionists. 
The anarcho-syndicalist organ CNT even went as far as to claim that whatever 
the outcome of the Popular Tribunal (by which the accused would be tried) they 
would disregard it and set free the militiamen. Given this blatant disregard for 
due process, Miaja suspended the newspaper, moving in tanks and troops to 
132 24 December 1936 133 Zugazagoitia, Guerra v Vicisitudes, pp. 231-32 "ý Actas de la Junta de Defensa de Madrid, 23 December 1936; reproduced in Arßstegui and 
Martinez La Junta de Defensa, p. 343 1 Ibid., p. 344 
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the street where it was published when the anarchists threatened to usurp his 
authority. 
This episode had significant repercussions in the Public Order arena: In the 
first instance it allowed Cazorla (who had replaced Carrillo as delegate for 
Public Order) and the Defence Council to finish definitively the task of replacing 
politically-oriented Vigilance Militias with official security forces. On 27 
December 1936 an edict was published by the Defence Council which entrusted 
the task of vigilance exclusively to the security and assault forces. From 3pm on 
the same day all control and vigilance guards on the access roads to the capital 
were to be retired. It was categorically prohibited to circulate arms in the interior 
of Madrid and there were to be no more control or vigilance guards for the 
protection of buildings that had not been expressly authorized by the general 
staff of the defence forces or by the General Department of Security. Any 
groups who assumed such functions without official authorisation were to be 
considered rebels and subjected to the corresponding sanctions of the military 
code of justice. 137 This edict was posted throughout Madrid. Some groups, 
mostly notably the guards at the Puente de Toledo and the Europa Cinema 
continued to resist authority138 but ultimately these isolated groups could be 
brought under control. 
It has often been argued that the new police function was used to persecute 
members of the CNT. The fact of the matter was that CNT militias had 
136 Zugazagoitia, Guerra y Vicisitudes, p. 232 737 Milicia Popular, 27 December 1936 138 Actas de la Junta de Defensa de Madrid, 30 December 1936; reproduced in Ardstegui and 
Martinez La Junta de Defensa, p. 351 
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purposefully resisted entering the ranks of the security forces when the 
opportunity had availed itself. Furthermore, it is possible that many of the 
policemen involved in the persecution of CNT members would have been those 
that had dealt with the CNT before the war. They might not necessarily be new 
policemen, but many were new Communist Party members, having acquired 
their membership cards after 18 July 1936.139 These men would have been 
attracted to the rigidity and discipline of the Party, and the political moderation it 
espoused. There were cases of illegal detention and the extortion of funds by 
individuals who claimed libertarian affiliation and such incidences were used as 
justification for harsh measures against such individuals and anarchist 
sympathisers in general. 140 Marin, the CNT representative on the Council 
himself admitted that the anti-authoritarian attitudes of many of its supporters 
could not be changed overnight, 14' and this indeed is the crux of the whole 
Public Order issue. 
The Civil War laid bare numerous contradictions at the heart of the anarcho- 
syndicalist movement, notably the problematic relationship between the 
individual and collective responsibilities of the anarchist militant and an inability 
to develop an adequate strategy for the social transformation which the 
movement aspired to achieve. 142 A myriad of historical, political and personal 
ties bound extremist and violent individuals to the CNT-FAI leadership in the 
1930s. They were part of the `libertarian family' and as such they brought 
139 Graham, The Spanish Republic, p. 195 140 II, p. 196, see also Actas de la Junta de Defensa de Madrid, 15 April 1937; reproduced in 
Ardstegui and Martinez La Junta de Defensa, p. 448 141Ibid., p. 196 and Actas de la Junta de Defensa de Madrid, 19 February 1937; reproduced in 
Arbstegui and Martinez La Junta de Defensa, p. 416 142 Chris Eahlam, "From the summit to the abyss': The Contradictions of Individualism and 
Collectivism in Spanish Anarchism' in The Republic Besieged, p. 161 
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growing embarrassment to the CNT-FAI leadership. The increasing realisation 
that individualistic violence might corrupt militants and compromise the 
movement led to an internal debate on the question of internal discipline and 
the need to subjugate the individual will to the exigencies of the organisation. 
Such concerns merged with anxieties that the relatively unsupervised 
expansion of the libertarian movement had allowed `undesirable elements' and 
provocateurs to enter the FAI. Other libertarians feared that criminals who 
sought to exploit anarchist ideology as a cloak for their traditional law-breaking 
might be attracted to the movement. 143 But with the outbreak of Civil War came 
the realisation that the problem of internal control within the movement had not 
been resolved. During the war the del Rosal column in Cuenca and the 
Valencia-based Iron column (Columna de Hierro) both recruited from the ex- 
inmates of the San Miguel de los Reyes prison. This was the inevitable result of 
the simplistic construction of `the prisoner' as always and everywhere a fully- 
fledged comrade-in-arms retained by some anarchist sectors - particularly in 
the FAI. '44 
The belief of CNT-FAI that revolution and authority were incompatible only 
served to worsen relations between the libertarian movement and the defenders 
of Republican bourgeois democracy. The movement had been able to carry a 
revolution of sorts to the factories and fields of Republican Spain as part of their 
collectivisation initiatives, but they had no political alternative to the state power 
and authority that they wished to dismantle, 145 and moreover, this situation had 
created and sustained the actions of the uncontrollables. The leadership soon 
143 Ibid. pp. 153-155 144 Graham, The Soanish Republic, p. 88 145 Eahlam, "From the summit to the abyss' pp. 153-56 
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realised that the individualistic acts of violence or pillage were having a 
damaging effect on the movement as a whole but given the broad and 
fragmented nature of the libertarian movement, even when the leadership came 
to accept a role within the Republican government, they were unable to reign in 
the undesirable elements, in part because they had never been under their 
control. 
Both the loose nature of the 'libertarian family' and the leadership's inability to 
bring to heel the uncontrolled elements, allowed not only the PCE, but all who 
supported the defence of the beleaguered Republic an opportunity to curtail the 
revolutionary aspirations of the CNT on the pretext of eliminating the fifth 
column, and so further strengthen the authority of the Republican state. 
Importantly, this was not a Moscow-inspired plot to reverse a revolution that it 
did not control, but was driven by a real desire to reinstate the rule of law and to 
finish with arbitrary justice. Undoubtedly the PCE was hostile to the CNT's 
attempts to transform society, but this has more foundation in the desire to 
present a stable bourgeois democracy to the outside world than in any attempt 
to create a Soviet-style democracy obedient to the vacillations of Moscow. It 
also represented the continuation of pre-Popular Front communist ideology: the 
PCE was unable to recognise as authentic any revolution that it did not lead. 
That the PCE succeeded in reinstating government authority in Madrid through 
its Public Order function would suggest that organisation played a key role in 
the state building project undertaken during the course of the civil war, and that 
the majority of the political and syndical organisations in Madrid (including the 
CNT), and its citizens were sympathetic to its aims. The conflict between the 
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Public Order Commission and the CNT patrols also undoubtedly derived from 
communist ideas concerning unity. At the heart of its ideas concerning both 
political unity and the restitution of the state's monopoly of coercion was a 
strong central state which could not tolerate alternative concepts of society and 
governance as practised by elements of the libertarian movement. Increasingly 
unity was becoming associated with political unanimity, which would provoke 
inter-organisational rivalry between communists and other political and syndical 
groups. 
The recruitment policies of the libertarian movement (which are largely beyond 
the scope of this study) and its reputation as a broad church also made it an 
obvious target for the PCE and the Defence Council in its war against the fifth 
column. Isolated cases of enemy infiltration provided justification for firm 
measures against the CNT. But this also highlights an issue which preoccupied 
all the Popular Front organisations. The PCE itself was extremely keen to 
prevent the permeation of enemy agents into its ranks, 1' and its persecution of 
the CNT on these grounds is as reflective of its fears for its own organisation as 
it is of its fear for or of others. This concern was coupled with a contradictory 
desire among most of the organisations within the Republican zone to attract 
new members, for the greater the membership, the greater the political and 
social influence. Additionally, many of the previously unaffiliated wanted to join 
the ranks of an organisation or party as means of demonstrating loyalty to the 
Republic, or, as demonstrated earlier, to obtain foodstuffs. A party card 
afforded some protection from arbitrary arrest, or death, and as the PCE was 
146 Mundo Obrero, 7 April 1937 See further chapter four below. 
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seen to take firm measures against such acts, it is understandable that its 
membership should increase dramatically in Madrid through those seeking to 
protect themselves from libertarian excesses. The middle classes now made up 
about 10 per cent of Party membership in the capital and its province, although 
workers still featured prominently, accounting for half of the province's militants, 
and agricultural labourers represented more than one quarter of members. 
Membership reports of the wartime PCE put the number of affiliates in Madrid at 
3,450 in March 1936, at 21,000 in December 1936, and at 40,000 in March 
1937. Of these 40,000,20,000 were workers, 12,000 were agricultural labourers, 
3,200 were peasants and 4,000 were from the middle class. Women and 
intellectual members were more numerous but still only represented a small 
fraction of the total, numbering1,500 and 800 respectively. Of the Madrid total 
however, a staggering 30,000 had been mobilised. 147 At least some of these 
new members had joined for personal advancement: Michael Seidman has 
suggested that many people joined organisations post-18 July for individualistic 
motives for example to keep a job, or to avoid the police who were liable to take 
measures against those not affiliated with a Popular Front organisation. 148 
It was cases of infiltration which led to the downwards spiral in relations 
between the CNT and PCE both within the Defence Council and outside it. The 
last ever Defence Council meeting on 15 April witnessed a heated exchange. 149 
The tension between the two organisations had started with the shooting of 
147AHPCE, Carpeta 17 'Militantes del Partido en marzo de 1936'; 'Militantes del Partido en 31 de diciembre de 1936'; Carpeta 18 'Fuerza numerica del Partido y composicibn social en 
Frimero de marzo de 1937'. 
Michael Seidman, 'Individualisms in Madrid during the Spanish Civil War' Journal of Modem History, 68 (March 1996), p. 64 
Graham, The Spanish Republic, pp. 194-95 neatly summarises this debate. 
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Pablo Yagae and was exacerbated by CNT allegations of mistreatment of its 
own members in clandestine, ostensibly communist prisons, 150 and by the 
discovery of Nationalist infiltration of the War Ministry and the CNT, the most 
notorious being the case of Alfonso Lopez de Letona. This particular case did 
nothing for the credibility of the CNT as they had continued to defend the 
accused despite claims that this member of the Popular Army had been a 
member of the monarchist party Renovaciön Espanola, and had a dubious past 
as a professional thief and member of the Tercio (Foreign Legion). There was 
also evidence to suggest that he had acted along with others as a liaison agent, 
meeting frequently with rightists and visiting embassies known to be hostile to 
the Republic. 151 At the same meeting allegations against abuses by Cazorla's 
police force were also taken seriously, and the Council created a commission 
(which excluded CNT, PCE and JSU representation) to investigate. 
152 The 
escalation of the situation, with its concurrent war of words in the press, in 
which both sides flagrantly flouted the Republic's censorship rules, ultimately 
also damaged the credibility of the Council. Although Largo Caballero gave no 
concrete reason for his decision to immediately disband the Council, this 
political and organisational rivalry was undoubtedly a contributory factor. 
Cazorla was certainly heavy-handed, even politically motivated in his approach 
to the CNT, but the justification for a hard-line approach is not easy to dismiss. 
However, the tough action taken against anarchists and other unofficial 
vigilance groups was supported by all the political organisations of the Popular 
150 Actas de la Junta de Defensa de Madrid, 15 April 1937; reproduced in ArBstegui and 
Martinez La Junta de Defensa, p. 441 
151 Ibid., p. 447 152 Ibid., p. 454 
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Front represented on the Council (the anarcho-syndicalist movement did not 
actually form part of the Popular Front), indicating that communist hegemony in 
Public Order relied on the acquiescence if not the active support of the major 
political forces in Madrid. Furthermore, communist dominance of Public Order 
and policing was in reality quite tenuous. The Consejo de Investigaciön within 
the DGS was dissolved and a Provincial Committee of Security for Madrid 
within the DGS under the presidency of Cazorla was created at the end of 
January 1937. The new committee was composed of one of each of the 
following organisations: IR, UR, UGT, CNT, PCE, Agrupacibn Socialista 
Madrilera and the Federaciön Local de Grupos Anarquistas. 153 Such 
developments reflected the consolidation of Republican authority through the 
creation of new institutions, rather than communist domination per se and 
suggest that both supposed communist hegemony and anarchist persecution 
were part of a more complex set of relations which related to the 
reestablishment of state authority. 
The Council as a whole had fulfilled a vital function at a critical time for the 
Republic. In particular, the communist-dominated Public Order Commission had 
made a significant contribution to the recuperation of power for the Republican 
government. The disbanding of the Defence Council and its replacement by the 
traditional civic authority of the ayuntamiento (town hall) was a further 
consequence of the reassertion of the central state. 'M Indeed, this restitution 
of Republican institutions occurred at the same time in many parts of 
Republican Spain. The PCE's competence as a military organiser, enhanced by 
153 Ardstegui and Martinez La Junta de Defensa, p. 233 IM See for example El Sol, 25 April 1937 on the disbanding of the Council and the formation of the new Town Hall administration. 
177 
the appearance of Soviet tanks and aeroplanes, was successfully transferred to 
civilian mobilisation at the critical moment of Madrid's defence. Witnessing first 
hand heroic resistance against all odds, the PCE especially would use the 
symbolism of Madrid to encourage unity around the common objective of 
defending the Republic and support for its policy of resistance to the end. Its 
improvised yet courageous decision to remain in the city earned the Party 
respect from Madrid's citizens, while its tough line on public order and the rule 
of law assisted the return of traditional forms of governance, at the expense of 
more revolutionary forms of organisation. It successes also translated into 
increased membership and a prominent position within the city's social and 
political spheres. However, its diverse and numerous membership, always a 
cause for concern among its leaders, was becoming increasingly 
unmanageable. The Party's close association with a policy of resistance would 
bring it greater influence in the short-term, but ultimately would also sow the 
seeds of its demise. The PCE's experience in the defence of Madrid would 
shape its actions throughout the remainder of the conflict. 
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I PCE poster on military instruction in the rearguard (anon) 
Source: Carmen Grimau, EI Cartel Republicano en la Guerra Civil (Ediciones 
Cätedra, Madrid, 1979), p. 70 
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3 UGT poster To defend Madrid is to defend Cataluna' (Marti Bas) 
Source: Jordi and Arnau Carulla, La Guerra Civil en 2000 cartells. vol. I 
(Postermil, Barcelona, 1997), p. 478 
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4 Political Commissariat poster'For the independence of Spain' (Renau) 
Source: Miravitiles [et al], Carteles de la Republica y de -la 
Guerra Civil, p. 188 
5 Madrid Defence Council poster `First we must win the war (anon) 
Source: Grimau, EI Cartel Republicano, p. 113 
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7 Izquierda republicana poster'Mando Unico' (Beltran) 
Source: Miravitlles [et al], Carteles, p. 175 
8 Madrid Defence Council poster'Popular Army' (Melendreras) 
Source: Miravitlles [et al], Carteles, p. 185 
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9 JSU enlistment poster (Bardasano) 
Source: Carulla La Guerra Civil en 2000 cartells, p. 332 
10 UGT/PSUC poster `What have you done for victory? ' (anon) 
Source: Miravitlles [et all, Carteles, p. 169 
11 Russian civil war poster'Have you enlisted as a volunteer? ' (D. Moor) 
Source: Grimau, EI Cartel Republicano, p. 123 
12 Poster'Sailors of Kronstadt' (Renau) 
Source: Grimau, El Cartel Republicano, p. 137 
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